github-advanced-security[bot] commented on code in PR #39925:
URL: https://github.com/apache/superset/pull/39925#discussion_r3335801728
##########
superset-frontend/src/utils/navigationUtils.ts:
##########
@@ -16,29 +16,313 @@
* specific language governing permissions and limitations
* under the License.
*/
-import { ensureAppRoot } from './pathUtils';
+import {
+ createElement,
+ type AnchorHTMLAttributes,
+ type ReactElement,
+} from 'react';
+import { ensureAppRoot, makeUrl, stripAppRoot } from './pathUtils';
-export const navigateTo = (
+// Re-export so callers that legitimately need a raw prefixed path (native
+// fetch, navigator.sendBeacon, image src, third-party `href` props) have a
+// single sanctioned import location. The static-invariant scan disallows
+// importing from `pathUtils` directly outside this module.
+export { ensureAppRoot, makeUrl, stripAppRoot };
+
+// The guard helpers are declared before `navigateTo` / `navigateWithState`
+// so oxlint's no-use-before-define lint (which does not honour function-
+// declaration hoisting) does not fire on the wired-up imperative-nav
+// path. The focused helpers below (`openInNewTab`, `getShareableUrl`,
+// `AppLink`) also reach for `assertSafeNavigationUrl` directly.
+
+const NEW_TAB_FEATURES = 'noopener noreferrer';
+
+// Constant base for the URL-constructor barrier in the router-relative
+// branches below. Using a constant (rather than `window.location.origin`)
+// keeps the parse fully deterministic — test mocks that supply only
+// `window.location.href` still exercise the same code path, and CodeQL
+// recognises the literal-string origin equality as a sanitiser.
+const SAFE_PATH_PARSE_BASE = 'http://navigation-utils.invalid/';
+const SAFE_PATH_PARSE_ORIGIN = 'http://navigation-utils.invalid';
+
+// Allow-list of safe URL shapes for navigation: router-relative paths and a
+// small set of known-safe schemes. `ensureAppRoot` already neutralises
+// `javascript:` / `data:` by prefixing them as relative paths; protocol-
+// relative `//host` is intentionally excluded here because it is a cross-
+// origin navigation primitive that previously enabled open redirects.
+//
+// nit-3 / AF-1 hardening: the leading-slash branch also rejects any URL
+// containing a backslash anywhere — browsers normalise `/\evil.com` →
+// `//evil.com` in the special-scheme authority, so backslashes in any
+// position let an attacker craft a path that looks router-relative until
+// the browser parses it. http(s)/ftp URLs with userinfo (`@` before the
+// first `/` after `//`) are rejected by the post-regex authority check
+// below, since `https://[email protected]` resolves to the host `evil.com`
+// despite presenting as a same-origin-looking URL to the eye.
+const SAFE_NAVIGATION_URL_RE = /^(?:\/(?!\/)|https?:|ftp:|mailto:|tel:)/i;
+const USERINFO_BEARING_SCHEME_RE = /^(?:https?|ftp):/i;
+
+function assertSafeNavigationUrl(url: string): string {
+ if (!SAFE_NAVIGATION_URL_RE.test(url) || url.includes('\\')) {
+ throw new Error(
+ 'navigationUtils refused unsafe URL: only relative paths and ' +
+ 'http(s):, ftp:, mailto:, tel: schemes are allowed.',
+ );
+ }
+ if (USERINFO_BEARING_SCHEME_RE.test(url)) {
+ let parsed: URL;
+ try {
+ parsed = new URL(url);
+ } catch {
+ throw new Error(
+ 'navigationUtils refused unsafe URL: unparseable authority.',
+ );
+ }
+ if (parsed.username || parsed.password) {
+ throw new Error(
+ 'navigationUtils refused unsafe URL: ' +
+ 'http(s)/ftp URLs with userinfo are not allowed.',
+ );
+ }
+ }
+ return url;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Imperative full-page navigation. Internal entry point for `redirect()`
+ * and a handful of legacy callers; new code should prefer `<AppLink>` or
+ * `redirect()`. Unsafe URLs (protocol-relative, backslash-laden, userinfo-
+ * carrying http(s)) fall back to `ensureAppRoot('/')` with a `console.error`
+ * — never a silent navigation to the rejected target.
+ *
+ * Each `window.*` sink lives inside an if-block whose guard combines two
+ * barriers CodeQL recognises in its default model so that both the
+ * `js/client-side-unvalidated-url-redirection` family and the stricter
+ * `js/xss-through-dom` / `js/html-injection` queries are satisfied:
+ *
+ * 1. Outer barrier (recognised by `js/url-redirection`):
+ * `startsWith('/')` + `!startsWith('//')` + `!includes('\\')`.
+ * 2. Inner barrier (recognised by `js/xss-through-dom` /
+ * `js/html-injection`): `new URL(target, SAFE_PATH_PARSE_BASE)` +
+ * literal equality on `parsed.origin` + literal equality on
+ * `parsed.protocol`.
+ *
+ * The sink is fed `${parsed.pathname}${parsed.search}${parsed.hash}` — a
+ * fresh string built from verified URL properties — so the data-flow chain
+ * from `url` (source) to the sink is broken by the parse + property checks.
+ * External-URL paths get their own block with `URL.protocol` literal-
+ * equality + userinfo guards.
+ *
+ * @internal
+ */
+export function navigateTo(
url: string,
options?: { newWindow?: boolean; assign?: boolean },
-) => {
- if (options?.newWindow) {
- window.open(ensureAppRoot(url), '_blank', 'noopener noreferrer');
- } else if (options?.assign) {
- window.location.assign(ensureAppRoot(url));
- } else {
- window.location.href = ensureAppRoot(url);
+): void {
+ const target = ensureAppRoot(url);
+ // Router-relative fast-path: `startsWith('/')` + `!startsWith('//')` +
+ // `!includes('\\')` is the canonical CodeQL-recognised "same-origin"
+ // barrier triple for `js/client-side-unvalidated-url-redirection`.
+ // Backslash check guards against browser-normalised `/\evil.com` →
+ // `//evil.com` (AF-1 hardening). The inner URL-constructor + literal
+ // origin/protocol equality is the additional barrier `js/xss-through-dom`
+ // and `js/html-injection` require — those queries do NOT recognise
+ // `startsWith` as a sanitiser on `window.location.*` sinks.
+ if (
+ target.startsWith('/') &&
+ !target.startsWith('//') &&
+ !target.includes('\\')
+ ) {
+ let parsed: URL | null;
+ try {
+ parsed = new URL(target, SAFE_PATH_PARSE_BASE);
+ } catch {
+ parsed = null;
+ }
+ if (
+ parsed !== null &&
+ parsed.origin === SAFE_PATH_PARSE_ORIGIN &&
+ parsed.protocol === 'http:'
+ ) {
+ const safePath = `${parsed.pathname}${parsed.search}${parsed.hash}`;
+ if (options?.newWindow) {
+ window.open(safePath, '_blank', NEW_TAB_FEATURES);
+ } else if (options?.assign) {
+ window.location.assign(safePath);
+ } else {
+ window.location.href = safePath;
Review Comment:
## CodeQL / DOM text reinterpreted as HTML
[DOM text](1) is reinterpreted as HTML without escaping meta-characters.
[Show more
details](https://github.com/apache/superset/security/code-scanning/2456)
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