On Sat, Oct 17, 2009 at 2:22 PM, jtd <[email protected]> wrote: > On Saturday 17 October 2009, Krishnakant wrote: >> On Sat, 2009-10-17 at 13:15 +0530, jtd wrote: >> > On Saturday 17 October 2009, Krishnakant wrote: >> > > We have also herd about the software in the woting machines being >> > > flawd. whether that comment came from a pollitical loss of the party in >> > > question is in doubt. >> > >> > In the case of the EVMs the "experts" claiming the flaw were unable to >> > demonstrate the flaw in the prescence of all party representatives. >> > >> > Also from the info i have gathered, the system is a simple hardwired >> > system with no method of reprogramming the microcontroller in circuit, >> > i.e without opening the evm. This means that one would have to collude >> > with officials and several party reps to remove and reaffix the onetime >> > seals. >> > The need for manual enable (which is also upper and lower time bound ) by >> > the voting official limits the ability to stuff the ballot to make this >> > exploit almost useless.
With due respect, the 'experiment' you refer to would make any student laugh. In reality, the time one has to manipulate a single machine can be anywhere up to 8 hours or even more, depending on the 'extent' of booth capturing. I do not find it impossible to conceive of a situation where the EPROM/controllers may not be physically substituted, instead of resetting or any other easy to detect approach, and contain within it all the workarounds for manual enable etc. In a city like Mumbai, such capturing may no longer be a viable option, but parts of the countryside are quite different. Niceties such as 'officials and several party reps' may not always be the case. What people have been asking for, and it is not unreasonable, is that the machine have the option of manual printout, for the voter to carry away. This would meet the doubts of an ordinary citizen. The second point, about open code, was to meet all the doubts about manual enable and so on, the failsafes built into the system under normal circumstances. Only technologists understand how critical this can be, for a system as important as a voting machine in a national election, or any other, for that matter, but this point has been explained so many times, that many non-techies know perfectly well why the EVM is still being questioned. However, this understanding is not matched by the attitude of EC officials. >> >> But in the case of the issue I pointed about MHADA's lucky draw, the >> problem was very much centered around software. >> and we may never know the reality. > > Very true. The very fact that it selected multiple times the same persons > shows a very poor software. But that is not the real point. > > In the past when draws were held manually, it was a public fact that the > process was rigged. Costed Rs.50,000/- to Rs.100000/-. This was between 87 to > 90. Some of my friends paid and got themselves alloted flats at Borivali > gorai. The ones in Ghatkopar Pantnagar were in great demand and the rig price > was Rs.200000/- and required insider contacts in MHADA. My friends had the > contacts but not enough cash on the table. So though we grew up in Pant > Nagar, they opted for Gorai. One of them worked in MHADA and brokered a > discount of Rs.5000/-. There was hughe rukus after the allotments as some > riggers had failed to get allotments (actually two agents delayed payment - > full two months before the draw afair - by a day and were not included in > the rig) and many non riggers suspected the process anyway. > > Computers can never remove systemic and process vulnerabilities. Infact they > only aide and make discovery more difficult. > Yes, we have the expression, to err is human, to really *&*^%^ up takes a computer. Of course, one that is programmed to do so. -- Vickram http://communicall.wordpress.com _______________________________________________ network mailing list [email protected] http://lists.fosscom.in/listinfo.cgi/network-fosscom.in
