Hi Ken and Espi,

The problem or risk does not warrant a single solution, there is no 
"catch-all". Abandoning the key and lock is not the answer, IMO. For instance, 
let's say I have a two story house and I have a 6 ft fence around my house's 
perimeter to reduce the likelihood of theft (risk), however, I want to double 
my security because I'm concerned that a criminal could just come in with a 6 
ft ladder and breach my defenses. So, I invest in a 12 ft fence so the criminal 
can't breach my defenses. Did I double my security? No, because a criminal 
could easily use a 12 ft ladder and then BOOM.

My proposed solution is to diversify the security approach as much as possible 
and use defense in depth, do JUST enough so that the criminal thinks twice 
about picking your house while he/she is on their neighborhood hunt. E.g. Leave 
a light on next to a front window, hang up signs that advertise your alarm 
system (even if you don't have one!), have a deadbolt installed on your front 
door or have a sign warning of beware of your dog. Sometimes it's even 
recommended to have deterrent plants against fences or near entrances on the 
property such as roses and thorny bushes. My two cents. :)

Regards,

James
Chicago, IL, United States

From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On 
Behalf Of Ken Schaefer
Sent: Thursday, July 31, 2014 8:57 PM
To: [email protected]
Subject: RE: [NTSysADM] This was inevitable, but it's still a good reminder

So if thats something thats OK with you, what exactly are you arguing here, Ken?

I'll try to explain it succinctly:

a)      Criminals 'follow the money' [1]

b)      Setting up cameras to photo PINs at ATMs is financially viable for 
criminals - you might get a few PINs out of thousands of customers, but that 
pays for the technology. This is different to setting up cameras outside a 
private residences, where to get the same "hit" ratio, you'd need to setup 1000 
cameras outside 1000 residences, to get the same few keys

c)      Where technology (e.g. CC chip-n-PIN) has evolved to counter new 
threats, this is because the risk from the criminal threat (whether that be 
financial, reputational or whatever) has become significant, despite the best 
efforts of law enforcement, insurance companies and so forth, to do something 
about it.

d)      To date, the risk you talk about doesn't seem to warrant the wholesale 
abandonment of a tried-n-tested technology that you advocate as being required, 
especially given that the alternatives all have their own significant 
drawbacks. If there was substantial losses arising from this new threat, I 
would expect insurance companies (at the very least) pushing people to adopt 
counter measures, or alternate ways of securing their entry ways.

Is that clearer?

[1] (let's leave aside the stupid ones, or the ones not thinking straight due 
to being under the influence etc.)


From: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> 
[mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Micheal Espinola Jr
Sent: Friday, 1 August 2014 11:39 AM
To: ntsysadm
Subject: Re: [NTSysADM] This was inevitable, but it's still a good reminder

Surely we all hold our keys in our hands when we use them - but I dont think we 
do anything to obstruct the important-end with the teeth from public view - 
like what we might do when we enter a pin.  I would put forward that people 
typically take out their keys, look at them to confirm the correct key as well 
as orientation, and then also briefly pause the key in mid air while confirming 
visually the proper orientation/alignment with the lock.

You forever run the risk of locking yourself out of you own home or car.  Do 
you have a car with a fob-only starter, with no key override?  Those are tons 
of fun to replace. Very time consuming; very expensive.

So wait - you dont think that current CC's should stay the same for another 
1000 years?  (hey. I can use "1000" too).  If current CC's should change, is 
that not saying that the current less-secure variation "have to go"...  in 
order to make way for a new version?  So if thats something thats OK with you, 
what exactly are you arguing here, Ken?


--
Espi


On Thu, Jul 31, 2014 at 6:17 AM, Ken Schaefer 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
I tend to hold my keys in my hand when I insert those keys into a lock, so I 
suspect that taking photos will be somewhat harder.
Photographing people's PINs at an ATM or similar location is a numbers game - 
for every 1000 people, you might get 10 or 5 PINs, which makes the endeavour 
worthwhile. Installing surveillance outside private property would involve 
1000x the expense, probably making it not worthwhile. And if you install your 
own counter-surveillance, then even if your physical key is compromised 
(assuming you only have one lock), you can record the perpetrators in the act, 
and claim on insurance and report to law enforcement.

In my line of work, I've seen this 1000 times:

-          Solution 123 (doesn't meet requirement ABC || is vulnerable to 
exploit DEF). We should look at solution 345 or 678

The issue is that whilst 345 or 678 might mitigate or solve the defect with 
123, it introduces new vulnerabilities or other non-compliance with 
requirements. And Solution 123 typically has a proven history behind it, and 
there are alternate measures that can be employed to satisfy ABC.

Keys and locks have served us well for hundreds of years (notwithstanding the 
threat of people lock picking your locks - despite that issue being around, we 
live with it every day). Introducing more complex keys, or electronic 
countermeasures introduces other risks. For example: If you make keys 
impossible to copy, then you run the risk of a Denial of Service attack against 
yourself if you lose your own key (e.g. through complete accident).

No doubt threats continually evolve - and this is an example of an emerging 
threat. However countermeasures also continually evolve. Criminals (other than 
the really stupid ones) follow the money. There's entire industries (e.g. 
insurance), not to mention law enforcement, that work to make crime not pay. 
It's the same reason why, eventually, the entire world, will have CC cards with 
chips and require PINs. Until the next round of attacks and countermeasures.

Cheers
Ken

From: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> 
[mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>] 
On Behalf Of Micheal Espinola Jr
Sent: Thursday, 31 July 2014 7:09 PM

To: ntsysadm
Subject: Re: [NTSysADM] This was inevitable, but it's still a good reminder

I've read that article before, and agree that it is a good read.

I didnt realize thats what you meant, because I dont concider that a realistic 
proposal to the threat - especially giving what you are potentially asking of 
the general public.  The threat, as I addressed it in my initial reply, is that 
a common-style key can be copied in an automated fashion via photographs. As an 
current example: A key factor in a lot of identity theft that happens with 
"skimmers" also incorporates video surveillance to steal pins, zip codes, etc, 
to be used with the skim-copied card. Surveillance could similarly be set up at 
residences and other building egresses to capture images of keys for 
duplication. Let alone that people casually place their keys down all the time.
Perhaps I'm misreading the situation, but this is what I see as the worst 
aspect of the threat - particularly because I see no need for physical 
possession.

--
Espi


On Wed, Jul 30, 2014 at 11:52 PM, Ken Schaefer 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
A simple solution would be not to give your keys out to untrusted parties

Fwiw, the Technet article was written by Steve Riley: "It's Me, and Here's My 
Proof: Why Identity and Authentication Must Remain Distinct" - it's a good 
article, worth reading.


From: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> 
[mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>] 
On Behalf Of Micheal Espinola Jr
Sent: Thursday, 31 July 2014 4:42 PM

To: ntsysadm
Subject: Re: [NTSysADM] This was inevitable, but it's still a good reminder

I'm sorry, what exactly was your proposal?  Was it the technet article?  I 
didnt read it.

--
Espi


On Wed, Jul 30, 2014 at 9:13 PM, Ken Schaefer 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
So, what's wrong with my proposal? You didn't address that anywhere, unless 
I've missed it somehow.

(leaving aside the issue of traditional lock picking, which has been an issue, 
or non-issue, for years)

From: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> 
[mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>] 
On Behalf Of Micheal Espinola Jr
Sent: Thursday, 31 July 2014 1:34 PM

To: ntsysadm
Subject: Re: [NTSysADM] This was inevitable, but it's still a good reminder

I'm referring specifically to the standard types of keys that are used by 
consumers for thier private property.  Current common door locks/keys are 
decreasingly viable as a security solution, and have been for years.  If a 
common key can now be duplicated via automation simply by a series of pictures, 
then its really time to put this antiquated system to rest.  Keys need to 
become more complex.  Its not that I have issue with the concept of physical 
keys - its a problem with the low-tech variations of common locks that are 
still so prevalent around the world.
"Authentication" issues aside, the typical mechanical systems are still not 
complex enough to prevent basic lock-picking methods.  And now, we are subject 
to duplication by photograph?  I think this is a horrendous turn of events. 
Cool tech, but how utterly exploitable on a massive scale.  People are already 
subject to video-based types of identity theft.  Now, I would speculate, that 
we can welcome breaking and entering.

--
Espi


On Wed, Jul 30, 2014 at 7:14 PM, Ken Schaefer 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Why do they "have to go"? Keys are a physical authenticator (something you 
have). You give it to someone else, and you run the risk of it being cloned or 
otherwise compromised. A simple solution would be not to give your keys out to 
untrusted parties...

I think the fundamental issues with using current keys is that there's no 
separation between identity and authenticator. Just like using your CC number 
online: http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc512578.aspx is an old 
article, but still applies. Not to mention the lack of simple revocation 
mechanisms, audit capabilities etc. :)

Cheers
Ken

From: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> 
[mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>] 
On Behalf Of Micheal Espinola Jr
Sent: Thursday, 31 July 2014 11:11 AM
To: ntsysadm
Subject: Re: [NTSysADM] This was inevitable, but it's still a good reminder

It was inevitable.  Locks and keys as they have existed for decades simply have 
to go.

--
Espi


On Tue, Jul 29, 2014 at 7:17 AM, Kurt Buff 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Physical security is just as important as computing security
http://www.wired.com/2014/07/keyme-let-me-break-in/





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