Damian Menscher via NANOG <nanog@nanog.org> writes:

> "This experiment will be done in collaboration with DNS providers who
> already support DoH, with the goal of improving our mutual users’
> security and privacy by upgrading them to the DoH version of their
> current DNS service. With our approach, the DNS service used will not
> change, only the protocol will. As a result, existing content controls
> of your current DNS provider, including any existing protections for
> children, will remain active."

That sounds useful, actually, as long as the browser can check, on every
startup, which recursive name server its host is configured to use, and
whether it is known that that server offers an equivalent DoH service,
and that the entity operating said service explicitly wants clients to
use that in preference to its regular port 53 or 853 service.  One could
imagine a local, special, domain, containing a record that the browser
could look for, and which, in effect, says: "we run an equivalent DoH
service; here's the URL; please use that".  This redirection would then
be valid for the TTL of that record.

Ideally, of course. the browser, like any other application, should just
use the host's local resolving mechanism, which, in turn, should be
using whatever the host is configured to use as a recursor, and this
mechanism should be secure, i.e. both trustworthy and private.

However: because the browser cannot know for sure that the DNS traffic
is being routed over a secure channel, and browsers are being used for
all sorts of sensitive communication, it could check, and try to assist
the user.  This means detecting whether communication with the recursor
is using port 53, and, if so, checking whether DoT and/or DoH is
available from that same service provider, possibly in the fashion
previously described.  It could also check that DNSSEC validation is in
use and working, and whether said DoT and/or DoH service is properly
secured, by certificates that have a valid chain from a trusted root, or
that can be verified from DNSSEC protected TLSA records.

Any problems found could then be reported to the user, along with
suggestions for how to fix them (or get them fixed).  As a last resort,
the user could be offered reconfiguration of the browser itself to
directly use a better mechanism offered by the already used resolving
name server, if possible.

Bottom line: those of us who provide DNS services to end users need to
make sure that we do so in a secure fashion, which means offering
encrypted DNS with DNSSEC validation.  If we don't, we can't blame the
browser makers for trying to help our users remedy our faults.  They
want to protect their users from poor sysadmins.  Let's not be that.

-tih
-- 
Most people who graduate with CS degrees don't understand the significance
of Lisp.  Lisp is the most important idea in computer science.  --Alan Kay

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