Indicating the resource server to the AS allows the AS to automatically select 
token type, encryption scheme and user data to be put into the access token 
based on a RS-specific policy. So there is no need to explicitely ask the AS 
for a certain token format or encryption scheme. 

> Am 11.04.2016 um 22:35 schrieb Anthony Nadalin <[email protected]>:
> 
> So it’s an incomplete solution then ?
>  
> From: Brian Campbell [mailto:[email protected]] 
> Sent: Monday, April 11, 2016 1:34 PM
> To: Anthony Nadalin <[email protected]>
> Cc: Nat Sakimura <[email protected]>; <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: Resource Indicators for OAuth 2.0
>  
> No, I'm not adding requirements for encryption. I was pointing out some of 
> the ways that an access token might be different for different RSs.
> 
> 
>  
> On Mon, Apr 11, 2016 at 2:18 PM, Anthony Nadalin <[email protected]> 
> wrote:
> So now you are adding more requirements for encryption ? The more this thread 
> goes on shows how unstable and not fully thought out this draft is to go 
> through WG adoption.
>  
> From: OAuth [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Brian Campbell
> Sent: Monday, April 11, 2016 12:30 PM
> To: Nat Sakimura <[email protected]>
> Cc: <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: Resource Indicators for OAuth 2.0
>  
> Sending a token type is not sufficient. There's more involved than the 
> format. Many cases need to know if to encrypt and whom to encrypt to.  What 
> claims to put in the token (or reference by the token). What algorithms and 
> keys to use for signing/encryption.  
> 
> The statement that the "Current proposal does not support the implicit flow" 
> is incorrect. Among other things, sec 2 has, "When an access token will be 
> returned from the authorization endpoint, the "resource" parameter is used in 
> the authorization request to the authorization endpoint as defined in Section 
> 4.2.1 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]."
>  
> On Sun, Apr 10, 2016 at 11:43 AM, Nat Sakimura <[email protected]> wrote:
> So, my understanding on the rationale/requirements for having this spec right 
> now is: 
>  
> R1. Authz server wants toprevent the replay by the server that received it. 
> R2. Authz server needs to mint the access token in a variety of format 
> depending on the resource server and to do that, you need to know which RS is 
> gong to be receiving it. 
>  
> To achieve R1, there are couple of methods. The proposed method here is to 
> audience restrict the token, but the same can be achieved by sender 
> constraining the token, e.g., by token binding. As far as I can see, the 
> sentiment of the WG seems to be to use the sender constraint through Token 
> Binding, so from this respect, this spec is not the one to do R1. Besides, 
> the current proposal only takes care of the code flow. The same requirement 
> should be there for implicit flow as well, so the current proposal is not 
> covering the R1 anyways. 
>  
> I can sort of understand R2, but I have two critique on the current proposal: 
>  
> C1. Current proposal does not support the implicit flow. To support it, the 
> resource URI has to be sent to the Authz endpoint instead of the Token 
> endpoint. 
> C2. It is much more direct to send the required token format rather than the 
> RS uri and probably better as: 
>   1) There are use cases where the AS does not maintain the list of RSs that 
> it supports, e.g., AOL. 
>        In such a case, even if the RS uri were sent to the AS, the AS cannot 
> mint the tokens in the appropriate format. 
>   2) When it is sent in the Authz request, it is leaking the information 
> about the resource that the client is going to the browser. 
>   3) There are use cases where it is desirable not to let the AS knows where 
> the Client is going from the privacy point of view. 
>  
> So, my suggestion is to drop R1 and concentrate on R2. And to solve R2, send 
> token type instead of the resource indicator in the request. 
> This also necessitates the Client to be able to find out what token type the 
> resource requires, perhaps in the unauthorized response web link header at 
> the resource in the manner of oauth-meta. 
>  
> Cheers, 
>  
> Nat
>  
>  
>  
> 2016年4月8日(金) 8:23 Prateek Mishra <[email protected]>:
> While this work addresses a gap in the existing OAuth specification set, I am 
> very concerned that this
> incremental extension will lead to even more confusion around the areas of 
> “scope”, “audience” and “resource server”.
> 
> I think we should try to solve this problem via  a framework that provides 
> better guidance and implementation
> models for OAuth use-cases. In other words, I feel that a broader discussion 
> is needed here.
> 
> 
> > On Apr 7, 2016, at 4:11 PM, Justin Richer <[email protected]> wrote:
> >
> > I support adoption of this document as a starting point for working group 
> > work.
> >
> > — Justin
> >
> >
> >> On Apr 6, 2016, at 1:25 PM, Hannes Tschofenig <[email protected]> 
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >> Hi all,
> >>
> >> this is the call for adoption of 'Resource Indicators for OAuth 2.0', see
> >> http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-campbell-oauth-resource-indicators/
> >>
> >> Please let us know by April 20th whether you accept / object to the
> >> adoption of this document as a starting point for work in the OAuth
> >> working group.
> >>
> >> Note: If you already stated your opinion at the IETF meeting in Buenos
> >> Aires then you don't need to re-state your opinion, if you want.
> >>
> >> The feedback at the BA IETF meeting was the following: ~10 persons
> >> for accepting the document and 0 persons against.
> >>
> >> Ciao
> >> Hannes & Derek
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> OAuth mailing list
> >> [email protected]
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > OAuth mailing list
> > [email protected]
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> 
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>  
>  
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