I probably got it wrong. At least I hope I did. But here it goes. What prevents somebody who does not like netsukuku or anybody using it from causing routing errors using a fake TP like this: - Create a new TP, which is identical to one originated from the target (can be a physical node if no TP signing is required or gnode either way). - Act as he would after receiving the TP from the target. Now the TP indicates, that there is a (very efficient) route from the attacker to the target. - When a neighbor receives the fake TP, it can not tell it from a good one, even if TP signing was required. A gnode can not have a /private/ key. If the "private" key of the gnode was shared by all members, then the attacker could just join the target gnode once to get the key, and use it later. - All packets that pass trough any node that has a more efficient route to the attacker than to the target, will be routed to the attacker.
If I have understood correctly, the only thing that should prevent this kind of attacks is that the attacker can not have more efficient route to everybody than the target does, but this is just a complication for the attacker, not prevention. Full rerouting could be achieved by surrounding the target with some bad nodes. _______________________________________________ Netsukuku mailing list [email protected] http://lists.dyne.org/mailman/listinfo/netsukuku
