Like any other announcement, except DOD and what looks suspiciously like a shell corporation. Either the DOD doesn’t know about it (and I’ve called DISA and opened a ticket), which is scary, or the DOD is creating a private shell corporation to move all it’s IP space out of government purview, which sounds even more scary.
-mel via cell > On Mar 15, 2021, at 1:11 PM, Christopher Morrow <[email protected]> > wrote: > > On Mon, Mar 15, 2021 at 4:04 PM Mel Beckman <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> As I said, “DOD Network Information Center”: >> >> Source Registry ARIN Kind Org Full Name DoD Network Information Center >> Handle DNIC Address 3990 E. Broad Street Columbus OH 43218 United States >> Roles Registrant Last Changed Wed, 17 Aug 2011 14:45:37 GMT (Wed Aug 17 2011 >> local time) Self https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/DNIC Alternate >> https://whois.arin.net/rest/org/DNIC Port 43 Whois whois.arin.net >> -mel > > NetRange: 7.0.0.0 - 7.255.255.255 > CIDR: 7.0.0.0/8 > NetName: DISANET7 > NetHandle: NET-7-0-0-0-1 > Parent: () > NetType: Direct Allocation > OriginAS: > Organization: DoD Network Information Center (DNIC) > RegDate: 1997-11-24 > Updated: 2006-04-28 > Ref: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/ip/7.0.0.0 > > > > OrgName: DoD Network Information Center > OrgId: DNIC > Address: 3990 E. Broad Street > City: Columbus > StateProv: OH > > > it seems to still say that... > This looks like any other sort of: "have my ISP announce my prefixes > because I can't bgp" (or whatever other reason) > > >> >> On Mar 15, 2021, at 1:01 PM, Christopher Morrow <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >> On Mon, Mar 15, 2021 at 3:38 PM Mel Beckman <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> I also note that this reassignment isn’t reflected in ARIN’s Whois database. >> >> >> where is it reflected? >> >> >> -mel >> >> >> On Mar 15, 2021, at 12:36 PM, Mel Beckman <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> Owen, >> >> >> I think one cause for concern is why “almost all DOD prefixes >> (7.0.0.0/8,11.0.0.0/8,22.0.0.0/8 and bunch of /22s) are now announced under >> AS8003 (GRSCORP) which was just formed a few months ago,” which, according >> to ARIN WHOIS, had a source registry of “DoD Network Information Center”. >> >> >> I think it’s a general matter of public interest how this reassignment of a >> massive government-owned block of well over sixteen million IP addresses >> happened. Even if not fraudulent, the public has a right to know who is >> behind this huge transfer of wealth. >> >> >> >> is it possible that the DoD: >> 1) signed a lRSA (or really just an RSA) >> 2) asked AS8003 to announce these prefixes (in certain sized blocks, maybe) >> >> under normal actions that arin does all the time for people? >> If these were /24's and not parts/whole of /8's would anyone have noticed? >> >> it's entirely possible that 8003 is just a holding tank for the >> prefixes while DoD/etc find a method to xfer the space to those that >> may be willing to pay pesos per ip, right? >> >> Don’t you? >> >> >> -mel beckman >> >> >> On Mar 15, 2021, at 12:23 PM, Owen DeLong via NANOG <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> According to the timeline posted to this list (by you, Siyuan), Globl >> Resource Systems, LLC was registered in Delaware on September 8, 2020. >> >> Your timeline also shows the resources being issued to GRS by ARIN on >> September 11, september 14, 2020 >> >> It looks to me like they subsequently registered the corporation in Florida >> and moved the company address there. >> >> >> I don’t see anything suspicious here based on your own statements, so I’m a >> bit confused what you are on about. >> >> >> Owen >> >> >> On Mar 12, 2021, at 03:34 , Siyuan Miao <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> Hi John, >> >> >> My biggest concern is why the AS8003 was assigned to the company (GLOBAL >> RESOURCE SYSTEMS, LLC) even before its existence. >> >> >> When we were requesting resources or transfers, ARIN always asked us to >> provide a Certificate of Good Standing and we had to pay the state to order >> it. >> >> >> However, it appears that a Certificate of Good Standing is not required or >> ARIN didn't validate it in this case. >> >> >> Regards, >> >> Siyuan >> >> >> On Fri, Mar 12, 2021 at 7:17 PM John Curran <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> On 11 Mar 2021, at 7:56 AM, Siyuan Miao <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> Hi Folks, >> >> >> Just noticed that almost all DOD prefixes (7.0.0.0/8,11.0.0.0/8,22.0.0.0/8 >> and bunch of /22s) are now announced under AS8003 (GRSCORP) which was just >> formed a few months ago. >> >> >> It looks so suspicious. Does anyone know if it's authorized? >> >> >> >> Siyuan - >> >> >> If you have concerns, you can confirm whether these IP address blocks are >> being routed as intended by verification with their listed technical >> contacts - e.g. https://search.arin.net/rdap/?query=22.0.0.0 >> >> >> As I noted on this list several weeks back - "lack of routing history is not >> at all a reliable indicator of the potential for valid routing of a given >> IPv4 block in the future, so best practice suggest that allocated address >> space should not be blocked by others without specific cause. Doing >> otherwise opens one up to unexpected surprises when issued space suddenly >> becomes more active in routing and is yet is inexplicably unreachable for >> some destinations." >> >> >> Thanks! >> >> /John >> >> >> John Curran >> >> President and CEO >> >> American Registry for Internet Numbers >> >> >>
