sha174n commented on code in PR #40503: URL: https://github.com/apache/superset/pull/40503#discussion_r3322243318
########## SECURITY.md: ########## @@ -0,0 +1,145 @@ +<!-- +Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one +or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file +distributed with this work for additional information +regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file +to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the +"License"); you may not use this file except in compliance +with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + + http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + +Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, +software distributed under the License is distributed on an +"AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY +KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the +specific language governing permissions and limitations +under the License. +--> + +# Security Policy + +This is a project of the [Apache Software Foundation](https://apache.org) and follows the +ASF [vulnerability handling process](https://apache.org/security/#vulnerability-handling). + +## Reporting Vulnerabilities + +**⚠️ Please do not file GitHub issues for security vulnerabilities as they are public! ⚠️** + + +Apache Software Foundation takes a rigorous standpoint in annihilating the security issues Review Comment: Applied your suggestion in 47e864e505. ########## AGENTS.md: ########## @@ -52,6 +52,37 @@ Common pre-commit failures: - **External API exposure** - Use UUIDs in public APIs instead of internal integer IDs - **Existing models** - Add UUID fields alongside integer IDs for gradual migration +## Security and Threat Model + +Before evaluating any code path for security issues, read [`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md). It is the canonical, authoritative source for Apache Superset's security model and is referenced by both human reporters and automated scanners. + +In short, the test for whether a finding is in scope is one question: + +> *Does it let a principal perform an action the role and capability matrix in `SECURITY.md` does not entitle them to?* + +If yes, it is in scope. If no, it is not. + +The three trust boundaries are: + +1. **The Admin role** is a fully trusted operational principal. Anything an Admin can do through documented configuration, API, or UI is an intended capability, not a vulnerability. +2. **The operator** owns deployment-time decisions (secrets, network exposure, feature-flag selection, connector and codec choices, notification destinations, third-party plugins). Misconfiguration at this layer is a deployment defect, not a Superset vulnerability. +3. **The codebase** is responsible for enforcing the role and capability matrix across its product surface. Failures of that enforcement, anywhere, are in scope regardless of which endpoint or component contains them. Review Comment: Rephrased in 47e864e505 to spell out the entry points the codebase has to enforce the matrix at (API routes, command and DAO layers, UI handlers, background jobs), instead of the abstract product surface phrasing. -- This is an automated message from the Apache Git Service. To respond to the message, please log on to GitHub and use the URL above to go to the specific comment. To unsubscribe, e-mail: [email protected] For queries about this service, please contact Infrastructure at: [email protected] --------------------------------------------------------------------- To unsubscribe, e-mail: [email protected] For additional commands, e-mail: [email protected]
