Looks like you cut off, but:
Except that this is the difference between what happens at a Marriott and what would happen at a business that was running rogue AP detection. In the business the portable AP would be trying to look like the network that the company operated so as to siphon off legitimate users. In a hotel the portable AP would be trying to create a different, separate network. And so your thesis does not hold.
But it's not a completely discrete network. It is a subset of the existing network in the most common example of e.g. a WLAN + NAT device providing access to additional clients, or at least an adjacent network attached to the existing one. Okay: theoretically a guest could spin up a hotspot and not attach it to the hotel network at all, but I'm assuming that's a pretty tiny edge case.
As the administration of the hotel/org network, I'm within bounds to say you're not allowed attach unauthorized devices to the network or extend the network and that should be fair in "my network, my rules", no? And so I can take action against a breach of those terms.
The hotspot is a separate network, but I don't have to allow it to connect to my network. I guess that points towards killing the wired port as a better method, as doing deauth on the hotspot(s) WLAN(s) would mean that you are participating in the separate network(s) and causing harm there rather than at the attachment point.
But what then of the duplicate SSID of the nefarious user at the business? What recourse does the business have while still staying in bounds?
-- Hugo On Fri 2014-Oct-03 22:27:06 -0400, Jay Ashworth <j...@baylink.com> wrote:
Except that this is the difference between what happens at a Marriott and what would happen at a business that was running rogue AP detection. In the business the portable AP would be trying to look like the network that the company operated so as to siphon off legitimate users. In a hotel the portable AP would be trying to create a different, separate network. And so your thesis does not hold. I think this is the distinction we need. Because it's clear that the business thing should be able to happen and the hotel thing should On October 3, 2014 10:25:22 PM EDT, Hugo Slabbert <h...@slabnet.com> wrote:On Fri 2014-Oct-03 17:21:08 -0700, Michael Van Norman <m...@ucla.edu> wrote:IANAL, but I believe they are. State laws may also apply (e.g.CaliforniaCode - Section 502). In California, it is illegal to "knowingly and without permission disrupts or causes the disruption of computerservicesor denies or causes the denial of computer services to an authorizeduserof a computer, computer system, or computer network." Blocking accesstosomebody's personal hot spot most likely qualifies.My guess would be that the hotel or other organizations using the blocking tech would probably just say the users/admin of the rogue APs are not authorized users as setting up said AP would probably be in contravention of the AUP of the hotel/org network./Mike-- HugoOn 10/3/14 5:15 PM, "Mike Hale" <eyeronic.des...@gmail.com> wrote:So does that mean the anti-rogue AP technologies by the various vendors are illegal if used in the US? On Fri, Oct 3, 2014 at 4:54 PM, Jay Ashworth <j...@baylink.com> wrote:----- Original Message -----From: "Ricky Beam" <jfb...@gmail.com>It doesn't. The DEAUTH management frame is not encrypted andcarries noauthentication. The 802.11 spec only requires a reason code be provided.What's the code for E_GREEDY? Cheers, -- jra -- Jay R. Ashworth Baylink j...@baylink.com Designer The Things I Think RFC 2100 Ashworth & Associates http://www.bcp38.info 2000LandRover DII St Petersburg FL USA BCP38: Ask For It By Name! +1727647 1274-- 09 F9 11 02 9D 74 E3 5B D8 41 56 C5 63 56 88 C0-- Sent from my Android phone with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity.
-- Hugo
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