EnxDev commented on code in PR #39469:
URL: https://github.com/apache/superset/pull/39469#discussion_r3601710370
##########
superset/views/users/api.py:
##########
@@ -161,6 +309,135 @@ def update_me(self) -> Response:
except ValidationError as error:
return self.response_400(message=error.messages)
+ @expose("/password", methods=["PUT"])
+ @protect()
+ @permission_name("write")
+ @safe
+ @statsd_metrics
+ @requires_json
+ @_rate_limit_me_password_change
+ def update_my_password(self) -> Response:
+ """Update the current user's password (AUTH_DB only)
+ ---
+ put:
+ summary: Update the current user's password
+ description: >-
+ Changes the authenticated user's password when ``AUTH_TYPE`` is
``AUTH_DB``.
+ Requires the current password and a new password that satisfies
+ ``AUTH_DB_CONFIG`` policy.
+ requestBody:
+ required: true
+ content:
+ application/json:
+ schema:
+ $ref: '#/components/schemas/CurrentUserPasswordPutSchema'
+ responses:
+ 200:
+ description: Password updated successfully
+ content:
+ application/json:
+ schema:
+ type: object
+ properties:
+ result:
+ $ref: '#/components/schemas/UserResponseSchema'
+ 400:
+ $ref: '#/components/responses/400'
+ 401:
+ $ref: '#/components/responses/401'
+ 429:
+ $ref: '#/components/responses/400'
+ 500:
+ $ref: '#/components/responses/500'
+ """
+ if app.config.get("AUTH_TYPE") != AUTH_DB:
+ return self.response_400(
+ message=(
+ "Password change is only available when AUTH_TYPE is
AUTH_DB."
+ ),
+ )
+
+ try:
+ body = _load_password_change_body(
+ self.current_user_password_put_schema,
+ request.json,
+ )
+ user_db = db.session.get(User, g.user.id)
+ if user_db is None:
+ return self.response_404()
+
+ old_hash = user_db.password
+ if not verify_auth_db_password(old_hash, body["current_password"]):
+ return self.response_400(message="Incorrect current password.")
+
+ new_hash = hash_auth_db_password(body["new_password"])
+ except ValidationError as error:
+ return self.response_400(message=error.messages)
+
+ try:
+ user_after, new_stamp = _commit_user_password_change(
+ self,
+ g.user.id,
+ old_hash,
+ new_hash,
+ )
+ except PasswordChangeConflictError:
+ return self.response_400(
+ message=(
+ "Unable to update password. Your password may have been "
+ "changed elsewhere; please try again."
+ ),
+ )
+ except SQLAlchemyError:
+ db.session.rollback() # pylint: disable=consider-using-transaction
+ logger.exception("Failed to commit password change")
+ return self.response_500(
+ message="Unable to update password. Please try again.",
+ )
+
+ cache_user_session_auth_stamp(g.user.id, new_stamp)
+ _reestablish_login_session(user_after)
+ _log_audit_event("UserPasswordChanged", {"user_id": g.user.id})
Review Comment:
Would it make sense to add more details here?
##########
superset/security/manager.py:
##########
@@ -1334,22 +1349,50 @@ def reset_password(self, userid: Union[int, str],
password: str) -> None:
bypassed. We distinguish the two by comparing the acting user
(``g.user``) against the target ``userid``: they match for a
self-service reset and differ for an admin reset.
+
+ On ``AUTH_DB``, the per-user session auth stamp is rotated so every
+ other session for the target account is invalidated — including when an
+ administrator resets a compromised password.
"""
+ # pylint: disable=import-outside-toplevel
+ from flask_appbuilder.const import AUTH_DB
+
super().reset_password(userid, password)
+ try:
+ target_user_id = int(userid)
+ except (TypeError, ValueError):
+ target_user_id = None
+
acting_user = getattr(g, "user", None)
acting_user_id = getattr(acting_user, "id", None)
# ``userid`` arrives as a string (the ``pk`` request arg) on the admin
# path, so coerce both sides before comparing.
- is_self_service = acting_user_id is not None and self._same_user(
- acting_user_id, userid
+ is_self_service = (
+ acting_user_id is not None
+ and target_user_id is not None
+ and self._same_user(acting_user_id, userid)
)
- if is_self_service:
+
+ if (
+ current_app.config.get("AUTH_TYPE") == AUTH_DB
+ and target_user_id is not None
+ ):
+ from superset.utils.auth_session_stamp import (
+ bump_user_session_auth_stamp,
+ sync_session_auth_stamp_on_login,
+ )
+
+ bump_user_session_auth_stamp(target_user_id)
+ if is_self_service and acting_user is not None:
+ sync_session_auth_stamp_on_login(acting_user)
+
+ if is_self_service and target_user_id is not None:
from superset.security.password_change import (
clear_password_must_change,
)
- clear_password_must_change(int(userid))
+ clear_password_must_change(target_user_id)
Review Comment:
@shantanukhond would it make sense to add an `_log_audit_event` here so we
can track who changed the password?
##########
superset/utils/auth_session_stamp.py:
##########
@@ -0,0 +1,382 @@
+# Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one
+# or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file
+# distributed with this work for additional information
+# regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file
+# to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the
+# "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance
+# with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
+#
+# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+#
+# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing,
+# software distributed under the License is distributed on an
+# "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY
+# KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the
+# specific language governing permissions and limitations
+# under the License.
+"""Session stamp: invalidate all browser sessions when a user's password
changes."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import logging
+import time
+from typing import Any
+from uuid import uuid4
+
+from flask import Flask, has_request_context, session
+from flask_login import current_user, logout_user
+from sqlalchemy.exc import IntegrityError, SQLAlchemyError
+
+from superset.extensions import db
+from superset.utils.decorators import transaction
+
+logger: logging.Logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+SESSION_AUTH_STAMP_SESSION_KEY = "_auth_session_stamp"
+SESSION_AUTH_STAMP_VALIDATED_AT_KEY = "_auth_session_stamp_validated_at"
+SESSION_AUTH_STAMP_VALIDATED_DB_STAMP_KEY =
"_auth_session_stamp_validated_db_stamp"
+
+_SAFE_METHODS = frozenset({"GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS"})
+_STAMP_CACHE_KEY_PREFIX = "auth_session_stamp:"
+_DEFAULT_STAMP_CACHE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 300
+
+
+def _stamp_cache_key(user_id: int) -> str:
+ return f"{_STAMP_CACHE_KEY_PREFIX}{user_id}"
+
+
+def _get_revalidation_seconds() -> int:
+ """Return ``SESSION_AUTH_STAMP_REVALIDATION_SECONDS``, defaulting on bad
config."""
+ from flask import current_app
+
+ raw = current_app.config.get("SESSION_AUTH_STAMP_REVALIDATION_SECONDS", 0)
+ try:
+ return int(raw)
+ except (TypeError, ValueError):
+ logger.warning(
+ "Invalid SESSION_AUTH_STAMP_REVALIDATION_SECONDS=%r; "
+ "defaulting to 0 (check on every request)",
+ raw,
+ )
+ return 0
+
+
+def _stamp_cache_timeout_seconds() -> int:
+ if (revalidation_seconds := _get_revalidation_seconds()) > 0:
+ return revalidation_seconds
+ return _DEFAULT_STAMP_CACHE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
+
+
+def _get_cached_user_session_stamp(user_id: int) -> str | None:
+ try:
+ from superset.extensions import cache_manager
+
+ cached = cache_manager.cache.get(_stamp_cache_key(user_id))
+ except Exception: # noqa: BLE001
+ logger.debug(
+ "Unable to read session auth stamp cache for user_id=%s",
+ user_id,
+ exc_info=True,
+ )
+ return None
+ return cached if isinstance(cached, str) else None
+
+
+def _cache_user_session_stamp(user_id: int, stamp: str) -> None:
+ try:
+ from superset.extensions import cache_manager
+
+ cache_manager.cache.set(
+ _stamp_cache_key(user_id),
+ stamp,
+ timeout=_stamp_cache_timeout_seconds(),
+ )
+ except Exception: # noqa: BLE001
+ logger.debug(
+ "Unable to write session auth stamp cache for user_id=%s",
+ user_id,
+ exc_info=True,
+ )
+
+
+def register_session_auth_stamp_hook(app: Flask) -> None:
+ """Register request hooks that manage the per-user session stamp."""
+ if getattr(app, "superset_session_auth_stamp_hook_registered", False):
+ return
+ app.superset_session_auth_stamp_hook_registered = True
+
+ @app.before_request
+ def _validate_user_session_auth_stamp() -> None: # noqa: WPS430
+ """Log out requests whose session cookie carries an outdated auth
stamp."""
+ validate_session_auth_stamp_for_request()
+
+
+@transaction()
+def ensure_user_session_stamp_value(user_id: int) -> str:
+ """Return the stamp for ``user_id``, inserting a stable row if missing."""
+ from superset.models.user_session_auth_stamp import UserSessionAuthStamp
+
+ row = db.session.get(UserSessionAuthStamp, user_id)
+ if row is not None:
+ return row.stamp
+ stamp = str(uuid4())
+ try:
+ with db.session.begin_nested():
+ db.session.add(UserSessionAuthStamp(user_id=user_id, stamp=stamp))
+ return stamp
+ except IntegrityError:
+ row = db.session.get(UserSessionAuthStamp, user_id)
+ if row is None:
+ logger.exception(
+ "Failed to resolve session auth stamp after IntegrityError "
+ "for user_id=%s",
+ user_id,
+ )
+ raise
+ return row.stamp
+
+
+def clear_flask_login_remember_cookie() -> None:
+ """
+ Schedule deletion of any Flask-Login remember-me cookie on the HTTP
response.
+
+ Superset does not expose remember-me in the React login flow, but
Flask-Login
+ and FAB still support persistent cookies when ``remember=True``. After a
+ password change, clear any existing remember token so it cannot
+ re-establish a session without re-authentication.
+ """
+ if not has_request_context():
+ return
+ session["_remember"] = "clear"
+
+
+def sync_session_auth_stamp_on_login(user: Any) -> None:
+ """Copy the DB stamp into the signed session cookie after a successful
login."""
+ if not has_request_context():
+ return
+ uid = getattr(user, "id", None)
+ if uid is None:
+ return
+ user_id = int(uid)
+ stamp = ensure_user_session_stamp_value(user_id)
+ session[SESSION_AUTH_STAMP_SESSION_KEY] = stamp
+ _mark_session_stamp_validated(stamp)
+ _cache_user_session_stamp(user_id, stamp)
+
+
+def cache_user_session_auth_stamp(user_id: int, stamp: str) -> None:
+ """Write a validated session auth stamp into the shared cache."""
+ _cache_user_session_stamp(user_id, stamp)
+
+
+@transaction()
+def bump_user_session_auth_stamp(user_id: int) -> str:
+ """Assign a new stamp so every other session for this user becomes
invalid."""
+ from superset.models.user_session_auth_stamp import UserSessionAuthStamp
+
+ new_stamp = str(uuid4())
+ row = db.session.get(UserSessionAuthStamp, user_id)
+ if row is None:
+ try:
+ with db.session.begin_nested():
+ db.session.add(UserSessionAuthStamp(user_id=user_id,
stamp=new_stamp))
+ return new_stamp
+ except IntegrityError:
+ row = db.session.get(UserSessionAuthStamp, user_id)
+ if row is None:
+ logger.exception(
+ "Failed to resolve session auth stamp after IntegrityError
"
+ "for user_id=%s",
+ user_id,
+ )
+ raise
+ row.stamp = new_stamp
+ return new_stamp
+
+
+def _resolve_stamp_check_user_id() -> int | None:
+ """Return the integer user id for the stamp check, or None to skip it."""
+ from flask import current_app
+ from flask_appbuilder.const import AUTH_DB
+ from sqlalchemy.orm.exc import DetachedInstanceError
+
+ if not has_request_context():
+ return None
+ # The stamp is only ever bumped on AUTH_DB password changes; skip the DB
+ # hit for other auth backends where the stamp never changes after login.
+ if current_app.config.get("AUTH_TYPE") != AUTH_DB:
+ return None
+ if not getattr(current_user, "is_authenticated", False):
+ return None
+ if getattr(current_user, "is_guest_user", False):
+ return None
+ try:
+ raw_id = current_user.get_id()
+ except DetachedInstanceError:
+ # The user object was detached from the session (e.g. after a rollback
+ # in a previous before_request hook). Fail open — Flask-Login will
+ # reload the user on the next request.
+ logger.warning(
+ "Skipping session auth stamp check: current_user is detached",
+ exc_info=True,
+ )
+ return None
+ if raw_id is None:
+ return None
+ try:
+ return int(raw_id)
+ except (TypeError, ValueError):
+ return None
+
+
+def _should_skip_stamp_db_lookup(
+ user_id: int, method: str, sess_stamp: str | None
+) -> bool:
+ """Return True when a recent DB check lets us skip another on read-only
traffic."""
+ if method not in _SAFE_METHODS or sess_stamp is None:
+ return False
+
+ revalidation_seconds = _get_revalidation_seconds()
+ if revalidation_seconds <= 0:
+ return False
+
+ validated_at = session.get(SESSION_AUTH_STAMP_VALIDATED_AT_KEY)
+ if validated_at is None:
+ return False
+ try:
+ elapsed = time.time() - float(validated_at)
+ except (TypeError, ValueError):
+ return False
+ if elapsed >= revalidation_seconds:
+ return False
+
+ # Only skip when this session still carries the stamp we last validated and
+ # the shared cache agrees (so password rotation on another client is
visible).
+ if session.get(SESSION_AUTH_STAMP_VALIDATED_DB_STAMP_KEY) != sess_stamp:
+ return False
+ cached_stamp = _get_cached_user_session_stamp(user_id)
+ return cached_stamp == sess_stamp
+
+
+def _mark_session_stamp_validated(db_stamp: str | None = None) -> None:
+ session[SESSION_AUTH_STAMP_VALIDATED_AT_KEY] = time.time()
+ if db_stamp is not None:
+ session[SESSION_AUTH_STAMP_VALIDATED_DB_STAMP_KEY] = db_stamp
+ session.modified = True
+
+
+def _load_db_stamp_for_user(
+ user_id: int, *, use_cache: bool = True
+) -> tuple[str | None, bool]:
+ """
+ Return ``(stamp, db_error)``.
+
+ ``db_error`` is True when the database lookup failed and the check should
+ fail open. ``stamp`` is None when no row exists.
+ """
+ from superset.models.user_session_auth_stamp import UserSessionAuthStamp
+
+ if use_cache:
+ cached_stamp = _get_cached_user_session_stamp(user_id)
+ if cached_stamp is not None:
+ return cached_stamp, False
+
+ try:
+ with db.session.begin_nested():
+ row = db.session.get(UserSessionAuthStamp, user_id)
+ db_stamp = row.stamp if row is not None else None
+ except SQLAlchemyError:
+ logger.warning(
+ "Skipping session auth stamp check due to a database error",
+ exc_info=True,
+ )
+ return None, True
+
+ if db_stamp is not None:
+ _cache_user_session_stamp(user_id, db_stamp)
+ return db_stamp, False
+
+
+def validate_session_auth_stamp_for_request() -> None:
+ """Drop login when the session cookie carries an outdated stamp for this
user."""
+ from flask import request as flask_request
+
+ user_id = _resolve_stamp_check_user_id()
+ if user_id is None:
+ logger.debug(
+ "Stamp validation skipped: no user_id for %s %s",
+ flask_request.method,
+ flask_request.path,
+ )
+ return
+
+ sess_stamp = session.get(SESSION_AUTH_STAMP_SESSION_KEY)
+ if _should_skip_stamp_db_lookup(user_id, flask_request.method, sess_stamp):
+ logger.debug(
+ "Session auth stamp DB check skipped (recently validated) for
user_id=%s "
+ "on %s %s",
+ user_id,
+ flask_request.method,
+ flask_request.path,
+ )
+ return
+
+ db_stamp, db_error = _load_db_stamp_for_user(
+ user_id,
+ use_cache=(
+ flask_request.method in _SAFE_METHODS and
_get_revalidation_seconds() > 0
+ ),
+ )
+ if db_error:
+ return
+
+ if db_stamp is None:
+ # No stamp row means the session predates stamp tracking. Allow the
+ # request without a check — sync_session_auth_stamp_on_login creates
+ # the row on every login, so this only occurs for sessions that
+ # pre-date the feature or whose row was removed independently.
+ # Committing inside a before_request hook would expire SQLAlchemy
+ # objects loaded by earlier hooks and can cause DetachedInstanceError
+ # in route handlers, so we never create the row here.
+ logger.debug(
+ "Session auth stamp check skipped: no DB stamp row for user_id=%s
on %s %s",
+ user_id,
+ flask_request.method,
+ flask_request.path,
+ )
+ return
+
+ # Compare the session cookie stamp against the authoritative DB value.
+ logger.debug(
+ "Validating session stamp for user_id=%s on %s %s: sess_stamp=%s,
db_stamp=%s",
+ user_id,
+ flask_request.method,
+ flask_request.path,
+ sess_stamp,
+ db_stamp,
+ )
+ if sess_stamp is None or sess_stamp != db_stamp:
+ # Sessions authenticated before stamp tracking carry no session stamp.
+ # Adopt the current DB value so the request can proceed. This is
bounded
+ # to the rollout window: the cookie is signed, so an attacker cannot
+ # strip the stamp to bypass invalidation after password rotation.
+ if sess_stamp is None and db_stamp is not None:
+ session[SESSION_AUTH_STAMP_SESSION_KEY] = db_stamp
Review Comment:
I had one thought about the stamp adoption logic. It looks like when a
session is restored from a remember-me cookie, there's no stamp in the session,
so the current code adopts the latest DB stamp and the session remains valid.
Would it make sense to only adopt the stamp for `fresh`
(`session["_fresh"]`) interactive logins, and instead reject non-fresh restored
sessions (logout + clear the remember cookie + `401`)?
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