Kathleen Moriarty has entered the following ballot position for draft-ietf-nvo3-hpvr2nve-cp-req-15: No Objection
When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this introductory paragraph, however.) Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-nvo3-hpvr2nve-cp-req/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- COMMENT: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Thanks for your work on this draft. In light of Spectre and Meltdown, I am wondering if there needs to be more explicit text in the draft on tenant isolation. Could you expand the pros and cons of the choices listed out in the security considerations section in the following sentence? Additional context would be helpful for the reader. One design point is whether the hypervisor should supply the NVE with necessary information (e.g., VM addresses, VN information, or other parameters) that the NVE uses directly, or whether the hypervisor should only supply a VN ID and an identifier for the associated VM (e.g., its MAC address), with the NVE using that information to obtain the information needed to validate the hypervisor-provided parameters or obtain related parameters in a secure manner. Since the communications happen in multiple ways, I'm wondering how isolation is considered for each. I see the text on authentication, ACLs and filter rules and that is all good, but I'm wondering if more is needed (firmer wording specific to isolation, etc.). From the intro: In such cases, there is no need for a standardized protocol between the hypervisor and NVE, as the interaction is implemented via software on a single device. While in the Split-NVE architecture scenarios, as shown in figure 2 to figure 4, control plane protocol(s) between a hypervisor and its associated external NVE(s) are required for the hypervisor to distribute the virtual machines networking states to the NVE(s) for further handling. The protocol is an NVE-internal protocol and runs between tNVE and nNVE logical entities. This protocol is mentioned in the NVO3 problem statement [RFC7364] and appears as the third work item. Sect 4: The authentication requirement could be stronger, is there a reason it isn't? Req-11: The protocol MUST allow the External NVE to authenticate the End Device connected. If this is not in software as one option provides, there is no statement on encrypted sessions, is there a reason why this is not needed? I also don't see a requirement on logging, should there be one? If not, why not? Are there security policy management functions that would need to track the connections between tenant systems and external NVEs to prove isolation or track the paths? I do see this in Sect 3.2: An external NVE may report the mappings of its underlay IP address and the associated TSI addresses to NVA and relevant network nodes may save such information to their mapping tables but not their forwarding tables. Is more needed? Maybe not, but if you could explain or adjust text and possibly the requirements, I'd appreciate it. _______________________________________________ nvo3 mailing list nvo3@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/nvo3
