http://en.fondsk.ru/article.php?id=1197
Strategic Culture Foundation (Russia)
February 7, 2008
Georgia: Heading for NATO. Abkhazia: A Union with
Russia?
Leonid Ivashov
-The Kosovo problem arose as a consequence of the
direct aggression by the United States and NATO
against the sovereign Yugoslavia and the destruction
of the integrity of that state and the forced ousting
of the Yugoslavian army and security forces out of
Kosovo.
-Georgia’s NATO entry would inevitably lead to the
deployment on its territory of military facilities
targeted at Russia.
The prospects of Ukraine’s getting a membership in the
North Atlantic alliance would narrow to the limit the
potential of Russian Black Sea Fleet, as the whole of
the Black Sea basin would be surrounded by NATO member
states (Turkey, Bulgaria, Rumania and Georgia). The
fleet would be blocked and that would throw Russia
back to the days before Peter the Great, depriving it
of its status of a sea-power.
The 2014 Olympic Games would also be under the sights,
and NATO special services would not waste time getting
down to the business of destabilising the North
Caucasian region.
Now that the presidential elections in Serbia are
over, the prospects of recognition of Kosovo and
Metohia have become more tangible after the
presidential elections in Serbia.
This has made a number of Russian experts resume
discussing the similarities of the legal status of
Kosovo on the one hand and on the other, the statuses
of the unrecognised republics on the territory of the
former USSR, in particular, Abkhazia and South
Ossetia.
Under the circumstances, the experts argue that the
next move should be the recognition by Russia of the
independent status of these Georgian autonomies
immediately after Kosovo secedes from Serbia. This
move would make ever more expedient resolving the
issue of independence of the Transdniester Republic
and Nagorno Karabakh with the ensuing aggravation of
tensions with Moldova and Azerbaijan.
But does this view fit in the picture of the
historical realities and Russia’s interests? No, and
once again “No.”
On the face of it, there is similarity between the
legal status of Kosovo on the one hand and Abkhazia
and South Ossetia on the other.
The Kosovo problem arose as a consequence of the
direct aggression by the United States and NATO
against the sovereign Yugoslavia and the destruction
of the integrity of that state and the forced ousting
of the Yugoslavian army and security forces out of
Kosovo.
The fact that Albanians, whose protection was the
chief argument for the West to vindicate its armed
intervention in the internal affairs of the SFRYu,
have a state formation of their own, Greater Albania,
should also be taken into consideration.
On the contrary, Abkhazia and South Ossetia have
determined their legal statuses in full conformity
with international law in force at the time (the early
1990s). The status of these two republics was
predetermined by Georgia’s secession from the legal
space of the Soviet Union. The move was not supported
by either Abkhazians or South Ossetians.
At the time Russia had a hard time getting back onto
the path of sovereign development, so it could not
rely on authority to support the just right of
Abkhazians, Adjarians and South Ossetians for
self-determination. Later on, the problem grew more
complicated due to growing tensions between Russia and
Georgia.
Expert community needs to take an objective view of
the reasons of their aggravation. I think that we are
overstraining our emphasis on the objective causes. It
pays to take a deeper look.
Take Georgia.
- At the time the USSR was growing weaker and then
finally broke up, the Georgian wish of sovereignty
grew stronger and stronger. Such a striving is
natural, provided it develops based on an objective
assessment of the history of relations with Russia.
Tbilisi played it differently, exhibiting the Great
Nation syndrome. All other national minorities became
for the Georgian elite the vassals of Georgian
nobility and seigneurs, less civilised and culturally
undeveloped people;
- The defeats suffered at the hands of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia were a severe hurt to Georgian national
pride;
- The preponderance of Georgians are still confident
that neither Abkhazians nor South Ossetians were the
winners, but it was Russia that stole the victory. So
all through these years Georgians have been imploring
Russia to give these territories back to them;
- Georgia’s dalliance with the West (first and
foremost, the United States) is nothing but an attempt
to assert itself as a state commensurate with Russia
with an eye to solving its territorial problems and
getting rid of the loser syndrome.
Saakashvili and those around him fail to realise that
as a result Georgia may lose its identity as a
civilisation, and probably, even its statehood.
However the Georgian elite does not register this
threatening prospect. The most important thing to them
is to assert Georgia as an independent state free from
Russia’s influence.
This is not the first time that Tbilisi resorts to
this kind of manoeuvring.
In 1918 when Russia was weakened, Georgia declared its
independence and opened the doors to German, Turkish
and later – British troops. Similar events took place
in the 1990s.
As for official Russian authorities, they failed to
find a proper formula to resolve the conflict
situations between Tbilisi and Sukhumi [Abkhazia], as
well as Tbilisi and Tskhinvali [South Ossetia].
The most important thing for Moscow was to keep the
developments within the boundaries of the negotiating
process, avoiding military clashes.
On top of that for many years another obstacle was the
duality of Moscow’s position as the Kremlin sided with
official Tbilisi, while the sympathies of Russian
parliament and general public were unchangingly with
Sukhumi and Tskhinval.
Moscow also failed to have its way demanding direct
participation of the leaders of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia in the sessions of CIS heads of states
discussing the settlement of the conflict not
promoting the negotiation process in a two-side
format. Much was lost.
What follows is Russia should put more effort into
developing the Caucasian vector of its foreign
policies.
Given that Tbilisi will continue drifting towards the
USA and NATO, whether the Kremlin people want it or
not, Moscow will have to pay especial attention to the
issue of the future of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in
the sense of Russia’s security and stability in the
North Caucasus.
Georgia’s NATO entry would inevitably lead to the
deployment on its territory of military facilities
targeted at Russia.
The prospects of Ukraine’s getting a membership in the
North Atlantic alliance would narrow to the limit the
potential of Russian Black Sea Fleet, as the whole of
the Black Sea basin would be surrounded by NATO member
states (Turkey, Bulgaria, Rumania and Georgia). The
fleet would be blocked and that would throw Russia
back to the days before Peter the Great, depriving it
of its status of a sea-power.
That is why Moscow should on no account allow the NATO
war machine to swallow Abkhazia.
What would we be, should we not prevent the situation
whereby the residence of Russian presidents in Sochi
would be within a firing distance of NATO cannons?
The 2014 Olympic Games would also be under the sights,
and NATO special services would not waste time getting
down to the business of destabilising the North
Caucasian region.
So my statement is: the solution of the Kosovo problem
should on no account become a “precedent” for the
declaration of the complete independence of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia.
This is would be both right in terms of the essence of
the problem and would save this country from the
traditional (since the Gorbachev and Yeltsin times)
reflex dependence on Western diplomacy waiting for the
next time about the Western next move. Only proactive
policies can help us stand for our national interests.
Russian diplomats should immediately clarify their
stance over the issue of the recognition of the
independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, linking
this issue with Georgia’s invitation to became a NATO
member rather than with the declaring of Kosovo’s
independent status, and upon the recognition of
Kosovo’s independence to sign without delay a package
of agreements with Abkhazia on close cooperation and a
union security treaty, allowing Russian troops to
enter this new independent state.
Serbian News Network - SNN
[email protected]
http://www.antic.org/
