Hi Kathleen,

Thanks for your comments. Please see inlines with [yz].


-----Original Message-----
From: Kathleen Moriarty [mailto:kathleen.moriarty.i...@gmail.com] 
Sent: Thursday, February 22, 2018 12:07 PM
To: The IESG <i...@ietf.org>
Cc: draft-ietf-nvo3-hpvr2nve-cp-...@ietf.org; Matthew Bocci 
<matthew.bo...@nokia.com>; nvo3-cha...@ietf.org; matthew.bo...@nokia.com; 
Subject: Kathleen Moriarty's No Objection on 
draft-ietf-nvo3-hpvr2nve-cp-req-15: (with COMMENT)

Kathleen Moriarty has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-nvo3-hpvr2nve-cp-req-15: No Objection

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Thanks for your work on this draft.  In light of Spectre and Meltdown, I am 
wondering if there needs to be more explicit text in the draft on tenant 

Could you expand the pros and cons of the choices listed out in the security 
considerations section in the following sentence?  Additional context would be 
helpful for the reader.

   One design point is whether the hypervisor
   should supply the NVE with necessary information (e.g., VM addresses,
   VN information, or other parameters) that the NVE uses directly, or
   whether the hypervisor should only supply a VN ID and an identifier
   for the associated VM (e.g., its MAC address), with the NVE using
   that information to obtain the information needed to validate the
   hypervisor-provided parameters or obtain related parameters in a
   secure manner.

[yz] I am thinking to add the following after the abovementioned text for 
better explanations. 
"The former approach can be used in a trusted environment so that the external 
NVE can directly use all the information retrieved from the hypervisor for 
local configuration. It saves the effort on the external NVE side from 
information retrieval and/or validation. The latter approach gives more 
reliable information as the external NVE needs to retrieve them from some 
management system database. Especially some network related parameters like 
VLAN IDs can be passed back to hypervisor to be used as a more authoritative 
provisioning. However in certain cases, it is difficult or inefficient for an 
external NVE to have access or query on some information to those management 
systems. Then the external NVE has to obtain those information from hypervisor.

Since the communications happen in multiple ways, I'm wondering how isolation 
is considered for each.  I see the text on authentication, ACLs and filter 
rules and that is all good, but I'm wondering if more is needed (firmer wording 
specific to isolation, etc.).  From the intro:

   In such cases, there is
   no need for a standardized protocol between the hypervisor and NVE,
   as the interaction is implemented via software on a single device.
   While in the Split-NVE architecture scenarios, as shown in figure 2
   to figure 4, control plane protocol(s) between a hypervisor and its
   associated external NVE(s) are required for the hypervisor to
   distribute the virtual machines networking states to the NVE(s) for
   further handling. The protocol is an NVE-internal protocol and runs
   between tNVE and nNVE logical entities. This protocol is mentioned in
   the NVO3 problem statement [RFC7364] and appears as the third work

Sect 4:  The authentication requirement could be stronger, is there a reason it 
   Req-11: The protocol MUST allow the External NVE to authenticate the
   End Device connected.

If this is not in software as one option provides, there is no statement on 
encrypted sessions, is there a reason why this is not needed?

[yz] This document tries to address the requirement between hypervisor and the 
external NVE, normally single hop only. The traffic isolation between them is 
by locally significant tag, usually VLAN. Section 2.1 pp2 states "Both the 
hypervisor and external NVE sides must agree on that tag value for traffic 
identification, isolation, and forwarding." 
[yz] As the protocol is used between server and ToR switch in data center which 
is believed a trustworthy environment, encrypted session is a pretty weak 
requirement over a single hop here.  VM migration is expected to be fast and 
encryption session requires key exchanges which takes time and resources. We do 
not intend to put it as a requirement. But existing mechanism like MACsec is 
applicable if people wants secure channel. Maybe we can briefly mention 
applicability of current secure channel mechanism in security considerations 

I also don't see a requirement on logging, should there be one?  If not, why 
not? Are there security policy management functions that would need to track 
the connections between tenant systems and external NVEs to prove isolation or 
track the paths?

I do see this in Sect 3.2:
   An external NVE may report the mappings of its underlay IP
   address and the associated TSI addresses to NVA and relevant network
   nodes may save such information to their mapping tables but not their
   forwarding tables.

Is more needed?  Maybe not, but if you could explain or adjust text and 
possibly the requirements, I'd appreciate it.
[yz] The key "logging" information is basically the mapping information for 
underlay<->overlay address and local tag<->VNI on NVA. The document is trying 
to focus on split-NVE rather than NVE-NVA, so some of the interleaved 
interaction between NVE and NVA are not specified and some like address 
mappings are shown here and there in section 3.  I think adding something like 
" locally significant tag and VNI mapping to be reported to NVA when locally 
significant tag information is provided by hypervisor " to section 3.1 makes 
sense as it is key information.

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