Ok, thanks - I was missing the possibility that bearer tokens could be
single use. I agree this covers my use case adequately, so I am now
definitely +1 for simplifying the spec in this way.
Thanks for bearing (pun intended) with me.
Jon
........
Jon Moore
On Apr 10, 2010, at 3:30 AM, "Torsten Lodderstedt" <[email protected]
> wrote:
From my point of view, your use case can be implemented in two ways
1) tokenized & signed URLs provided by your origin server
2) URLs with one-time usage bearer tokens as parameter acquired by
your origin server
I see the following pros/cons:
Load: (2) requires the origin server to acquire one token per link
on your page from the auth server, which may cause a lot of load on
the authz server :-(. (1) only needs to obtain a single token since
the signature is calculated by the origin server locally. This might
be much better from a load perspective.
Security: As a further downside (2) either requires HTTPS
communication for the whole page or you acquire the URL with one-
time usage bearer token over HTTP. Acquisition from authz server can
still be performed over HTTPS. If this acceptable depends on your
security considerations.
Comments?
regards,
Torsten.
Am 10.04.2010 03:34, schrieb Moore, Jonathan:
However, this doesn't address my earlier use case of a signed,
cross-domain JSONP call, especially if it's sitting on a non-HTTPS
page; I need to make a non-HTTP XHR request to obtain a (signed or
tokenized) URL to include in my <script> include, so requiring a
bearer token and SSL basically forces me to have the whole page
delivered over HTTPS, which may be overkill for my application.Â
While I can understand that token and secret acquisition might need
SSL, always requiring it on authorized requests too seems too much.
Can someone explain/re-explain why query parameter signatures need
to be eliminated? The Authorization header is great when you can
manipulate it, but you can't always. Why is it problematic for the
signatures to be able to appear in either place?
Jon
........
Jon Moore
On Apr 9, 2010, at 1:39 PM, "Eran Hammer-Lahav"
<[email protected]> wrote:
In practice this is the same as logging in which I expect to
require SSL anyway. Signed or not, attackers should not be able to
login to your email account simply by using a MITM attack when you
click on your IM client. So SSL is required already.
EHL
On 4/9/10 7:30 AM, "George Fletcher" <[email protected]> wrote:
Yes, this is possible, though to be secure it should really happen
over SSL which is less of a requirement for a signed request.
I guess the main question is whether we really need to remove the
signature related parameters from URL and only allow them in the
Authorization header. For signed requests, these use cases pretty
much require that the signature parameters be allowed in the URL.
Obviously, if we change our model to not use signed URLs then this
issue goes away:)
Thanks,
George
On 4/9/10 12:58 AM, Brian Eaton wrote:
On Thu, Apr 8, 2010 at 7:08 AM, George Fletcher <[email protected]>
<mailto:[email protected]> Â wrote:
 Â
Â
I realize that these sorts of use cases are trivial if
establishment of the
SSO session switches from a signed mechanism to the OAuth WRAP
bearer token
model. The one nice feature of the signed URL is that it is one
time use
where the bearer token can be replayed multiple times.
   Â
Â
Yep, Google does this kind of thing too.
Is there something that stops you from declaring that a particular
token is single use?
1) Client makes call to Authorization server, passing in either the
refresh token or an access token (depending on the security model
you
want.)
2) AS returns a token.
3) Client uses the token to pop open a web browser.
Cheers,
Brian
 Â
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