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From Jane's Defense Weekly:

08/24/01

Who are the NLA?

By Tim Ripley

Over the past eight months the ethnic Albanian National Liberation Army
(NLA), or Ushtria Clirimitore Kombetare (UCK), has grown from a group of
less than 200 guerrillas into a fighting force of 3,000 fighters,
controlling hundreds of square miles of northern and western Macedonia. So
far the group has withstood several Macedonian army and police offensives
and bounced back to seize even more territory. The haphazard bombardment of
Albanian villages by Macedonian aircraft, helicopter gunships and artillery
has proved a boon to the NLA, prompting a steady stream of recruits and huge
cash donations from the Albanian Diaspora in Western Europe and North
America. By mid-August, when NATO committed itself to intervening in the
conflict to collect rebel arms as part of the Ohrid peace agreement, the NLA
had seized control of a huge swathe of territory and put the poorly led and
equipped government forces firmly on the defensive.

Origins

The origins of the current conflict stretch back to the secession of
Macedonia from the old Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991.
While Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were ravaged by war during the first
half of the 1990s, Macedonia managed to gain its independence and remain
largely peaceful, even though relations between the country's 600,000-strong
ethnic Albanian population and the 1.4 million ethnic Macedonian majority
were tense.

The event that changed everything was the revolt by ethnic Albanians in the
Serbia-controlled province of Kosovo in 1998. This set in train sequence of
events that threaten to overwhelm Macedonia's precarious peace. The
radicalisation of the Albanian population of Kosovo during the mid-1990s led
to the growth of Albanian nationalism throughout the former Yugoslavia - in
Kosovo, Macedonia, southern Serbia and Montenegro. Under the banner of the
Popular Movement for Kosova (LPK), ethnic Albanians spread around the
Yugoslav successor republics began demanding their own state or, as it
became known, Greater Albania.

Exiled ethnic Albanians living in Western Europe and North America rallied
to the cause, setting up the Homeland Calling fund to finance the revolt of
the LPK's armed wing, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), or Ushtria
Clirimitore e Kosovoes (UCK). Many Albanians from Macedonia also joined the
fight against the Serbs, rising to senior positions in the LPK and KLA. At
the height of the war in early 1999 some 40,000 men were estimated to
fighting with the KLA either inside Kosovo or along the Albanian border. The
force officially disbanded in September 1999 under pressure from NATO and
was reborn as the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), or Trupat Mbroysat Kosoves
(TMK), with a disaster relief role.

The Albanian nationalist cause underwent a resurgence in the autumn of 2000
for two main reasons. The demise of the regime of Slobodan Milosevic in
Yugoslavia led to fears that the international community would do a deal
with the new government in Belgrade to deny Kosovo its independence. At the
same time, the poor showing of former LPK and KLA leaders, such as Ramush
Hajredinaj, in the October 2000 Kosovo administrative elections meant many
of them were looking for ways to re-invigorate the nationalist cause. This,
they believed, had been betrayed by Pristina-based figures such as Hashim
Thaci, who are now closely identified with the international community.

The Ushtria Clirimitore e Presevo, Medvedja, Bujanovic (UCPMB), or
Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja, Bujanovic, stepped up its insurgency
in southern Serbia. Meanwhile, plans were laid to mount a major uprising in
Macedonia. The NATO decision in February 2001 to hand back the Ground
Security Zone (GSZ), or buffer zone, along Kosovo's boundary with Serbia to
Yugoslav control further confirmed Albanian suspicions that the
international community was set to betray Kosovo to Belgrade.

NLA aims

With suspicions that their cause was about to be betrayed, many former KLA
members with family roots in Macedonia therefore decided the time was ripe
to stage their own revolution. This would fulfil two aims: freeing their
countrymen from the rule of the Skopje government; and driving Albanians in
Kosovo back to supporting the nationalist cause.

Members of the Homeland Calling organisation provided funding and allowed
the NLA access to the covert arms dumps in Kosovo and Albania under their
control. A few hundred former KLA fighters of Macedonian origin began
training and organising in the summer of 2000, establishing training bases
and arms caches along the mountainous border between Kosovo and Macedonia.
Albanian villagers on both sides of the border have close family ties, and
they proved to be a fertile source of recruits.

The group's strategy was first to stage a series of hit-and-run attacks on
Macedonian police and army bases to advertise their existence and attract
recruits. Then a more widespread series of attacks would be launched to
secure control of a 'liberated zone', which would became a haven for
fighters battling to free ethnic Albanian regions of Macedonia.

Leadership and structure

The NLA leadership at first kept its activities highly secret to prevent
counter action by either the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) or the Macedonian
security forces. During late 2000 rumours began circulating of a group
calling itself the Armaj Kombetare Shiqitare (AKSh), or Albanian National
Army (ANA), mounting attacks on Macedonian police posts along the border
with Kosovo, but this group remained in the shadows and was subsequently
eclipsed by the NLA in January 2001. The ANA group grew out of a split
within the ranks of the LPK in the late 1990s and has since claimed
responsibility for a series of attacks in Macedonia, culminating in the 8
August truck ambush in which at least 10 Macedonian soldiers died. Inside
Macedonia it has little influence among local ethnic Albanian commanders,
who all universally claim allegiance to the NLA, but it remains an
indication that the leadership of the rebels could be divided about how to
go forward.

The choice of the name, NLA or UCK, by the Macedonian-based rebel group is
no accident and it is meant to signify the continuity of the struggle from
the original KLA. The leadership of the NLA is still shrouded in mystery,
with its leaders and spokesmen adopting noms de guerre when they meet
Western journalists. So far a number - including Emrush Xhemali, the former
security chief of KLA leader Hashim Thaci - have been identified as senior
leaders. The ultra-nationalists' Swiss-based leader, Fazli Veliu, has been
named in media reports as the chief financier of the rebellion. He remains
president of the LPK. The renamed Liria Kombetare (National Freedom) fund
has replaced Homeland Calling as the main source of money for the NLA.
Adverts for fundraising events are regularly placed in the Swiss-based
Albanian newspaper Bota Sot. Vaxhid Sedjiu is the LPK's director of
fundraising in Switzerland.

Aid money is taken to Kosovo and Macedonia by personal couriers. Western
intelligence agencies believe the NLA has amassed a war chest of $60 million
from the Albanian Diaspora over the last six months.

Inside Macedonia the leadership is centred on the mountains above Tetovo in
the village of Sipkovica. Ali Ahmeti, a KLA founder of Macedonian origin who
has links to Ramush Hajredinaj, has taken on the role of political spokesman
and negotiator with NATO. A senior KLA commander, Gezim Ostremi, deserted
from his post as TMK chief of staff early in 2001 to take over as NLA chief
of staff. Former Macedonian member of parliament Hisni Shaqiri also has a
political/propaganda role. Over in the east, in the Black Mountains,
Commander Mala is the main leader, along with his deputy, Commander Sokoli.
This group has strong links to the family of murdered moderate KLA leader
Commander Dreni from Prizren in Kosovo. Commander Hoxha, another KLA
veteran, has a roving role of 'NLA inspector', overseeing major operations
such as the seizure of Aracinovo in June.

Control of territory

The first incident attributed to the NLA was a mortar attack on a remote
Macedonian police station at Tearce on 22 January 2001, which left one
policemen dead and three injured. A month later NLA units and the Macedonian
police fought a two-hour gun battle in the mountain-top village of Tanusevci
on the border with Kosovo in the heart of the Black Mountain region. It is
believed this was an unplanned incident after a NLA column was intercepted
by the Macedonian police. As fighting escalated, the NLA seized a number of
villages in the area. Only around 200 NLA fighters were believed to have
been involved in the fighting at this stage.

Over the next six months the NLA expanded massively as it gained control of
even more territory. By mid April it overtly controlled the Black Mountain
area north of Skopje, centred on the villages of Lipkovo, Slupcane and
Nikustak. The heartland of the NLA is the high mountains to the west of
Tetovo, along the Kosovo and Albanian borders. In July the NLA swept down
from the mountains into the predominantly Albanian city of Tetovo and into
the valley to the east. A string of Albanian villages rallied to the cause
and NLA fighters moved on to the Zeden feature between Tetovo and Skopje,
capturing the border town of Raduse. These offensives left government forces
isolated in Tetovo and a number of small garrisons around the town and at
Vratnica, which could only be re-supplied by helicopter.

Until the 8 August ambush the NLA chose not to cut the main Tetovo-Skopje
highway, but its units demonstrated they had the ability to do so if
necessary.

To conduct these operations the NLA massively expanded its force structure
to absorb the new recruits entering its ranks from within Macedonia, Kosovo,
Albania and the Diaspora. By early August the NLA boasted six brigades: 111,
113 and 114 Brigades were operating the Black Mountain region; 112 Brigade
is in control of a number of 'battalions' in Tetevo; to the south, 116
Brigade is based around Gostivar, although it has not so far overtly
attempted to take control of the town (which has an 80% Albanian
population); while 115 Brigade is believed to be located in Albanian
villages overlooking the capital, Skopje, and its vital power station. The
NLA has pushed units far into the mountains south of Skopje, although they
have so far not overtly declared control of territory in this strategic
region.

NLA brigades are a mix of KLA veterans, who provide the command cadre and
experienced fighters, and local volunteers integrated into the ranks. Local
men and boys are then recruited to provide logistic support, medical help
and other administrative tasks. Villagers, meanwhile, provide food for the
fighters. Diaspora groups linked to localities provide the funds and
expertise to buy and smuggle arms to specific brigades.
The NLA arsenal

NLA arms have come from a variety of sources, including the hundreds of
thousands of weapons looted from Albanian army armouries in 1997. West and
Eastern European black markets have been tapped, as well some unusual
sources. Uniforms have been made in factories in Yugoslavia and black market
purchases made from corrupt officials in the Zastava arms factory in Serbia.
There have also been reports of truck convoys into Macedonia from Bulgaria.
During the failed Macedonian police attack to relieve Radusa in early
August, government forces had to abandon a T-55 tank and two armoured
personnel carriers (a TM 170 and a BTR), which were captured by the NLA and
pressed into service against their former owners.

The main arms import routes are via Albania. KFOR's Operation Eagle has
recently begun to be a major headache for the NLA, which has lost 2000
weapons and 180,000 rounds ammunition to NATO patrols. The anarchic nature
of Albania, however, means the NLA has a very secure supply line to western
Macedonia.

Estimates of the NLA arsenal are very difficult to make, with many Western
intelligence agencies completely in the dark about its activities. Weapons
known to be in the NLA inventory include 9M32 Strella-2M (SA-7B 'Grail' Mod
1) manportable surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), 120mm and 82mm mortars,
rocket-propelled grenades, light anti-tank rockets, 12.7mm heavy machine
guns as well as assorted light machine guns and AK-type assault rifles. Land
mines and demolition charges have also been used to great effect. The NLA
has managed to hold on to all the territory it has captured in spite of
heavy government attacks, killing just under 70 members of the security
forces for the loss of only a couple of dozen of its fighters at the most.

As far as heavy weapons are concerned, it is estimated by Western sources
that the NLA has around 40 mortars and just a handful of SAMs. Small arms
are impossible to measure, since every Albanian man in most northern and
western villages possesses some kind of weapon. The NLA has been estimated
to have 2,000 hardcore fighters and a similar number of volunteers, all of
whom have access to some type of weapon.

Conclusion

With the signing of the Ohrid peace deal the NLA has reached a crucial
turning point. Over the next few weeks it will have to make crucial
decisions on whether it is to go along with the accord and disarm, before
entering the internal Macedonian political process, or if it is to continue
its struggle for wider Albanian nationalist aims. What is clear is that it
is now making these decisions from a position of strength. With Western
policymakers now having to take the NLA into account, it has proved it can
shape events in the Balkans.

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