Truths and Misconceptions

Empire's Rotten Serbia Policy

by Nebojsa Malic

In the August 2007 issue of Chronicles magazine, historian Srdja Trifkovic 
argues persuasively that the U.S. has painted itself into a corner with its 
Kosovo policy; a small patch of land in the Balkans, insignificant to American 
interests in Europe or the Middle East, has been made into a test of the 
American Empire and its ability to impose its will on the world – a test that 
the Empire cannot pass.

For years, U.S. policymakers have based their actions on the premise that 
Serbian leaders will yield to pressure and surrender Kosovo to ethnic Albanian 
separatists. Now it is becoming obvious that this assumption was wrong all 
along. The harder Washington presses for the separation of Kosovo, the more 
adamant Serbia is to defend it. Furthermore, the issue of Kosovo is eroding the 
already precarious public support in Serbia for joining the EU, while the 
support for NATO is nearly nonexistent.

The first U.S. ambassador in the post-Milosevic Serbia, William Montgomery, did 
something unusual at the end of his mandate in 2004. Instead of moving on to 
another assignment, Montgomery bought a villa near Dubrovnik, in southern 
Croatia, and became a columnist for the Belgrade daily Danas (Today). His 
columns, a strange mix of personal insight and official propaganda, have become 
quite popular with the readers of Danas – primarily "liberal-democrats" and the 
"human rights" crowd.

The August 19 column, titled "Ten Inconvenient Truths about Serbia," received a 
lot of media attention in Belgrade. It could well be the perfect example of 
America's twisted thinking about this central Balkans country: a mixture of 
projection, false premises, ignorance, arrogance, and an inkling of truth.

False Premises

Montgomery opens his commentary by asserting that the "overwhelming majority" 
of Serbs suffers from a "disease" of nationalism. They have a different 
perception of the past two decades than "the rest of the world," and this 
"emotion" is preventing any sort of reform or a more "realistic" look at the 
past. Instead, he argues, there is "a vision of Serbia as an innocent victim of 
malevolent outside forces and bearing no responsibility for the ills which have 
befallen it."

While it is true that the Serbs don't subscribe to the CNN version of their 
history, thanks to incessant propaganda and brainwashing, the dominant public 
opinion actually blames Milosevic for the calamities of the past 20 years – 
including the NATO aggression and the ethnic cleansing of Serbs from Croatia 
and Kosovo under U.S. and NATO auspices. Serbs do regard themselves as victims, 
but of Milosevic, not outside forces. They still regard the Empire as 
essentially benevolent – which, given the American and European support of 
neo-Nazis, Islamic militants and terrorists so long as they opposed the Serbs, 
can only be classified as Stockholm syndrome.

Montgomery was one of the key players in organizing the Serbian opposition in 
the months preceding the 2000 coup, funneling "suitcases of cash" to various 
anti-Milosevic groups. Now, however, he acts surprised that the Serbs wanted to 
live better, rather than accept the blame for all the Balkans ills. Policies 
and demands of the West since 2000 "were based on the false premise that the 
Serbian people had repudiated nationalism," he complains.

False premises? There's a lot of that going around.

Pipe Dream

The fourth "truth" according to Montgomery is a favorite fantasy of Serbia's 
"modern urban intellectuals." He claims that, "if Serbia would have played its 
cards correctly, it could have remained the most dominant country in the 
region… If a peaceful transition had taken place, Serbia, Slovenia, and Croatia 
would all now be in the European Union."

Never mind that Albanian separatism in Kosovo existed since 1912, or that Alija 
Izetbegovic wrote a manifesto for Islamic revolution in the 1970s, or that 
Franjo Tudjman triumphed in Croatia on a nationalist, separatist, anti-Serb 
platform generously funded by émigrés tied to the WW2 Ustasha movement. Let's 
also ignore the role of Germany in forcing its European partners to recognize 
Slovenia and Croatia in exchange for the Treaty of Maastricht, establishing the 
EU – or, while we're at it, the decision of the EU-appointed Badinter 
commission that defined Yugoslavia out of existence. How could any Serbian 
government have "played" any of this to its benefit?

Problem With Perceptions

Montgomery's fifth point – that Serbia's current political leaders spend more 
time fighting among themselves than against the Radicals and Socialists – is 
essentially correct, but the "threat" these two parties represent is hard to 
define. Both have demonstrated willingness and ability to abide by democratic 
rules of conduct – unlike the Liberal Democrats, for example. Televised 
shouting matches in the Serbian parliament show that Radicals certainly don't 
have the monopoly on invective in political speech. And as for their influence, 
while the Radicals are certainly polling strong, the Socialists are on the 
margin.

Claim number six gets at least something right:

"Most Serbs are focused on their severe economic problems and are just trying 
to keep their heads above water. It is a trap, however, to believe (as too many 
American officials seem to do), that this means Kosovo is not really important 
to them."

But once again, Montgomery tries to shift responsibility from his own 
government – which insists on an independent, Albanian state in Kosovo – and 
onto Serbia. Kosovo, he says, is "seen as a concrete example of how the 
International Community ignores international law to suit its own purposes and 
demonstrates its prejudice against Serbia and overall hypocrisy." He continues, 
"It is precisely this ongoing drama which is preventing Serbia from coming to 
terms with its past. In fact, it is helping to ratify all the outstanding 
prejudices and extremist views of the nationalists."

Notice the wording here. It's not American actions concerning Kosovo that 
ratify nationalist "prejudices" (how can something be prejudice if it's borne 
out by reality?), but Serbian perceptions! Montgomery's solution here is not 
for America to stop championing the cause of Albanian separatists, but for the 
Serbs to change their mind and start believing such a violation is moral, 
valid, and for their own good.

It's the State, Stupid

Making his seventh point, Montgomery compliments Belgrade as "the most dynamic 
city in the entire region," calls the Serbian privatization "the most 
successful perhaps in all of the countries undergoing democratic transition," 
and the economic growth "impressive."

Then he decries the gap between Belgrade and the rest of the country, and the 
contrast between those who benefited from transition and those who were left 
behind (pensioners, the unemployed). Given the experiences of other countries 
that transitioned from Communism into managerial statism, all of this is quite 
typical. Since all the power and capital are concentrated in Belgrade, the city 
prospers while the rest of the country languishes. Corruption is widespread 
because nothing can be done without the state. The problem is not endemic, but 
systematic.

He is quite right, however, to point out that Serbia's transition is different 
because of the decade-long U.S. (and UN) blockade of Serbia. While he is 
careful not to judge whether the sanctions brought down Milosevic (as his 
bosses at the State Department think) or helped him stay in power (as many in 
Serbia believe), Montgomery argues that the blockade did "catastrophic damage" 
to Serbia's social fabric, healthcare and education. He is not wrong.

A Paradox That Isn't

The ninth claim Montgomery makes begins with an oft-overlooked fact that 
"Serbia itself is extremely multi-ethnic and multi-religious." And yet, he 
contends, "Serbs have demonstrated time and time again a fierce resistance to 
becoming minorities anywhere (Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo all being good 
examples)." How can this be? Argues Montgomery:

"The only explanation I have is that the minorities in Serbia have accepted 
that they have very limited political power or influence and the Serbs, as a 
people, find that extremely difficult to do."

This is just appallingly stupid. As a former ambassador to Croatia, Montgomery 
surely knew about the "Independent State of Croatia" and its systematic 
slaughter, expulsion and forced conversion of Serbs during WW2, on the 
territories of present-day Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Surely he has heard 
of the 13th Waffen-SS Division, better known as "Handschar" (scimitar), which 
was composed of Bosnian Muslims. Or the 21st Waffen-SS Division "Skanderbeg," 
composed of Kosovo Albanians? How could a senior American diplomat sent to 
Croatia not know that until 1991, the constitutions in Croatia and Bosnia 
explicitly recognized Serbs as a constituent people? What people, anywhere in 
the world, would be eager to become a minority in their own country?

Things That Won't Change

The last point Montgomery makes is that recent offerings by the West to Serbia 
may be too little, too late, and won't change Belgrade's position on Kosovo. He 
is quite correct there as well.

The Empire acted on false premises throughout the 1990s, culminating with the 
one Montgomery mentions – that after October 2000, there was no need for good 
will and diplomacy towards Serbia, as demands and threats were thought to be 
enough. That policy has been a failure since at least mid-2006, if not earlier.

In 2004, Montgomery turned over the post of ambassador to Austrian-born Michael 
Polt, who went on to become reviled for constantly preaching the independence 
of Kosovo and abandoning all pretense of diplomatic tact. Even the scandalous 
behavior of Germany's Andreas Zobel in April this year paled in comparison with 
Polt's everyday arrogance. Polt's replacement, Cameron Munter, arrived in 
Belgrade last week. He has worked closely in the past with Daniel Fried 
(another senior U.S. official who champions independent Kosovo) and Madeleine 
Albright, and helped organize NATO enlargement. It won't be too hard for Munter 
to appear more polite than Polt. The policy he's been sent to advocate, 
however, looks set to remain as rotten as it's ever been.

http://www.antiwar.com/malic/?articleid=11490


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