First Kosovo, and then what?
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November 20, 2007
EUROPE STILL has a Balkans problem. This is the message to take away from the
victory of former guerrilla leader Hashim Thaci's party in Saturday's
parliamentary elections in Kosovo - balloting that was boycotted by the 10
percent of Kosovo's population who are Serbs.
The UN-supervised region is officially part of Serbia. But ever since NATO went
to war in 1999 to force Slobodan Milosevic to end his ethnic cleansing of
Albanian villages in Kosovo, the region's Albanian majority have set their
sights on separation from Serbia. Recently, American, Russian, and European
mediators have been trying to craft a formula for autonomy or phased
independence that would be acceptable both to Serbia and the Albanian Kosovar
government.
The mediators are due to report to United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon
by that date, and Thaci has threatened to declare independence unilaterally if
they do not recommend independence for Kosovo. But any such unilateral action
could set off instability across the Balkans and beyond.
While 20 of the EU's 27 members favor independence for Kosovo, nearly all dread
a unilateral declaration. That prospect conjures up memories of Europe's
careless acceptance of declarations of independence from Yugoslavia by
Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia in the early 1990s. Those acts ushered in
horrific wars and crimes against humanity.
A unilateral lunge for independence by Kosovo could spur Serbs in Bosnia and
Herzogovina - half that country's population - to follow suit. And Kremlin
warnings against the imposition of any Kosovo formula not acceptable to Serbia
raises the specter of Russian backing for independence movements in Georgia,
Moldova, and even Ukraine. This would be a prescription for armed conflict
around the periphery of Europe.
Some European diplomats also worry about the United Nations carving new
countries out of older countries' provinces. They recognize that separatist
reflexes persist in regions such as Catalonia and the Basque country. Even the
Flemish and Walloon populations of tiny Belgium may want a nationalist divorce.
The Kosovo majority's impatience for independence is understandable,
particularly since it has been subjected to a corrupt and inefficient UN
tutelage. But the European, American, and Russian mediators should keep Serbia
and the Kosovars at the negotiating table as long as it takes to hammer out a
resolution to which both sides agree.
This may mean incorporating the Serbian-populated area of Kosovo into Serbia
proper, along with Serbian monasteries and holy sites. It may entail minor
population transfers. But whatever the eventual solution, it should be accepted
by the two peoples and not imposed by
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