I can only assume they dont, since historically (generally speaking) there have had serious breaches that should not have happened. I've been involved with POS systems, banking systems, as well as various wifi-devices - and for years, there's been a lot of foolishness. Business rarely does what it should - and instead only does what it has to, or can financially bet against.
- Banking: We (the US) still allow a system that relies heavily on magnetic strip media. - Telco: We (the US) still allow a system were cell phones can be stolen and reused. -- Espi On Mon, Dec 23, 2013 at 6:31 PM, Ken Schaefer <[email protected]> wrote: > Your rant presupposes that there isn’t “decent security” already in > place. What evidence do you have that there isn’t? > > > > Cheers > > Ken > > > > *From:* [email protected] [mailto: > [email protected]] *On Behalf Of *J- P > *Sent:* Tuesday, 24 December 2013 12:43 PM > *To:* [email protected] > *Subject:* RE: [NTSysADM] RE: 40 Million CC breach at Target.... > > > > /rant on > > I have one question that rings in the back of my mind, they (banks > creditors merchants etc..) charge all sorts of fee's, > sometimes i'have heard of fees larger than a bill thats due- > Why cant they take a piece of that to get some decent security into place? > > /rant off > > Happy holidays and a prosperous new year to all > > > > > > > > > > > Jean-Paul Natola > > > ------------------------------ > > From: [email protected] > > Date: Mon, 23 Dec 2013 08:10:19 -0500 > Subject: Re: [NTSysADM] RE: 40 Million CC breach at Target.... > To: [email protected] > > *>>**That's a pretty fair analogy - and both statements are true. On > the* > > > > > > > *other hand, banking is much better understood - experience with banking > goes back hundreds of years, with concomitant expertise in many fields in > dealing with the risks in banking. The experience around computing is much > more shallow, and the risks are not as well known, nor has nearly as much > thought and practice gone into mitigating them.* > > > > > Okay, so how about when banking relies upon computing? Which risk profile > comes into play, then -- the hundreds of years, or the shallow > years/decades? > > Whether or not YOU use online banking, it is almost assured that your bank > provides it and that others are aware of its existence. Do you think that > your bank is providing such a service without any reliance upon 3rd > parties? Do you think that because you aren't using the online services > from your bank that your data would be unimpacted? > > (Hint: I'm sure that some of the people impacted in the Target breach, as > in the TJX breach before it, were *not* online users) > > > > > *ASB **http://XeeMe.com/AndrewBaker* <http://xeeme.com/AndrewBaker> > *Providing Virtual CIO Services (IT Operations & Information Security) for > the SMB market…* > > > > > > > > On Sun, Dec 22, 2013 at 10:31 PM, Kurt Buff <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Sun, Dec 22, 2013 at 6:59 PM, Andrew S. Baker <[email protected]> > wrote: > >>>Amazon's cloud is external to its customers - Amazon's staff, > > procedures and infrastructure are a risk to its customers. > > > > > That's as illogical a statement as the following: > > > XYZ Bank's technology infrastructure is external to its customers - XYZ > > Bank's staff, procedures and infrastructure are a risk to its > customers... > > That's a pretty fair analogy - and both statements are true. On the > other hand, banking is much better understood - experience with > banking goes back hundreds of years, with concomitant expertise in > many fields in dealing with the risks in banking. The experience > around computing is much more shallow, and the risks are not as well > known, nor has nearly as much thought and practice gone into > mitigating them. > > > >>>Except when suborned or perverted by money, patriotism or blackmail: > > > http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/20/us-usa-security-rsa-idUSBRE9BJ1C220131220 > > > > > And how does you maintaining your infrastructure on-premises, but having > to > > rely on 3rd party telecommunications mitigate the above risk in any way? > > It's not just that specific incident - that's but one example, and in > this specific instance, there was no remedy - trusted parties were > subverted, and the same can happen in other fields. I'm not arguing > for perfection here - just a recognition that complexity brings risk, > and that keeping things simple and under more control is usually wise. > > Indeed, for some businesses, especially small ones with no IT staff, > or very limited IT staff, going with a public cloud might make sense. > But if a business has good IT staff, I'd venture that migrating most > or all of their infrastructure to a public cloud isn't their best bet. > > Kurt > > >
