MAYS DECISIVE MORNING
(Koha Ditore, by Veton Surroi, a member of the Kosovo negotiating team for
the status)
1.
The morning of 15 May 2006 dawns in Guntherschloss as it did two days
before. The Alps have the same warning sensitivity, one should hear birds
singing to know how the day would be. But birds signals are not necessary
for Marti Ahtisaari. It is clear that the crucial negotiations hours have
passed by, therefore, the decision should be made in the last round. Being a
mediator with a 30-years experience, he knows that the last round is just
for the sake of appearance; if one has not created enough hopes for an
agreement in the round before the last, then, one should be in the last
round just to say that he made efforts. The round before the last showed
what the first one did. Ahtisaari had heard at the beginning of November
2005, at the first meeting for hearing the negotiating positions, from
Kosovo delegation that independence will not be negotiated, and the Belgrade
delegation saying that they would negotiate about anything, except for
independence.
He would recall that he was engaged in May 1999 to stop the war in Kosovo,
respectively NATO bombardments, which ended with liberation of Kosovo from
the Serb forces. Then, he had not talked at all with Kosovo Albanians. They
were scattered throughout the world and no one took them into consideration
then.
But where was he exactly on 15 May 1999?
Is this important, let me think? Few moths ago, he was shaking hands in
Aceh, Indonesia, for reaching a peace deal. 20 years ago, he was shaking
hands in Nairobi and handing over the power to the people of this country
who were getting decolonized. This morning, like in any other decisive
morning, things had to reach their culmination. The offer had to be
accepted, or sides would have to confront with further consequences.
2.
The day when he would be invited officially by UN SG Kofi Annan to take over
the duty of a mediator, he had already passed almost the entire September by
holding calm consultations about his future mission. During this month, he
had heard lots of things. He had heard that the leading structure in Kosovo
was weak and it was getting even weaker following the illness of President
Rugova. He had heard that the leadership in Belgrade was in a bad position
because of the conflict between the PM and President, and their advisors who
said to them that negotiations should be left on the hands of the rival. He
had heard that the Contact Group had a united position, but it had not
elaborated its stances yet and it was not known when would they be ready. He
had heard that negotiations about Kosovo had a special importance for Kofi
Annan, who had just emerged damaged by the Iraqi oil scandal, which was
misused by Saddam in the oil for food program affair. He had heard that
negotiations are important for the trans-Atlantic relations, which went bad
following the war in Iraq, because Kosovo was a successful story of a joint
US-European intervention. He had heard that negotiations may not be as
attractive as it is being said because the Americans want to leave Kosovo
issue to the EU, which implies that they would not confront with the
Russians as much as they would do if that was an issue within the sphere of
the American interest. He had heard that the Russians found this issue
interesting just for the sake of appearance, because whenever Moscow asks
Belgrade what it wants, then they cannot defend the reply they get. Does
Belgrade really think that two million Kosovo Albanians would be willingly
within Serbia? Does Belgrade think that NATO forces would go away to leave
the place to Serb forces?
3.
As soon as one gets in the Kosovo issue, he enters a mess of questions,
information, and stances. But this does not make it different from any other
negotiations.
He tells the close assisting staff to set the priorities.
Firstly, instructions of the great power. The Contact Group has announced
that it is working on the leading Principles of the negotiations. When the
principles are concluded, the non-negotiated principles, approved earlier in
London, should be reviewed once more. A framework of documents, which should
be made by a group of legal experts, should come out of them.
Secondly, a proper relation between the Negotiator and the great powers
should be established. The Americans, Russians, and the EU want the
deputy-negotiator positions. The staff tells him that there are no
mediations where there are lots of mediators. He wants that anything that is
called the American, Russian, and Brussels representative should have a
liaison position with the capitals. Although, as he himself knows from 1999,
a moment would come when he would make decisive telephone calls to foreign
ministers and the leaders in Washington, Moscow, London, and Paris.
4.
Now, on the 15th, the issue has been rapidly going on. In an improvised
office in the castle, Ahtisaari gathers once more his deputies and the
staff, takes the Framework Document on the hand and announces something that
all have felt this was the end of negotiations and lunch was the deadline.
5.
In December 2005, things should have looked differently in Guntherschloss.
The Christmas was getting closer, and officials of the Austrian Foreign
Ministry were paying a visit to the village. In few days, Austria would take
over the EU Chairmanship. Another personal reflection for PM Schussel. Seven
years ago, he was Foreign Affairs Minister when the crisis was reaching the
culmination. Now, as PM, Schussel would request that the final deal about
Kosovos final status, the last open issue in the Balkans, to be reached in
the Austrian territory.
The Ministry official inspected everything. Including the local cafeteria in
the village where the atmosphere could get relaxed.
One of the negotiations veteran in Rambouillet recalls to the Foreign
Ministry Task Group for Kosovo that before those talks resumed, French
President Chirac offered his personnel for taking care of food, especially
vine, showing how importantly was France considering these negotiations.
The diplomat asked, Well, what would Schussel offer in the name of
Austria.
6.
The question was more than Austrian. In December 2005, Austria was preparing
for taking over the EU chairmanship with big victories in the foreign
policy. Chancellor Schussel, who was almost isolated in Europe three years
ago because of the coalition with Heider extreme right wing, managed in
October to be the main factor for negotiations on Turkeys and Croatias
acceptance in the EU.
In the last minutes of the summit in Luxembourg, Austria accepted opening of
negotiations on Turkeys acceptance on condition that those about Croatia
open as well. So, Vienna managed to be not only the sponsor of Croatias
independence, but also its acceptance in the EU.
For more, the EU also agreed on starting the negotiations about
stabilization-association process with Serbia and Montenegro. This created a
parallel process of talks with the EU. On the one hand, negotiations about
Kosovo. On the other hand, those about the fate of Serbia regarding European
integration. A prolongation in one side implies prolongation on the other,
and this was European basic weapon toward Belgrade.
7.
That is not enough! would Ahtisaari hear in Belgrade. That refrain would
be repeated in a soft way by S-M Foreign Minister, sometimes in a rougher
way by the Serbian PM saying (Serbia does not sell its territory for a
stabilization-association deal.)
In fact, he was expecting such a reaction. There were no concerns about the
initial reactions. The problem was to have a clear concept what united
Europe wants from these negotiations. He had received the Contact Group
principles. One of them was to make sure international presence in Kosovo
even after the status agreement. All the analyzing centers had stated
earlier that the EU should take a post-statutory role in Kosovo. But
European centers have not told him what that role would be.
He had posed a direct question to some of the European leaders in November
2005 do you want High-Rep like in Bosnia or not? (Do you want a Senior
Representative like in Bosnia, which means powerful authority).
He would make that question, now formally as well, in the British final
summit in December.
Ahtisaari told European authorities that the EU should tell him what is it
ready to do in Kosovo following the definition of the status, because this
would help during the negotiating process. Kosovo Authorities should clearly
know what are we ready for, but Belgrade should know as well. He was
kidding, it should know if I have the rabbit in the black hat that you gave
to me.
8.
Memo 1
From:
To: Marti Ahtisaari
Following yesterdays conversation regarding the initial phase of the
shuttle diplomacy, and the options we discussed, the Group of our Ministry
together with the informal Quint groups in Prishtina and Belgrade suggest
explaining of the Serb position anything except for independence. If
Belgrade does not move from this position, then we have explained 90% of the
things, so Kosovo should be a state, but according to Belgrade, it should
not have sovereignty. Let us take this out of the agenda so that we can
focus on the sovereignty.
Memo 2
From:
To: Marti Ahtisaari
Our Ministers posed a direct question to Draskovic and Kostunica: Do you
seriously accept a Kosovo Albanian, for example Agim Ceku, to be Serbias
Defense Minister? Because your offer on status may take to this direction.
Draskovic said Yes, on the other hand, Kostunica said that modalities
about this would be discussed later.
Serbian News Network - SNN
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