http://www.serbianna.com/columns/borojevic/061.shtml
INTERVIEW
Kosovo: No endgame in sight
By Boba Borojevic August 16, 2007
The alleged dilemma “Kosovo or the EU” is both artificial and mendacious. It
was stated by Herr Ischinger, but it is not in his power to make the offer.
Even if Serbia were to give up Kosovo, which it will not do, according to
the former German ambassador in Belgrade, Andreas Zobel, it could
subsequently hope to enter the EU in 20 to 25 years… Dr Srdja Trifkovic
analyzes the troika initiative on Kosovo status.
The Contact Group “troika” – Aleksandar Botsan-Harchenko representing
Russia, Frank Wiesner representing the United States, and Wolfgang Ischinger
representing the European Union – visited Belgrade and Pristina on August 10
– 11, marking a new start in the search for a solution to the vexed problem
of Kosovo-Metohija. Dr. Srdja Trifkovic, one of the leading experts on the
Balkans, threw some light on the background to the visit of the troika, in
his interview on August 14 to “Monday’s Encounter” on CKCU 93.1 FM in
Ottawa. ST: In late July we witnessed the collapse of Western efforts,
led by the US, to present a Security Council resolution that would be
essentially in line with the Ahtisaari’s proposal – which is to say, that
would grant Kosovo-Metohija independent statehood, under whatever name and
through whatever procedure. The decision by the US and the EU to give up on
further efforts at the UNSC and to return to the auspices of the Contact
Group may be seen as
a victory for the Russian diplomacy. Indirectly it was a victory for
Serbia, too, except that all Serbian efforts in and of themselves would not
have been sufficient, were it not for the strategic decision that the
government in Moscow had made that this was an issue on which they would
make a stand. Within the Contact Group, and now within the Troika, there
is disagreement between the participants on what should be the final
objective and also how it should be obtained. The Russians are particularly
insistent that the whole process needs to remain under the control, guidance
and auspices of the UNSC. The US, and some countries of the EU, would like
to transform the Contact Group into a decision-making body in its own right,
subjected to majority vote, which would not only mediate between the parties
but also initiate particular models for the solution, and then actively
encourage the parties to embrace them. Imposition of the US will
The key issue is whether
the US will follow the path of unilateral recognition if there is no agreed
solution at the end of the four moths’ period – and in my view it is obvious
that there is not going to be one. For as long as the Albanian side believes
that the US will embark on unilateral recognition, we are not going to see
any progress. Hard-line terms in which Agim Ceku outlined the Albanian
position when the Troika arrived in Pristina over the weekend is indicative
both of the domestic political pressures which the Albanian leaders feel,
and the fact that the US regards the issue of Kosovo independence as a test
of strength, as a test of its ability to impose its will in spite of Russian
objections. To the Bush administration this is important in the light of a
string of failures of US foreign policy in the Middle East, Iraq,
Afghanistan, Iran, North Korea etc. Within the Troika we have a tenuous
situation, with three parties with widely different objectives pretending to
be acting
unanimously: · The Americans want to recognize an independent Kosovo
broadly in line with Ahtisaari plan, for reasons that are either bad or
unfathomable. · The EU does not have an agreed policy – or, rather, it
has the pretence of a consensus on the acceptance of the Ahtisaari plan
provided it is adopted through the UN. In another words, if it doesn’t
happen and if the U.S. press the Europeans to follow the unilateral path, I
am confident that there will be divisions within the EU. The fabled common
foreign policy will prove to be a mirage. · Finally we have the Russians,
very firm in their insistence that there cannot be no solution that would
bypass the Security Council, and who are opposed to any solution that would
be imposed against the will of the parties concerned, including of course
the Republic of Serbia. Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica and
Belgrade's position Dr. Trifkovic, who met with the Serbian Prime
Minister Vojislav Kostunica in
July, says that he does not expect a great deal of movement in the
forthcoming negotiations. “But I am sure,” Trifkovic says, “that Kostunica
is rock-solid on the assumptions and principles on which those negotiations
are to be conducted, and on the outcome that would be acceptable to the
Serbian side”: ST: That outcome can be a model of a very high autonomy
that would include all of the most advanced features of autonomous status
enjoyed by other minorities around the world. Independence is completely
unacceptable to Kostunica, however. Right now he may be contemplating the
reaction that Serbia would be forced to adopt in case the US and other
countries extend independence unilaterally. Obviously, Serbia has to take
stock of its options very seriously. Serbia’s reaction would depend to
some extend on the balance of forces within the ruling coalition in
Belgrade. Within the ruling coalition we still have an ongoing tension
between the “pro-Western reformists” –
i.e. the Democratic Party of Boris Tadic, which keeps talking of
Euro-Atlantic integrations (in other words not only EU but also NATO) – and
Prime minister Kostunica and his party, the Democratic Party of Serbia,
which is very careful to avoid the “Atlantic” part of this equation; they
call only for “European” integrations. They are aware that it is
inconsistent to expect Russia’s support in keeping Kosovo on the one hand,
and at the same time talking about the integration into a military structure
that is geopolitically by nature and of necessity anti-Russian. NATO does
not have any other purpose in life any more, except to act as the
geopolitical Cordon Sanitaire that seeks to surround Russia and reduce her
to the level of the Grand Duchy of Moscow of 500 years ago.
Threat of violence and advocacy of independence
Albanians in Kosovo threaten violence if they do not get independence.
This type of blackmail by any standards would not be tolerated in any
high-level negotiations. Yet, the USA, Canada and others take this blackmail
as a valid argument to grant Kosovo independence. Dr Trifkovic pointed out
that the US has different yardsticks by which it judges different
situations:
ST: We have seen this “situational morality” in the Yugoslav crisis
time and over again. The threat of secession by the Krajina Serbs from
Croatia, or the Bosnian Serbs from Bosnia-Herzegovina, was met with extreme
hostility in Washington, and it was countered with the claim that
territorial integrity of recognized states had to be upheld at any price.
This went so far as to prompt the US to aid and abet the massive ethnic
cleansing of the Serbs from the Krajina in summer of 1995. On the other
hand, territorial integrity is disregarded vis-à-vis Serbia itself, when it
comes to severing one seventh of her sovereign territory. Threat of violence
by the Albanians is a valid argument to grant them independence whereas
invented or exaggerated stories of violence by the Serbs in 1998-99 are
still treated as valid grounds for taking Kosovo away from Serbia. Again, we
are looking at an alternative reality – like Alice in Wonderland, where once
you go through the looking
glass even lies loose all pretence to credibility.
Canadian civil servant on the solution for Kosovo
In a letter sent to the interviewer, Canadian foreign minister Peter
MacKey says, “The Government of Canada believes that the comprehensive
recommendations by Mr. Ahtisaari meet the goal of Canadian policy as they
proposed extending decentralized powers to municipalities as well as giving
the Serb minority extensive rights and security under the supervision of the
international community. This would also include privileged ties with
Serbia. In addition, this corresponds to the European Union's multi-ethnic
vision for the Western Balkans…” Dr. Trifkovic counters with the opinion
that “the civil servant who wrote the letter on behalf of Canadian foreign
minister has never been to Kosovo and has probably never met a single
Albanian or Serb from the Kosovo province”:
ST: He does not have a faintest idea that the notion of multi-ethnic
harmony in the context of Kosovo is as valid and as likely to come into
being as the notion of inter-religious and inter-ethnic harmony between
Israelis and the Palestinians in a joint state, in which each community
would grant the other full rights and they will all joint hands and sing
Kumbaya. The civil servant who wrote the letter, and his boss, should be
asked what is wrong with simply turning the tables and saying that the
Albanians will be given all those rights that are promised to the Serbs,
that they could even have the right to establish those privileged links with
Tirana, and enjoy local self-rule. If the Ahtisaari’s plan is so wonderful
for the Serbs, than it should be equally applicable to the Albanians if you
change the names of the parties. The difference is that it would not require
changing international borders and it would not require violating 300 years
of the Westphalian
system of state sovereignty – not to mention the Helsinki final Act and the
UN Charter.
The fundamental issue on which the proponents of multilateralism in
international relations such as Canada fail to respond to the Russian and
Serbian argument is how do you envisage the survival of an international
system in which a sovereign nation state, a bona fide member of the
international community, can have a part of its sovereign territory take
away from it by fiat, by an imposed decision of the rest of the world. What
a precedent it would set to the rest of the world! When US bureaucrats
Nicolas Burns or Daniel Fried say that “no precedent would be set,” they are
deluded. A bureaucrat cannot control reality by the force of his public
statement. If Kosovo is recognized it would give a signal to each and every
dissatisfied ethnic minority in the world that: 1) it should use violence in
pursuit of its separatist objectives and 2) if it is ruthless enough and
persistent enough, it will get what it wants. It will have consequences not
only for the Tamils in Shri
Lanka, or the Russians in Crimea, or Hungarians in Transylvania, or the
Muslims in Kashmir, but potentially one day for the Mexicans in New Mexico,
Arizona, Texas and Southern California,” concluded Trifkovic.
Serbian News Network - SNN
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