Serbia’s United Strategy Cracks Apart at the Seams 

Before they even got to the negotiating table, Serbia's leaders have already
broken ranks in public on Kosovo's future. 

By Dragana Nikolic-Solomon in Belgrade (12-Oct-05) 
 
Weeks from the probable start of negotiations on Kosovo’s future status, it
is still not known who will be in Serbia’s negotiating team, while cracks
are showing in what had been billed as a unified platform. 
The disagreements may end up prolonging the talks and so jeopardising the
position of the Serb minority in Kosovo, according to some analysts.

A united strategy was agreed last spring, ending years in which various
political blocs in Serbia had all proposed different solutions for the
break-away majority Albanian province.

United around the vague formula of “more than autonomy, less than
independence,” Serbs ruled out independence as an option. 

They said it contravened international norms on the inviolability of state
borders and would lead to instability in the region and in Serbia.

More precise details of Serbia’s negotiating plan were revealed in
mid-September by the new head of the government’s Coordinating Centre for
Kosovo, Sanda Raskovic-Ivic, of the Democratic Party of Serbia, DSS, led by
Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica.

She told the media that Serbia would insist on retaining overall sovereignty
over Kosovo while conceding executive, judicial and legislative power to the
local authorities.

According to Raskovic-Ivic, Kosovo’s borders would be patrolled by Serbia
and Montenegro’s army and Kosovo would not be entitled to a seat at the
United Nations. When it came to defence and foreign affairs, Serbia and
Montenegro would continue to represent Kosovo.

However, these proposals have only created new political misunderstandings
within Serbia.

Serbia’s President, Boris Tadic, leader of the opposition Democratic Party,
DS, told the media a few days later that Raskovic-Ivic’s new proposals
differed from the platform he and Kostunica had hammered out as “common
Serbian policy”.

He said Raskovic-Ivic had also revealed details of a tactical and strategic
character, which “should not have been made public”.

Meanwhile Serbia and Montenegro’s Foreign Minister and leader of the Serbian
Renewal Movement, SPO, Vuk Draskovic proposed his own solution. This was
based on the “Z4” plan offered to the break-away Croatian Serbs a decade ago
but never acted on. 

This would give Kosovo its own government, prime minister, parliament,
president, police, currency and budget on the condition that it acknowledged
Serbia’s sovereignty.

Draskovic said this formula could be the cornerstone in the search for a
negotiated solution between Pristina and Belgrade.

Tadic criticised Draskovic’s plan, however, saying this scenario was also
“out of the framework which was agreed upon within the political
leadership”.

Tadic added: “I would love to know which Serbian government plan I should
discuss with the authorities and which is the common plan we should
present.”

He concluded: “As Serbian president I am also responsible for Kosovo
negotiations.”

The rifts between the DS and the DSS date back to their time as allies
within the Serbian opposition movement which brought down Slobodan
Milosevic’s regime in October 2000.

The differences in policies between the moderately nationalist DSS and the
pro-European DS were encapsulated in the bitter battle between their two
leaders, the late Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic and the current Prime
Minister Vojislav Kostunica.

Dusan Prorokovic, a DSS member and head of the Serbian parliamentary
committee on Kosovo denied there was any misunderstanding amongst the
political leadership. 

“All [of the] main points of the platform have been agreed upon,” he told
Balkan Insight. 

“The current problems in communications between the two parties [the DS and
DSS] should not block their communications when Kosovo and Metohija are
discussed”.

Dusan Batakovic, Tadic’s advisor on Kosovo, disagreed, saying that Serbia’s
politicians had revealed different stances, which he suggested might damage
Serbia’s strategic interests.

“Co-ordination, which is a basic condition for future work on establishing a
common platform for the forthcoming negotiations, does not exist,” said
Batakovic.

Another presidential advisor on Kosovo, Leon Kojen, was more optimistic,
saying the two parties may yet find a common language.

Kojen said the Serbian leadership had already discussed several documents
that would form the basis for the Serbian negotiating platform. 

Through a slight adjustment of these documents, “a widely accepted
negotiation platform might be formulated,” he said.

For now, however, analysts say it remains unclear which platform Serbia will
reveal at the negotiating table.

“The Serbian platform is not unified and there is real confusion [within the
leadership]”, Nicholas Whyte, Europe program director of the International
Crisis Group (ICG), told Balkan Insight.

Whyte added that while the status of Kosovo remains unresolved, the issue
“affects Serbia’s economy, security and reform process”.

A former Serbia and Montenegro Foreign Minister, Goran Svilanovic, told
Balkan Insight that co-operation between Kostunica and Tadic ahead of Kosovo
negotiations was crucial.

“Party disputes are one thing, but all other misunderstandings must be put
aside once serious negotiations are entered into,” he said. 

Svilanovic said neither Serbia’s platform nor the names of the negotiation
team needed to be revealed now. 

“Even if the negotiating team is not ready, it is not too late for it to be
prepared as negotiations have not started yet,” he said.

But Nebojsa Covic, the former head of the government’s Kosovo Coordination
Centre and leader of the Social Democratic Party, warned that if Belgrade
failed to prepare well for the negotiations, the outcome would be Kosovo’s
conditional independence. 

“Belgrade should step forward with a clear and concrete stance on what is
sovereignty, what is territorial integrity, and what the maximum and the
minimum is,” he said.

Judy Batt, from the Paris-based Institute for Security Studies, said if
Serbia was not ready to start negotiations, it might delay solving Kosovo’s
final status.

Batt said prolonging the talks might have adverse implications for Kosovo
Serbs and for neighbouring Macedonia, which has a large Albanian population,
fuelling violence in Kosovo.

Minna Jarvempaa, an analyst at the European Stability Initiative, ESI, a
research and policy institute, said lack of coherence both in Belgrade and
Pristina - and a lack of clarity over how the whole process should be
carried on - might make the negotiation process very cumbersome. 

“The process might be drawn out for both sides, not only because of
irreconcilable differences but because of the lack of a road map,” she said.


Batt said another problem was that Serbia lacked a strong leadership that
could deliver a settlement. 

“Serbia will loose an opportunity to gain something for the Kosovo Serb
minority,” she said.

She said that Serbia’s demands for the Kosovo Serbs to enjoy security,
decentralisation and the protection of their historic heritage might be lost
if Serbia failed to act resolutely and responsibly.

“Decentralisation, some form of territorial autonomy for the Serbs,
including an international presence that will guarantee stability, could
represent a realistic compromise,” Batt went on.

Batt added that Serbia and Montenegro’s path to Europe would be “open” if
Serbia could only solve its remaining problems, such as cooperation with the
Hague tribunal and the demands of Montenegro and Kosovo for independence.

According to Batt, Serbian public opinion is now ready to be told what it
already knows, which is that “Kosovo is lost”.

Serbia’s ability to prove that it is a viable state, which can solve
difficult issues, will be “in turn met with EU readiness to speed up the
process of EU integration”, she said.

Sources close to the government also admit privately that Kosovo is lost. 

However they also add that “no one is ready to confess that in public” as it
would mean political suicide.

“They are aware that Kosovo is lost but they want to gain at least something
- ideally, two or three municipalities - where Kosovo Serbs are the majority
and which they [the local Serbs] would control”, one source close to the
government told Balkan Insight.

Dragana Nikolic-Solomon is the editor of Balkan Insight in Serbia and the
director of the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, BIRN in Serbia.
Balkan Insight is BIRN’s on line publication. 
 
 http://www.birn.eu.com/insight_03_3_eng.php


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