sadpandajoe commented on code in PR #39925:
URL: https://github.com/apache/superset/pull/39925#discussion_r3335743783
##########
superset-frontend/src/utils/navigationUtils.ts:
##########
@@ -16,29 +16,281 @@
* specific language governing permissions and limitations
* under the License.
*/
-import { ensureAppRoot } from './pathUtils';
+import {
+ createElement,
+ type AnchorHTMLAttributes,
+ type ReactElement,
+} from 'react';
+import { ensureAppRoot, makeUrl, stripAppRoot } from './pathUtils';
-export const navigateTo = (
+// Re-export so callers that legitimately need a raw prefixed path (native
+// fetch, navigator.sendBeacon, image src, third-party `href` props) have a
+// single sanctioned import location. The static-invariant scan disallows
+// importing from `pathUtils` directly outside this module.
+export { ensureAppRoot, makeUrl, stripAppRoot };
+
+// The guard helpers are declared before `navigateTo` / `navigateWithState`
+// so oxlint's no-use-before-define lint (which does not honour function-
+// declaration hoisting) does not fire on the wired-up imperative-nav
+// path. The focused helpers below (`openInNewTab`, `getShareableUrl`,
+// `AppLink`) also reach for `assertSafeNavigationUrl` directly.
+
+const NEW_TAB_FEATURES = 'noopener noreferrer';
+
+// Allow-list of safe URL shapes for navigation: router-relative paths and a
+// small set of known-safe schemes. `ensureAppRoot` already neutralises
+// `javascript:` / `data:` by prefixing them as relative paths; protocol-
+// relative `//host` is intentionally excluded here because it is a cross-
+// origin navigation primitive that previously enabled open redirects.
+//
+// nit-3 / AF-1 hardening: the leading-slash branch also rejects any URL
+// containing a backslash anywhere — browsers normalise `/\evil.com` →
+// `//evil.com` in the special-scheme authority, so backslashes in any
+// position let an attacker craft a path that looks router-relative until
+// the browser parses it. http(s)/ftp URLs with userinfo (`@` before the
+// first `/` after `//`) are rejected by the post-regex authority check
+// below, since `https://[email protected]` resolves to the host `evil.com`
+// despite presenting as a same-origin-looking URL to the eye.
+const SAFE_NAVIGATION_URL_RE = /^(?:\/(?!\/)|https?:|ftp:|mailto:|tel:)/i;
+const USERINFO_BEARING_SCHEME_RE = /^(?:https?|ftp):/i;
+
+function assertSafeNavigationUrl(url: string): string {
+ if (!SAFE_NAVIGATION_URL_RE.test(url) || url.includes('\\')) {
+ throw new Error(
+ 'navigationUtils refused unsafe URL: only relative paths and ' +
+ 'http(s):, ftp:, mailto:, tel: schemes are allowed.',
+ );
+ }
+ if (USERINFO_BEARING_SCHEME_RE.test(url)) {
+ let parsed: URL;
+ try {
+ parsed = new URL(url);
+ } catch {
+ throw new Error(
+ 'navigationUtils refused unsafe URL: unparseable authority.',
+ );
+ }
+ if (parsed.username || parsed.password) {
+ throw new Error(
+ 'navigationUtils refused unsafe URL: ' +
+ 'http(s)/ftp URLs with userinfo are not allowed.',
+ );
+ }
+ }
+ return url;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Imperative full-page navigation. Internal entry point for `redirect()`
+ * and a handful of legacy callers; new code should prefer `<AppLink>` or
+ * `redirect()`. Unsafe URLs (protocol-relative, backslash-laden, userinfo-
+ * carrying http(s)) fall back to `ensureAppRoot('/')` with a `console.error`
+ * — never a silent navigation to the rejected target.
+ *
+ * Each `window.*` sink lives inside an if-block whose guard is composed
+ * exclusively of inline barriers CodeQL recognises in its default model:
+ * router-relative paths are gated by `new URL(target, origin)` plus an
+ * `origin === window.location.origin` equality (the canonical sanitiser
+ * barrier for `js/client-side-unvalidated-url-redirection` and
+ * `js/xss-through-dom`); external URLs are gated by `String.includes` for
+ * backslashes, constant equality on `URL.protocol`, and property reads on
+ * `URL.username` / `URL.password`. Router-relative and external-scheme code
+ * paths are split so each sink has a complete, function-call-free safety
+ * check immediately above it.
+ *
+ * @internal
+ */
+export function navigateTo(
url: string,
options?: { newWindow?: boolean; assign?: boolean },
-) => {
- if (options?.newWindow) {
- window.open(ensureAppRoot(url), '_blank', 'noopener noreferrer');
- } else if (options?.assign) {
- window.location.assign(ensureAppRoot(url));
- } else {
- window.location.href = ensureAppRoot(url);
+): void {
+ const target = ensureAppRoot(url);
+ // Backslash rejection (AF-1): browsers normalise `/\evil.com` →
+ // `//evil.com` in the special-scheme authority. Done as a pre-check
+ // before the URL constructor barrier because `new URL('/\\evil', origin)`
+ // would percent-encode the backslash and pass the origin check — visually
+ // safe but masking attacker intent.
+ if (!target.includes('\\')) {
+ // Router-relative path: anchor the input at the current origin and
+ // verify the resulting URL stays same-origin. `URL.origin ===
+ // window.location.origin` is the canonical CodeQL-recognised
+ // sanitiser barrier for `js/client-side-unvalidated-url-redirection`
+ // and `js/xss-through-dom` on `window.location.*` / `window.open`
+ // sinks. The sink-fed value is built from verified URL properties
+ // (`pathname` + `search` + `hash`), so the data-flow chain from
+ // `url` (source) to the sink is broken by the parse + origin check.
+ let sameOrigin: URL | null;
+ try {
+ sameOrigin = new URL(target, window.location.origin);
+ } catch {
+ sameOrigin = null;
+ }
+ if (
+ sameOrigin !== null &&
+ sameOrigin.origin === window.location.origin
+ ) {
+ const safePath =
`${sameOrigin.pathname}${sameOrigin.search}${sameOrigin.hash}`;
+ if (options?.newWindow) {
+ window.open(safePath, '_blank', NEW_TAB_FEATURES);
+ } else if (options?.assign) {
+ window.location.assign(safePath);
Review Comment:
Combined barrier: outer `startsWith("/") && !startsWith("//") &&
!includes("\\\\")` triple (recognised by `js/url-redirection`) plus inner `new
URL(target, SAFE_PATH_PARSE_BASE)` + literal equality on `parsed.origin` +
literal equality on `parsed.protocol` (recognised by `js/xss-through-dom` /
`js/html-injection`). The sink at this line is fed
`${parsed.pathname}${parsed.search}${parsed.hash}`, a fresh string built from
verified URL properties, so the data-flow chain from `url` is broken by the
parse + property checks. Constant base (`http://navigation-utils.invalid/`)
keeps the parse deterministic under test mocks. Fixed in 5fee21b509.
##########
superset-frontend/src/utils/navigationUtils.ts:
##########
@@ -16,29 +16,281 @@
* specific language governing permissions and limitations
* under the License.
*/
-import { ensureAppRoot } from './pathUtils';
+import {
+ createElement,
+ type AnchorHTMLAttributes,
+ type ReactElement,
+} from 'react';
+import { ensureAppRoot, makeUrl, stripAppRoot } from './pathUtils';
-export const navigateTo = (
+// Re-export so callers that legitimately need a raw prefixed path (native
+// fetch, navigator.sendBeacon, image src, third-party `href` props) have a
+// single sanctioned import location. The static-invariant scan disallows
+// importing from `pathUtils` directly outside this module.
+export { ensureAppRoot, makeUrl, stripAppRoot };
+
+// The guard helpers are declared before `navigateTo` / `navigateWithState`
+// so oxlint's no-use-before-define lint (which does not honour function-
+// declaration hoisting) does not fire on the wired-up imperative-nav
+// path. The focused helpers below (`openInNewTab`, `getShareableUrl`,
+// `AppLink`) also reach for `assertSafeNavigationUrl` directly.
+
+const NEW_TAB_FEATURES = 'noopener noreferrer';
+
+// Allow-list of safe URL shapes for navigation: router-relative paths and a
+// small set of known-safe schemes. `ensureAppRoot` already neutralises
+// `javascript:` / `data:` by prefixing them as relative paths; protocol-
+// relative `//host` is intentionally excluded here because it is a cross-
+// origin navigation primitive that previously enabled open redirects.
+//
+// nit-3 / AF-1 hardening: the leading-slash branch also rejects any URL
+// containing a backslash anywhere — browsers normalise `/\evil.com` →
+// `//evil.com` in the special-scheme authority, so backslashes in any
+// position let an attacker craft a path that looks router-relative until
+// the browser parses it. http(s)/ftp URLs with userinfo (`@` before the
+// first `/` after `//`) are rejected by the post-regex authority check
+// below, since `https://[email protected]` resolves to the host `evil.com`
+// despite presenting as a same-origin-looking URL to the eye.
+const SAFE_NAVIGATION_URL_RE = /^(?:\/(?!\/)|https?:|ftp:|mailto:|tel:)/i;
+const USERINFO_BEARING_SCHEME_RE = /^(?:https?|ftp):/i;
+
+function assertSafeNavigationUrl(url: string): string {
+ if (!SAFE_NAVIGATION_URL_RE.test(url) || url.includes('\\')) {
+ throw new Error(
+ 'navigationUtils refused unsafe URL: only relative paths and ' +
+ 'http(s):, ftp:, mailto:, tel: schemes are allowed.',
+ );
+ }
+ if (USERINFO_BEARING_SCHEME_RE.test(url)) {
+ let parsed: URL;
+ try {
+ parsed = new URL(url);
+ } catch {
+ throw new Error(
+ 'navigationUtils refused unsafe URL: unparseable authority.',
+ );
+ }
+ if (parsed.username || parsed.password) {
+ throw new Error(
+ 'navigationUtils refused unsafe URL: ' +
+ 'http(s)/ftp URLs with userinfo are not allowed.',
+ );
+ }
+ }
+ return url;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Imperative full-page navigation. Internal entry point for `redirect()`
+ * and a handful of legacy callers; new code should prefer `<AppLink>` or
+ * `redirect()`. Unsafe URLs (protocol-relative, backslash-laden, userinfo-
+ * carrying http(s)) fall back to `ensureAppRoot('/')` with a `console.error`
+ * — never a silent navigation to the rejected target.
+ *
+ * Each `window.*` sink lives inside an if-block whose guard is composed
+ * exclusively of inline barriers CodeQL recognises in its default model:
+ * router-relative paths are gated by `new URL(target, origin)` plus an
+ * `origin === window.location.origin` equality (the canonical sanitiser
+ * barrier for `js/client-side-unvalidated-url-redirection` and
+ * `js/xss-through-dom`); external URLs are gated by `String.includes` for
+ * backslashes, constant equality on `URL.protocol`, and property reads on
+ * `URL.username` / `URL.password`. Router-relative and external-scheme code
+ * paths are split so each sink has a complete, function-call-free safety
+ * check immediately above it.
+ *
+ * @internal
+ */
+export function navigateTo(
url: string,
options?: { newWindow?: boolean; assign?: boolean },
-) => {
- if (options?.newWindow) {
- window.open(ensureAppRoot(url), '_blank', 'noopener noreferrer');
- } else if (options?.assign) {
- window.location.assign(ensureAppRoot(url));
- } else {
- window.location.href = ensureAppRoot(url);
+): void {
+ const target = ensureAppRoot(url);
+ // Backslash rejection (AF-1): browsers normalise `/\evil.com` →
+ // `//evil.com` in the special-scheme authority. Done as a pre-check
+ // before the URL constructor barrier because `new URL('/\\evil', origin)`
+ // would percent-encode the backslash and pass the origin check — visually
+ // safe but masking attacker intent.
+ if (!target.includes('\\')) {
+ // Router-relative path: anchor the input at the current origin and
+ // verify the resulting URL stays same-origin. `URL.origin ===
+ // window.location.origin` is the canonical CodeQL-recognised
+ // sanitiser barrier for `js/client-side-unvalidated-url-redirection`
+ // and `js/xss-through-dom` on `window.location.*` / `window.open`
+ // sinks. The sink-fed value is built from verified URL properties
+ // (`pathname` + `search` + `hash`), so the data-flow chain from
+ // `url` (source) to the sink is broken by the parse + origin check.
+ let sameOrigin: URL | null;
+ try {
+ sameOrigin = new URL(target, window.location.origin);
+ } catch {
+ sameOrigin = null;
+ }
+ if (
+ sameOrigin !== null &&
+ sameOrigin.origin === window.location.origin
+ ) {
+ const safePath =
`${sameOrigin.pathname}${sameOrigin.search}${sameOrigin.hash}`;
+ if (options?.newWindow) {
+ window.open(safePath, '_blank', NEW_TAB_FEATURES);
+ } else if (options?.assign) {
+ window.location.assign(safePath);
+ } else {
+ window.location.href = safePath;
Review Comment:
Combined barrier: outer `startsWith("/") && !startsWith("//") &&
!includes("\\\\")` triple (recognised by `js/url-redirection`) plus inner `new
URL(target, SAFE_PATH_PARSE_BASE)` + literal equality on `parsed.origin` +
literal equality on `parsed.protocol` (recognised by `js/xss-through-dom` /
`js/html-injection`). The sink at this line is fed
`${parsed.pathname}${parsed.search}${parsed.hash}`, a fresh string built from
verified URL properties, so the data-flow chain from `url` is broken by the
parse + property checks. Constant base (`http://navigation-utils.invalid/`)
keeps the parse deterministic under test mocks. Fixed in 5fee21b509.
##########
superset-frontend/src/utils/navigationUtils.ts:
##########
@@ -16,29 +16,281 @@
* specific language governing permissions and limitations
* under the License.
*/
-import { ensureAppRoot } from './pathUtils';
+import {
+ createElement,
+ type AnchorHTMLAttributes,
+ type ReactElement,
+} from 'react';
+import { ensureAppRoot, makeUrl, stripAppRoot } from './pathUtils';
-export const navigateTo = (
+// Re-export so callers that legitimately need a raw prefixed path (native
+// fetch, navigator.sendBeacon, image src, third-party `href` props) have a
+// single sanctioned import location. The static-invariant scan disallows
+// importing from `pathUtils` directly outside this module.
+export { ensureAppRoot, makeUrl, stripAppRoot };
+
+// The guard helpers are declared before `navigateTo` / `navigateWithState`
+// so oxlint's no-use-before-define lint (which does not honour function-
+// declaration hoisting) does not fire on the wired-up imperative-nav
+// path. The focused helpers below (`openInNewTab`, `getShareableUrl`,
+// `AppLink`) also reach for `assertSafeNavigationUrl` directly.
+
+const NEW_TAB_FEATURES = 'noopener noreferrer';
+
+// Allow-list of safe URL shapes for navigation: router-relative paths and a
+// small set of known-safe schemes. `ensureAppRoot` already neutralises
+// `javascript:` / `data:` by prefixing them as relative paths; protocol-
+// relative `//host` is intentionally excluded here because it is a cross-
+// origin navigation primitive that previously enabled open redirects.
+//
+// nit-3 / AF-1 hardening: the leading-slash branch also rejects any URL
+// containing a backslash anywhere — browsers normalise `/\evil.com` →
+// `//evil.com` in the special-scheme authority, so backslashes in any
+// position let an attacker craft a path that looks router-relative until
+// the browser parses it. http(s)/ftp URLs with userinfo (`@` before the
+// first `/` after `//`) are rejected by the post-regex authority check
+// below, since `https://[email protected]` resolves to the host `evil.com`
+// despite presenting as a same-origin-looking URL to the eye.
+const SAFE_NAVIGATION_URL_RE = /^(?:\/(?!\/)|https?:|ftp:|mailto:|tel:)/i;
+const USERINFO_BEARING_SCHEME_RE = /^(?:https?|ftp):/i;
+
+function assertSafeNavigationUrl(url: string): string {
+ if (!SAFE_NAVIGATION_URL_RE.test(url) || url.includes('\\')) {
+ throw new Error(
+ 'navigationUtils refused unsafe URL: only relative paths and ' +
+ 'http(s):, ftp:, mailto:, tel: schemes are allowed.',
+ );
+ }
+ if (USERINFO_BEARING_SCHEME_RE.test(url)) {
+ let parsed: URL;
+ try {
+ parsed = new URL(url);
+ } catch {
+ throw new Error(
+ 'navigationUtils refused unsafe URL: unparseable authority.',
+ );
+ }
+ if (parsed.username || parsed.password) {
+ throw new Error(
+ 'navigationUtils refused unsafe URL: ' +
+ 'http(s)/ftp URLs with userinfo are not allowed.',
+ );
+ }
+ }
+ return url;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Imperative full-page navigation. Internal entry point for `redirect()`
+ * and a handful of legacy callers; new code should prefer `<AppLink>` or
+ * `redirect()`. Unsafe URLs (protocol-relative, backslash-laden, userinfo-
+ * carrying http(s)) fall back to `ensureAppRoot('/')` with a `console.error`
+ * — never a silent navigation to the rejected target.
+ *
+ * Each `window.*` sink lives inside an if-block whose guard is composed
+ * exclusively of inline barriers CodeQL recognises in its default model:
+ * router-relative paths are gated by `new URL(target, origin)` plus an
+ * `origin === window.location.origin` equality (the canonical sanitiser
+ * barrier for `js/client-side-unvalidated-url-redirection` and
+ * `js/xss-through-dom`); external URLs are gated by `String.includes` for
+ * backslashes, constant equality on `URL.protocol`, and property reads on
+ * `URL.username` / `URL.password`. Router-relative and external-scheme code
+ * paths are split so each sink has a complete, function-call-free safety
+ * check immediately above it.
+ *
+ * @internal
+ */
+export function navigateTo(
url: string,
options?: { newWindow?: boolean; assign?: boolean },
-) => {
- if (options?.newWindow) {
- window.open(ensureAppRoot(url), '_blank', 'noopener noreferrer');
- } else if (options?.assign) {
- window.location.assign(ensureAppRoot(url));
- } else {
- window.location.href = ensureAppRoot(url);
+): void {
+ const target = ensureAppRoot(url);
+ // Backslash rejection (AF-1): browsers normalise `/\evil.com` →
+ // `//evil.com` in the special-scheme authority. Done as a pre-check
+ // before the URL constructor barrier because `new URL('/\\evil', origin)`
+ // would percent-encode the backslash and pass the origin check — visually
+ // safe but masking attacker intent.
+ if (!target.includes('\\')) {
+ // Router-relative path: anchor the input at the current origin and
+ // verify the resulting URL stays same-origin. `URL.origin ===
+ // window.location.origin` is the canonical CodeQL-recognised
+ // sanitiser barrier for `js/client-side-unvalidated-url-redirection`
+ // and `js/xss-through-dom` on `window.location.*` / `window.open`
+ // sinks. The sink-fed value is built from verified URL properties
+ // (`pathname` + `search` + `hash`), so the data-flow chain from
+ // `url` (source) to the sink is broken by the parse + origin check.
+ let sameOrigin: URL | null;
+ try {
+ sameOrigin = new URL(target, window.location.origin);
+ } catch {
+ sameOrigin = null;
+ }
+ if (
+ sameOrigin !== null &&
+ sameOrigin.origin === window.location.origin
+ ) {
+ const safePath =
`${sameOrigin.pathname}${sameOrigin.search}${sameOrigin.hash}`;
+ if (options?.newWindow) {
+ window.open(safePath, '_blank', NEW_TAB_FEATURES);
+ } else if (options?.assign) {
+ window.location.assign(safePath);
+ } else {
+ window.location.href = safePath;
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ // External-URL path: parse, verify scheme via literal equality
+ // (CodeQL recognises constant-equality barriers on `URL.protocol`),
+ // verify no userinfo (nit-3), then feed the URL constructor's
+ // normalised `href` to the sink.
+ let parsed: URL | null;
+ try {
+ parsed = new URL(target);
+ } catch {
+ parsed = null;
+ }
+ if (
+ parsed !== null &&
+ (parsed.protocol === 'https:' ||
+ parsed.protocol === 'http:' ||
+ parsed.protocol === 'ftp:' ||
+ parsed.protocol === 'mailto:' ||
+ parsed.protocol === 'tel:') &&
+ !parsed.username &&
+ !parsed.password
+ ) {
+ const safeExternal = parsed.href;
+ if (options?.newWindow) {
+ window.open(safeExternal, '_blank', NEW_TAB_FEATURES);
+ } else if (options?.assign) {
+ window.location.assign(safeExternal);
+ } else {
+ window.location.href = safeExternal;
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+ // eslint-disable-next-line no-console -- guarded surface, observable in dev.
+ console.error('navigationUtils.navigateTo refused unsafe URL:', url);
+ // Fallback to deployment home. Same URL-constructor + origin barrier.
+ const home = ensureAppRoot('/');
+ if (!home.includes('\\')) {
+ let homeUrl: URL | null;
+ try {
+ homeUrl = new URL(home, window.location.origin);
+ } catch {
+ homeUrl = null;
+ }
+ if (homeUrl !== null && homeUrl.origin === window.location.origin) {
+ window.location.href =
`${homeUrl.pathname}${homeUrl.search}${homeUrl.hash}`;
Review Comment:
Combined barrier: outer `startsWith("/") && !startsWith("//") &&
!includes("\\\\")` triple (recognised by `js/url-redirection`) plus inner `new
URL(target, SAFE_PATH_PARSE_BASE)` + literal equality on `parsed.origin` +
literal equality on `parsed.protocol` (recognised by `js/xss-through-dom` /
`js/html-injection`). The sink at this line is fed
`${parsed.pathname}${parsed.search}${parsed.hash}`, a fresh string built from
verified URL properties, so the data-flow chain from `url` is broken by the
parse + property checks. Constant base (`http://navigation-utils.invalid/`)
keeps the parse deterministic under test mocks. Fixed in 5fee21b509.
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