On Tue, Jun 6, 2017 at 9:13 PM, Mark Andrews <ma...@isc.org> wrote: > > In message <CAL9jLaZNRdE0gL4nVn93vhv1BOBtx0EKgJet8pVXa3Mve1Gy_Q@mail. > gmail.com>, Christopher Morrow writes: > > > > On Tue, Jun 6, 2017 at 8:26 PM, Mark Andrews <ma...@isc.org> wrote: > > > > > Now we could continue discussing how easy it is to hijack addresses > > > of we could spend the time addressing the problem. All it takes is > > > a couple of transit providers to no longer accept word-of-mouth and > > > the world will transition overnight. > > > > i don't think any transit providers were used in the previous thread > worth > > of examples/comms... > > I don't know that IXP folk either: > > 1) want to be the police of this > > 2) should actually be the police of this (what is internet abuse? from > > who's perspective? oh...) > > > > The 'solution' here isn't new though... well, one solution anyway: > > https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6810 > > You missed the point. We have the mechanisms to prevent hijacking > today. We just need to use them and stop using the traditional >
apologies for taking your bait. > mechanisms which cannot be mathematically be verified as correct. > > i agree. > Getting to that stage requires several companies to simultaneously > say "we will no longer accept <list> as valid mechanisms to verify > routes announcements. You need to use X or else we won't accept > the announcement". Yes, this requires guts to do. > > agreed here as well. > Mark > -- > Mark Andrews, ISC > 1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia > PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742 INTERNET: ma...@isc.org >