Hi
On 11/04/16 23:19, Phil Hunt (IDM) wrote:
I am objecting to modifying the protocol in the default case as a
majority do not need RI in the case of fixed endpoints.
Migration would be challenging because the change is breaking and
affects existing clients.
How does it break the existing clients given this is an optional feature
? Can you please describe the situation where the existing clients get
broken ?
Brian, would it make sense to update the text to mention that the
clients do not have to be directly configured and instead it can be set
during the registration time, so that the property gets seamlessly
linked to client access tokens, etc, without the client applications
having to be set up with the resource indicators manually ?
Thanks, Sergey
Dynamic discovery are up and coming cases and a relatively green field.
Dealing with it at configuration/discovery makes broader sense as it has
no impact on existing clients.
Phil
On Apr 11, 2016, at 12:18, Brian Campbell <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
I'm not sure where the idea that it's only applicable to special uses
like collaboration services is coming from. The pattern described in
the draft (using a different parameter name but otherwise the same) is
deployed and in-use for normal OAuth cases including and especially
the resource owner centric ones.
On Mon, Apr 11, 2016 at 11:33 AM, Phil Hunt (IDM)
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
I am finding I am not happy with solving the bad resource endpoint
config issue with resource indicator. At best I see this as a
special use draft for things like collab services or things which
aren't resource owner centric.
Yet resource endpoint config is a concern for all clients that
configure on the fly. Is it reasonable to make resource indicator
mandatory for all clients? Probably not.
As OAuth depends primarily on TLS, it feels wrong not to have a
solution that confirms the server host names are correct either
via config lookup or some other mechanism.
Tokbind is also a solution but I suspect it may only appeal to
large scale service providers and may be further off as we wait
for load balancers to support tokbind. Also there are issues with
tokbind on initial user binding where the mitm attack might itself
establish its own token binding. I have to think this through some
to confirm. But the issue of worry is what is happening on
initialization and first use if the hacker has already interceded
a mitm. That would make validation at config time still critical.
Hopefully somebody can arrive at an alternative for broader oauth
use cases.
Phil
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--
Sergey Beryozkin
Talend Community Coders
http://coders.talend.com/
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