dpgaspar commented on code in PR #40503:
URL: https://github.com/apache/superset/pull/40503#discussion_r3323936949
##########
AGENTS.md:
##########
@@ -52,6 +52,37 @@ Common pre-commit failures:
- **External API exposure** - Use UUIDs in public APIs instead of internal
integer IDs
- **Existing models** - Add UUID fields alongside integer IDs for gradual
migration
+## Security and Threat Model
+
+Before evaluating any code path for security issues, read
[`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md). It is the canonical, authoritative source for
Apache Superset's security model and is referenced by both human reporters and
automated scanners.
+
+In short, the test for whether a finding is in scope is one question:
+
+> *Does it let a principal perform an action the role and capability matrix in
`SECURITY.md` does not entitle them to?*
+
+If yes, it is in scope. If no, it is not.
+
+The three trust boundaries are:
+
+1. **The Admin role** is a fully trusted operational principal. Anything an
Admin can do through documented configuration, API, or UI is an intended
capability, not a vulnerability.
+2. **The operator** owns deployment-time decisions (secrets, network exposure,
feature-flag selection, connector and codec choices, notification destinations,
third-party plugins). Misconfiguration at this layer is a deployment defect,
not a Superset vulnerability.
+3. **The codebase** is responsible for enforcing the role and capability
matrix wherever it exposes functionality to a principal: API routes, command
and DAO layers, UI handlers, background jobs, and any other entry point. A
missing or incorrect enforcement check is in scope no matter where it lives.
+
+The security model assumes that operator-controlled infrastructure, including
the metadata database, cache backends, message brokers, secret stores, and
deployment environment, remains within the operator's trust boundary.
Vulnerabilities must demonstrate a security boundary violation by an attacker
who does not already control those systems.
+
+The canonical authorization pattern in this codebase is `@has_access_api`
(Flask-AppBuilder) at the route level plus
`security_manager.raise_for_access(...)` at the object level, with DAO
`base_filters` where listing is involved. Code following both gates is not a
finding **on authorization grounds** by itself; code that omits the per-object
gate on a route that returns or mutates a specific object is. Code following
both gates can still contain injection, SSRF, XSS, or other classes of finding
unrelated to authorization, which are evaluated separately.
Review Comment:
`@has_access_api` is the legacy decorator, let's reference:
- @protect() — REST API routes (ModelRestApi / BaseApi)
- @has_access_api — legacy view routes
- @has_access — legacy HTML view routes
##########
AGENTS.md:
##########
@@ -52,6 +52,37 @@ Common pre-commit failures:
- **External API exposure** - Use UUIDs in public APIs instead of internal
integer IDs
- **Existing models** - Add UUID fields alongside integer IDs for gradual
migration
+## Security and Threat Model
+
+Before evaluating any code path for security issues, read
[`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md). It is the canonical, authoritative source for
Apache Superset's security model and is referenced by both human reporters and
automated scanners.
+
+In short, the test for whether a finding is in scope is one question:
+
+> *Does it let a principal perform an action the role and capability matrix in
`SECURITY.md` does not entitle them to?*
+
+If yes, it is in scope. If no, it is not.
+
+The three trust boundaries are:
+
+1. **The Admin role** is a fully trusted operational principal. Anything an
Admin can do through documented configuration, API, or UI is an intended
capability, not a vulnerability.
+2. **The operator** owns deployment-time decisions (secrets, network exposure,
feature-flag selection, connector and codec choices, notification destinations,
third-party plugins). Misconfiguration at this layer is a deployment defect,
not a Superset vulnerability.
+3. **The codebase** is responsible for enforcing the role and capability
matrix wherever it exposes functionality to a principal: API routes, command
and DAO layers, UI handlers, background jobs, and any other entry point. A
missing or incorrect enforcement check is in scope no matter where it lives.
+
+The security model assumes that operator-controlled infrastructure, including
the metadata database, cache backends, message brokers, secret stores, and
deployment environment, remains within the operator's trust boundary.
Vulnerabilities must demonstrate a security boundary violation by an attacker
who does not already control those systems.
+
+The canonical authorization pattern in this codebase is `@has_access_api`
(Flask-AppBuilder) at the route level plus
`security_manager.raise_for_access(...)` at the object level, with DAO
`base_filters` where listing is involved. Code following both gates is not a
finding **on authorization grounds** by itself; code that omits the per-object
gate on a route that returns or mutates a specific object is. Code following
both gates can still contain injection, SSRF, XSS, or other classes of finding
unrelated to authorization, which are evaluated separately.
+
Review Comment:
text implies `raise_for_access` is expected on every route that "returns or
mutates a specific object", which would flag annotations, tags, saved queries,
etc. as missing it. That's a false positive factory.
```
Object-level authorization via security_manager.raise_for_access(...)
applies to data-bearing resources: dashboards, charts, datasets/datasources,
queries, database+table access, and query contexts.
Other resources (annotations, tags, CSS templates, reports, RLS rules,
etc.) rely on route-level @protect() / @has_access_api plus DAO base_filters
for ownership scoping; the absence of
raise_for_access on these resources is by design, not a finding.
```
WDYT?
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