On Tue, 20 Sep 2016 10:39:20 -0700
Eric Dumazet <eric.duma...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Tue, 2016-09-20 at 09:45 -0700, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> > because 'div by zero' is an abnormal situation that shouldn't be exploited.
> > Meaning if xdp program is doing DoS prevention and it has a bug that
> > attacker can now exploit by sending a crafted packet that causes
> > 'div by zero' and kernel will warn then attack got successful.
> > Therefore it has to be silent drop.
> A silent drop means a genuine error in a BPF program might be never
> caught, since a tracepoint might never be enabled.
I do see your point. But we can document our way out of it.
> > tracpoint in such case is great, since the user can do debugging with it
> > and even monitoring 24/7 and if suddenly the control plan sees a lot
> > of such trace_xdp_abotred events, it can disable that tracepoint to avoid
> > spam and adjust the program or act on attack some other way.
> > Hardcoded warnings and counters are not generic enough for all
> > the use cases people want to throw at XDP.
> > The tracepoints idea is awesome, in a sense that it's optional.
> Note that tracepoints are optional in a kernel.
Well, that is a good thing, as it can be compiled out (as that provides
an option for zero cost).
> Many existing supervision infrastructures collect device snmp
> counters, and run as unprivileged programs.
A supervision infrastructures is a valid use-case. It again indicate
that such XDP stats need to structured, not just a random driver
specific ethtool counter, to make it easy for such collection daemons.
> tracepoints might not fit the need here, compared to a mere
I do see your point. I really liked the tracepoint idea, but now I'm
I do have a use-case where I want to use the NIC HW-RX-ingress-overflow
and TX-overflow drop indicators, but I don't want to tie it into this
discussion. The abort and error indicators a not relevant for that
Jesper Dangaard Brouer
MSc.CS, Principal Kernel Engineer at Red Hat
Author of http://www.iptv-analyzer.org