So, looks like we have consensus on the characters: a-zA-z0-9_ (no need 
for other characters according to the proposal below).

Here's a proposal from NWAM to create secure object names from the 
discussions in this thread:

Rather than using the nwam-ESSID-BSSID as it currently does, nwam will 
create a MD5/SHA1 (which one?) hash of the name(s) that it will use for 
the names of secure objects.  The name is be "nwam_hash".  If the 
tunable nwamd/strict_bssid from CR 6773627 is set, then the hash will be 
of the string "ESSID-BSSID" ('-' between the two values), otherwise the 
hash will be just "ESSID".  Since libdladm has a length restriction of 
DLD_SECOBJ_NAME_MAX (32) on the names, only the first 27 from the 
characters from the hash will be used in the secobj name.

Let's say, there's agreement on the above naming scheme (or some 
variation of it).  There's still a question of what to do with secure 
object names that are already out there.

There are ones that don't work (with spaces from the ESSID), so the user 
probably has already switched to a ESSID/secobj with no spaces.  The 
user also could not use dladm because the secobj's cannot loaded into 
the kernel.

The second situation is where there are secobjs already out there that 
don't follow the character restrictions (either through nwam or dladm).  
These could contain @*% and other characters.  These secobj's should 
still be allowed to be loaded by dladm, and used by both dladm and 
NWAM.  Thus, NWAM will need to failover to the current nwam-ESSID-BSSID 
naming scheme if the new nwam_hash scheme fails when it tries to connect 
to a WEP/WPA network. 

Comments?
Anurag

Peter Memishian wrote:
>  > Going back to what this thread was about: what characters to allow in 
>  > secobj names?
>  > 
>  > 1. Are we allowing just alphanumeric and '_' for the secure object 
>  > names? What about '-' and '.' which are already used explicitly by NWAM?
>
> I think it's OK to allow those if it'd be useful to NWAM.
>
>  > 2. What's the plan of action for secobj names that will be invalidated 
>  > by the implementation of (1)?
>
> It's only really an issue for upgrade, right?  If the user has to re-input
> their key in the case where their ESSID used characters that are invalid
> for a secobj, that doesn't seem so bad, at least based on where we are
> with Indiana these days.
>
>   
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