Some major stakeholders are under legal or regulatory obligation to supervise and control. A small number of control points makes this less awful to effect.
Dave Edelman On Mar 16, 2012, at 16:21, "cdel.firsthand.net" <[email protected]> wrote: > NAT at the edge is one thing as it gives an easy to sell security proposition > for the board. But CGN controlled by whoever sitting between their NATs does > the opposite. > > > > Christian de Larrinaga > > > On 16 Mar 2012, at 19:35, William Herrin <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On Fri, Mar 16, 2012 at 2:01 PM, Octavio Alvarez >> <[email protected]> wrote: >>> On Tue, 13 Mar 2012 23:22:04 -0700, Christopher Morrow >>> <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> NetRange: 100.64.0.0 - 100.127.255.255 >>>> CIDR: 100.64.0.0/10 >>>> OriginAS: >>>> NetName: SHARED-ADDRESS-SPACE-RFCTBD-IANA-RESERVED >>> >>> Weren't we supposed to *solve* the end-to-end connectivity problem, >>> instead of just letting it live? >> >> "We" forgot to ask if all the stakeholders wanted it solved. Most >> self-styled "enterprise" operators don't: they want a major control >> point at the network border. Deliberately breaking end to end makes >> that control more certain. Which is why they deployed IPv4 NAT boxen >> long before address scarcity became an impactful issue. >> >> Regards, >> Bill Herrin >> >> >> -- >> William D. Herrin ................ [email protected] [email protected] >> 3005 Crane Dr. ...................... Web: <http://bill.herrin.us/> >> Falls Church, VA 22042-3004 >> >
