What happened to do not trust anyone? Create your own resiliency by being multihomed to as many transits you can afford.
You need the ability to shutdown a transit that is having trouble. It happens to all of them. Regards Baldur ons. 16. maj 2018 19.02 skrev David Hubbard <dhubb...@dino.hostasaurus.com>: > I’m curious if anyone who’s used 3356 for transit has found shortcomings > in how their peering and redundancy is configured, or what a normal > expectation to have is. The Tampa Bay market has been completely down for > 3356 IP services twice so far this year, each for what I’d consider an > unacceptable period of time (many hours). I’m learning that the entire > market is served by just two fiber routes, through cities hundreds of miles > away in either direction. So, basically two fiber cuts, potentially 1000+ > miles apart, takes the entire region down. The most recent occurrence was > a week or so ago when a Miami-area cut and an Orange, Texas cut (1287 > driving miles apart) took IP services down for hours. It did not take > point to point circuits to out of market locations down, so that suggests > they even have the ability to be more redundant and simply choose not to. > > I feel like it’s not unreasonable to expect more redundancy, or a much > smaller attack surface given a disgruntled lineman who knows the routes > could take an entire region down with a planned cut four states apart. > Maybe other regions are better designed? Or are my expectations > unreasonable? I carry three peers in that market, so it hasn’t been > outage-causing, but I use 3356 in other markets too, and have plans for > more, but it makes me wonder if I just haven't had the pleasure of similar > outages elsewhere yet and I should factor that expectation into the > design. It creates a problem for me in one location where I can only get > them and Cogent, since Cogent can't be relied on for IPv6 service, which I > need. > > Thanks > > >