Yahoo has exactly the same use case. The user is authenticated into the Yahoo Instant Messenger client application, and clicks on the Yahoo Mail button to check Yahoo Mail.
Clicking the Mail button spawns a browser window with an authentication token that is passed to the browser on the URL. The browser submits the token to Yahoo¹s authentication server which validates the token, sets authentication cookies to the browser, and then redirects the browser to Yahoo Mail. Allen On 4/8/10 11:30 AM, "George Fletcher" <[email protected]> wrote: > On 4/8/10 11:31 AM, Eran Hammer-Lahav wrote: >> Re: [OAUTH-WG] Limiting signed requests to use the Authorization request >> header Can you share an example of a native application launching an external >> browser with a protect resource? >> > Native application = AIM > Protected Resource = User's AIM Mail box > > AIM has supported this for a while. >> >> Why can¹t the end user just login to the browser using normal web login and >> access the resource? >> > It's a better user experience to be seamlessly logged in than having to > reenter credentials. > > Thanks, > George >> >> EHL >> >> >> On 4/8/10 7:51 AM, "Anthony Nadalin" <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >>>> > Why is the native application launching a browser with a protected >>>> resource request? That seems odd. >>> >>> Not odd at all a lot of the Eclipse applications can work this way >>> >>> >>> From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of >>> Eran Hammer-Lahav >>> Sent: Thursday, April 08, 2010 7:41 AM >>> To: George Fletcher; OAuth WG >>> Cc: Jonathan Moore >>> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Limiting signed requests to use the Authorization >>> request header >>> >>> Why is the native application launching a browser with a protected resource >>> request? That seems odd. >>> >>> Note that we currently have no plans of supporting signatures in any of the >>> flows. We are discussing signatures only for using tokens with secrets when >>> accessing protected resources. >>> >>> EHL >>> >>> >>> On 4/8/10 7:08 AM, "George Fletcher" <[email protected]> wrote: >>> Another use case is where a rich client wants to bootstrap a web session >>> with the same identity (rich client to web SSO). Assuming that the web >>> session will be established via OAuth with signatures, there is no way to >>> fire up the browser with a "signed URL" if the OAuth parameters and >>> signature need to be in a header. >>> >>> As Jon mentions, the concept of allowing a service to create a signed URL >>> and then pass it back to JS running in the browser, or invoking a browser >>> directly is something that we leverage a lot across our rich clients and web >>> applications. >>> >>> I realize that these sorts of use cases are trivial if establishment of the >>> SSO session switches from a signed mechanism to the OAuth WRAP bearer token >>> model. The one nice feature of the signed URL is that it is one time use >>> where the bearer token can be replayed multiple times. >>> >>> Thanks, >>> George >>> >>> Real world use case. Login into the latest AIM client. Click the mail >>> icon/link. >>> >>> >>> On 3/31/10 7:25 AM, Moore, Jonathan wrote: >>> >>> What about a use case where the signature will be generated by one component >>> but the request will be redeemed by another? >>> >>> For example, suppose there is a cross-domain JSONP call that requires >>> authorization; in this case, I might have my client side code hit *my* >>> origin server, obtain a signed URL, and then redeem it by hitting the JSONP >>> resource. This has scaling advantages over having my origin proxy an OAuth >>> request, and doesn't require me to have keys located on the client; I can >>> keep them safely in my data centers. >>> >>> In this case, sending a "ready to redeem" signed request using the query >>> parameter mechanism simplifies the client-side code. Furthermore, in this >>> use case (cross-domain script inclusion), the client doesn't have the means >>> to set the Authorization header (it can only include a <script> element with >>> a URL). >>> >>> A similar use case would be if you wanted to provide signed redirects >>> (similarly useful for cross-domain functionality); browsers aren't going to >>> modify the redirect URL they get back, or add an Authorization header to it. >>> >>> Jon >>> ........ >>> Jon Moore >>> Comcast Interactive Media >>> >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: [email protected] on behalf of Eran Hammer-Lahav >>> Sent: Wed 3/31/2010 12:20 AM >>> To: OAuth WG >>> Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Limiting signed requests to use the Authorizationrequest >>> header >>> >>> Since we have consensus that using signed requests is a more advance use >>> case and will be used by more experienced developer, I would like to suggest >>> we limit sending signed request parameters to the Authorization header (no >>> URI query parameters or form-encoded body). >>> >>> This will not change the ability to send the oauth_token parameter in the >>> query or body when using bearer tokens (as well as in the header). It will >>> only apply to sending signed requests. >>> >>> The makes client request parameter much simpler as the only parameter >>> "invading" the URI or body space of the request is oauth_token. Anything >>> else is limited to the header. >>> >>> Thoughts? If you are not a fan, please reply with a use case. >>> >>> EHL >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> OAuth mailing list >>> [email protected] >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> OAuth mailing list >>> [email protected] >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> OAuth mailing list >> [email protected] >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >> > > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
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