On Mon, Jun 5, 2017 at 7:05 AM, Mel Beckman <m...@beckman.org> wrote:
> One way is for the hijacker to simply peer with himself. The hijacker has > an existing peering arrangement with, say, AT&T. He then tells AT&T that he > will be transit for ASxxxx advertising XYZ routes, by dint of a cheerfully > forged LOA. Once filters have been updated, the hijacker advertises the > space to himself, and then from thence to AT&T. > that doesn't seem to be what's happening in ron's example though... it looks, to me, like the example ron has is more a case of: 1) register contacts for lost asn (AS34991) 2) setup equipment/etc at an IX (bulgaria-ix it seems, at least) with another shill/lost-child asn (AS206776) 3) start doing the bgps with the IX fabric's route-server 4) profit (or something) so here the IXP operator (balkans ix actually?) http://lg.bix.bg/?query=summary&addr=&router=rs1.bix.bg+%28IPv4%29 (search for 206776 -> http://lg.bix.bg/?query=bgp&addr=neighbors+193.169.198.191&router=rs1.bix.bg+(IPv4) ) should probably look more than just side-eyes at their customer... > > It's no great trick getting peering set up. Just fill out a ten-question > BGP app and pay a one-time fee of maybe $100, and you're done. > err, you'll have to better explain this I think. Are you saying: "get an ASN from RIR that costs 100USD" (might, probably does) this doesn't get you a peering/transit contract though... -chris > > -mel beckman > > > On Jun 5, 2017, at 3:56 AM, Ronald F. Guilmette <r...@tristatelogic.com> > wrote: > > > > > > The more I know, the less I understand. > > > > Maybe some of you kind folks can help. > > > > Please explain for me the following scenario, and how this all actually > > works in practice. > > > > Let's say that you're a malevolent Bad Actor and all you want to do is > > to get hold of some ASN that nobody is watching too closely, and then > > use that to announce some routes to some IPv4 space that nobody is > > watching too closely, so that you can then parcel out that IP space > > to your snowshoe spammer pals... at least until somebody gets wise. > > > > OK, so you pull down a copy of, say, the RIPE WHOIS database, and you > > programatically walk your way through it, looking for contact email > > addresses on ASN records where the domain of the contact email address > > has become unregistered. Say for example the one for AS34991. So > > then you re-register that contact domain, fresh, and then you start > > telling all of your friends and enemies that you -are- AS34991. > > > > That part seems simple enough, and indeed, I've seen -this- part of the > > movie several times before. However once you have stepped into the > > identity of the former owners of the ASN, if you then want to actually > > proceed to -announce- some routes, and actually ave those routes make > > it out onto the Internet generally, then you still have to -peer- with > > somebody, right? > > > > So, I guess then, if you're clever, you look and see who the ASN you've > > just successfully hijacked has historically peered with, and then you > > somehow arrange to send route announcements to those guys, right? > > (I'm talking about AS206776 and AS57344 here, BTW.) > > > > But see, this is where I get lost. I mean how do you push your route > > announcements to these guys? (I don't actually know that much about > > how BGP actually works in practice, so please bear with me.) How do > > you know what IP address to send your announcements to? And if you are > > going to push your route announcements out to, say, the specific routers > > that are run by AS206776 and AS57344, i.e. the ones that will send your > > desired route announcements out to the rest of the Internet... well.. > > how do you find out the IP addresses of those routers on those other > > networks? Do you call up the NOCs at those other networks and do a bit > > of social engineering on them to find out the IP addresses you need to > > send to? And can you just send BGP messages to the routers on those > > other networks without -any- authentication or anything and have those > > routers just blindly accept them -and- relay them on to the whole rest > > of the Internet?? > > > > I've read article after article after article bemoanging the fact that > > "BGP isn't secure", but now I'm starting to wonder just how massively > > and unbelieveably unsecure it actually is. I mean would these routers > > being run by AS206776 and AS57344 just blindly accept -any- route > > announcements sent to them from literally -any- IP address? (That seems > > positively looney tunes to me! I mean things can't really be THAT > > colossally and unbelievably stupid, can they?) > > > > Thanks in advance for any enlightenment. > > > > > > Regards, > > rfg > > > > > > P.S. It would appear to be the case that since some time in April of > this > > year the "Bulgarian" network, AS34991, had evinced a rather sudden and > > pronounced affinity for various portion of the IPv4 address space > nominally > > associated with the nation of Columbia, including at least five /24 > blocks > > within 168.176.0.0/16 which, from where I am sitting, would appear to > belong > > to the National University of Columbia. > > > > Oh well. They apparently haven't been missing those five gaping holes in > > their /16 since the time the more specifics started showing up in April. > > > > And anyway, so far it looks like the new owners of AS34991 haven't > actually > > sub-leased any of those /24s to any spammers yet. Only the > 190.90.88.0/24 > > block seems to be filled, wall-to-all, with snowshoe spammers so far. > > > > >
