From: Dragan Rakic [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Thursday, January 31, 2008 7:42 AM



 

As far as it is  know, America is not world’s law maker and it does not mean
if America

recognize Kosovo as republic that Kosovo will be “independent”. In that case

the province could have some privileges by USA, but cannot react like
independent state 

if not recognized by all the UN member countries. Admitting that USA is the
only judge and jury

in the international matters, is unacceptable. In the current state of
things, the independent Kosovo is more likely 

to be a robbery of the Serbian territory by the force, than the  legal and
mutual agreement of conceding

it for some vital world interests.

 

D.Rakic

France 

EU

 

From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf
Of ANTIC.org-SNN
Sent: Thursday, January 31, 2008 1:17 PM
To: 'Balkan News'; [email protected]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Serbia;
'SerbianNewsNetwork'; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED];
'YUGO'
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [Yugoland] Warning light on Kosovo by John Bolton - Washington
Times

 

 

John Bolton is former permanent U.S. representative to the United Nations.
[Contributors] Lawrence Eagleburger is former U.S. secretary of state. Peter
Rodman is former assistant secretary of defense for international security
affairs.

[EMAIL PROTECTED] 

http://www.washingtontimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080131/COMMENTAR
Y/288472699/home.html
<http://www.washingtontimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080131/COMMENTA
RY/288472699/home.html&template=nextpage> &template=nextpage

The Washington Times

COMMENTARY


Warning light on Kosovo


By John Bolton
January 31, 2008 

The Bush administration has indicated its readiness to recognize a
unilateral declaration of independence by ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, a
province of the Republic of Serbia that since 1999 has been under United
Nations administration and NATO military control.

Such a declaration may take place as early as February. American recognition
would be over Serbia's objections, without a negotiated solution between
Serbia and Kosovo's Albanians, and without modification by the United
Nations Security Council of Resolution 1244, which reaffirms Serbian
sovereignty in Kosovo while providing for the province's "substantial
autonomy." U.S. recognition may be joined by that of some members of the
European Union, which has been under heavy diplomatic pressure from
Washington, though several EU states and a number of countries outside
Europe have said they would reject such action.

Attempting to impose a settlement on Serbia would be a direct challenge to
the Russian Federation, which opposes any Kosovo settlement not accepted by
Belgrade.

We believe an imposed settlement of the Kosovo question and seeking to
partition Serbia's sovereign territory without its consent is not in the
interest of the United States. The blithe assumption of American policy —
that the mere passage of nine years of relative quiet would be enough to
lull Serbia and Russia into reversing their positions on a conflict that
goes back centuries — has proven to be naive in the extreme.

We believe U.S. policy on Kosovo must be re-examined without delay, and we
urge the Bush administration to make it clear that pending the results of
such re-examination it would withhold recognition of a Kosovo independence
declaration and discourage Kosovo's Albanians from taking that step.

Current U.S. policy relies on the unconvincing claim that Kosovo is "unique"
and would set no precedent for other troublespots. Of course every conflict
has unique characteristics. However, ethnic and religious minorities in
other countries already are signaling their intention to follow a Kosovo
example. This includes sizeable Albanian communities in adjoining areas of
southern Serbia, Montenegro, and especially the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, as well as the Serbian portion of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Recognition of Kosovo's independence without Serbia's consent would set a
precedent with far-reaching and unpredictable consequences for many other
regions of the world. The Kosovo model already has been cited by supporters
of the Basque separatist movement in Spain and the Turkish-controlled area
of northern Cyprus. Neither the Security Council nor any other international
body has the power or authority to impose a change of any country's borders.

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the current policy is the dismissive
attitude displayed toward Russia's objections. Whatever disagreements the
United States may have with Moscow on other issues, and there are many, the
United States should not prompt an unnecessary crisis in U.S.-Russia
relations. There are urgent matters regarding which the United States must
work with Russia, including Iran's nuclear intentions and North Korea's
nuclear capability. Such cooperation would be undercut by American action to
neutralize Moscow's legitimate concerns regarding Kosovo.

If the U.S. moves forward with recognizing Kosovo, Moscow's passivity cannot
be taken for granted. It may have been one thing in 1999 for the United
States and NATO to take action against Yugoslavia over the objections of a
weak Russia.

Today, it would be unwise to dismiss Russia's willingness and ability to
assist Serbia. On an issue of minor importance to the United States, is this
a useful expenditure of significant political capital with Russia?

Our Kosovo policy is hardly less problematic for our friends and allies in
Europe. While some European countries, notably members of the EU, may feel
themselves obligated to join us in recognizing Kosovo's independence, a
number of those countries would do so reluctantly because of Washington's
inflexibility and insistence. No more than the United States, Europe would
not benefit from an avoidable confrontation with Russia.

Even if Kosovo declared itself an independent state, it would be a
dysfunctional one and a ward of the international community for the
indefinite future. Corruption and organized crime are rampant. The economy,
aside from international largesse and criminal activities, is nonviable. Law
enforcement, integrity of the courts, protection of persons and property,
and other prerequisites for statehood are practically nonexistent. While
these failures are often blamed on Kosovo's uncertain status, a unilateral
declaration of independence recognized by some countries and rejected by
many others would hardly remedy that fact.

The result would be a new "frozen conflict," with Kosovo's status still
unresolved. The risk of renewed violence would further impede Kosovo's
development. Moreover, heightened tensions might require reinforcing the
U.S. presence in Kosovo when we can least afford it due to other
commitments.

Serbia has made great strides in democratic development and economic
revitalization since the fall of the regime of Slobodan Milosevic. Current
policy with respect to Kosovo risks complete reversal of these gains. Faced
with a choice between Western partnership and defense of their sovereign
territory and constitution, there is little doubt what Serbia would decide.

The current positive trend could falter in the face of political
radicalization and possible internal destabilization. Serbia's relations
with countries that had recognized Kosovo would be impaired. Serbia would
inevitably move closer to Russia as its only protector.

We do not underestimate the difficulty and complexity of the Kosovo question
nor do we suggest the status quo can endure indefinitely. As with thorny
questions elsewhere, viable and enduring settlements should result from
negotiation and compromise. Such an outcome has been undermined by a U.S.
promise to the Kosovo Albanians that their demands will be satisfied if they
remain adamant and no agreement is reached with Belgrade. Such a promise
cannot be justified by the claim, often heard from proponents of
independence, that the Albanians' "patience" is running out, so independence
must be granted without delay. This is nothing less than appeasing a threat
of violence.

A reassessment of America's Kosovo policy is long overdue. We hope a policy
that would set a very dangerous international precedent can still be averted
if that reassessment begins now. In the meantime, it is imperative that no
unwarranted or hasty action be taken that would turn what is now a
relatively small problem into a large one.

John Bolton is former permanent U.S. representative to the United Nations.
Lawrence Eagleburger is former U.S. secretary of state. Peter Rodman is
former assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs.

 

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