Yes, it does, thanks!

It makes me think that the Security Considerations text should include something along the lines that OAuth does not exclude (or maybe even "encourages" instead of "does not exclude") multi-factor authentication, which can mitigate cases where the present security mechanisms deem insufficient.

Igor


Allen Tom wrote:
Hi Igor,

Without getting into any specific details, most large websites will check
your browser cookies, along with other factors (including your IP address,
simultaneous sessions from other IP addresses, recent changes to your
account, the time you last verified your password, etc) to determine if your
browser is still authorized to access your Mail. When in doubt, the site
will verify your password to refresh the session before continuing.

Hope that helps,
Allen



On 4/8/10 3:09 PM, "Igor Faynberg" <[email protected]> wrote:

Allen,

(I am a happy user of Yahoo mail via Verizon.) In some cases, especially
if I had not used e-mail for a while, Yahoo prompts me to enter the
password. Now, I think this is a very good feature, which would protect
me if my computer is stolen. The question: how is this interworking with
the case you explained?

Igor

Allen Tom wrote:
Yahoo has exactly the same use case.

The user is authenticated into the Yahoo Instant Messenger client
application, and clicks on the Yahoo Mail button to check Yahoo Mail.

Clicking the Mail button spawns a browser window with an
authentication token that is passed to the browser on the URL. The
browser submits the token to Yahoo¹s authentication server which
validates the token, sets authentication cookies to the browser, and
then redirects the browser to Yahoo Mail.

Allen


On 4/8/10 11:30 AM, "George Fletcher" <[email protected]> wrote:

    On 4/8/10 11:31 AM, Eran Hammer-Lahav wrote:

        Re: [OAUTH-WG] Limiting signed requests to use the
        Authorization request header Can you share an example of a
        native application launching an external browser with a
        protect resource?

    Native application = AIM
    Protected Resource = User's AIM Mail box

    AIM has supported this for a while.


        Why can¹t the end user just login to the browser using normal
        web login and access the resource?

    It's a better user experience to be seamlessly logged in than
    having to reenter credentials.

    Thanks,
    George


        EHL


        On 4/8/10 7:51 AM, "Anthony Nadalin" <[email protected]>
        wrote:


Why is the native application launching a browser with a
            protected resource request? That seems odd.

            Not odd at all a lot of the Eclipse applications can work
            this way


            *From:* [email protected]
            [mailto:[email protected]] *On Behalf Of *Eran
            Hammer-Lahav
            *Sent:* Thursday, April 08, 2010 7:41 AM
            *To:* George Fletcher; OAuth WG
            *Cc:* Jonathan Moore
            *Subject:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] Limiting signed requests to use
            the Authorization request header

            Why is the native application launching a browser with a
            protected resource request? That seems odd.

            Note that we currently have no plans of supporting
            signatures in any of the flows. We are discussing
            signatures only for using tokens with secrets when
            accessing protected resources.

            EHL


            On 4/8/10 7:08 AM, "George Fletcher" <[email protected]> wrote:
            Another use case is where a rich client wants to bootstrap
            a web session with the same identity (rich client to web
            SSO). Assuming that the web session will be established
            via OAuth with signatures, there is no way to fire up the
            browser with a "signed URL" if the OAuth parameters and
            signature need to be in a header.

            As Jon mentions, the concept of allowing a service to
            create a signed URL and then pass it back to JS running in
            the browser, or invoking a browser directly is something
            that we leverage a lot across our rich clients and web
            applications.

            I realize that these sorts of use cases are trivial if
            establishment of the SSO session switches from a signed
            mechanism to the OAuth WRAP bearer token model. The one
            nice feature of the signed URL is that it is one time use
            where the bearer token can be replayed multiple times.

            Thanks,
            George

            Real world use case. Login into the latest AIM client.
            Click the mail icon/link.


            On 3/31/10 7:25 AM, Moore, Jonathan wrote:

            What about a use case where the signature will be
            generated by one component but the request will be
            redeemed by another?

            For example, suppose there is a cross-domain JSONP call
            that requires authorization; in this case, I might have my
            client side code hit *my* origin server, obtain a signed
            URL, and then redeem it by hitting the JSONP resource.
            This has scaling advantages over having my origin proxy an
            OAuth request, and doesn't require me to have keys located
            on the client; I can keep them safely in my data centers.

            In this case, sending a "ready to redeem" signed request
            using the query parameter mechanism simplifies the
            client-side code. Furthermore, in this use case
            (cross-domain script inclusion), the client doesn't have
            the means to set the Authorization header (it can only
            include a <script> element with a URL).

            A similar use case would be if you wanted to provide
            signed redirects (similarly useful for cross-domain
            functionality); browsers aren't going to modify the
            redirect URL they get back, or add an Authorization header
            to it.

            Jon
            ........
            Jon Moore
            Comcast Interactive Media



            -----Original Message-----
            From: [email protected] on behalf of Eran Hammer-Lahav
            Sent: Wed 3/31/2010 12:20 AM
            To: OAuth WG
            Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Limiting signed requests to use the
            Authorizationrequest header

            Since we have consensus that using signed requests is a
            more advance use
            case and will be used by more experienced developer, I
            would like to suggest
            we limit sending signed request parameters to the
            Authorization header (no
            URI query parameters or form-encoded body).

            This will not change the ability to send the oauth_token
            parameter in the
            query or body when using bearer tokens (as well as in the
            header). It will
            only apply to sending signed requests.

            The makes client request parameter much simpler as the
            only parameter
            "invading" the URI or body space of the request is
            oauth_token. Anything
            else is limited to the header.

            Thoughts? If you are not a fan, please reply with a use case.

            EHL

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