I am objecting to modifying the protocol in the default case as a majority do not need RI in the case of fixed endpoints.
Migration would be challenging because the change is breaking and affects existing clients. Dynamic discovery are up and coming cases and a relatively green field. Dealing with it at configuration/discovery makes broader sense as it has no impact on existing clients. Phil > On Apr 11, 2016, at 12:18, Brian Campbell <[email protected]> wrote: > > I'm not sure where the idea that it's only applicable to special uses like > collaboration services is coming from. The pattern described in the draft > (using a different parameter name but otherwise the same) is deployed and > in-use for normal OAuth cases including and especially the resource owner > centric ones. > > >> On Mon, Apr 11, 2016 at 11:33 AM, Phil Hunt (IDM) <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> I am finding I am not happy with solving the bad resource endpoint config >> issue with resource indicator. At best I see this as a special use draft for >> things like collab services or things which aren't resource owner centric. >> >> Yet resource endpoint config is a concern for all clients that configure on >> the fly. Is it reasonable to make resource indicator mandatory for all >> clients? Probably not. >> >> As OAuth depends primarily on TLS, it feels wrong not to have a solution >> that confirms the server host names are correct either via config lookup or >> some other mechanism. >> >> Tokbind is also a solution but I suspect it may only appeal to large scale >> service providers and may be further off as we wait for load balancers to >> support tokbind. Also there are issues with tokbind on initial user binding >> where the mitm attack might itself establish its own token binding. I have >> to think this through some to confirm. But the issue of worry is what is >> happening on initialization and first use if the hacker has already >> interceded a mitm. That would make validation at config time still critical. >> >> Hopefully somebody can arrive at an alternative for broader oauth use cases. >> >> Phil >> _______________________________________________ >> OAuth mailing list >> [email protected] >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >
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