I agree that we’re getting dangerously close to recommending signed assertions at every step of the process, thereby bypassing HTTP. This was the same mistake that WS-* and SOAP made, let’s not repeat it if we can.
— Justin > On Apr 30, 2016, at 10:57 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Hi Nat, > > sure, one could also authenticate and cryptographically protect the redirect > response. Leveraging OIDC concepts is an idea worth considering but they > should be adopted to the OAuth philosophy. The id token as used in the hybrid > flows mixes an identity assertion with elements of transport security > measures. A OAuth AS does not provide identity data to clients, so we only > need the transport security part. > I personally would prefer a OAuth response object (similar to request object > you have proposed) over the id token. Such a response object could contain > (and directly protect) state, code and other response values. I consider this > the more elegant design and it is easier to implement then having detached > signatures over hash values of codes or access tokens. Moreover, it would > allow to encrypt the response as well. > Generally, our threat analysis so far does not have provided justification > for cryptographically protected redirect responses. All proposals currently > on the table stop mix up and code injection using simpler mechanisms. > I think OAuth 2.0 is a huge success due to its balance of versatility, > security and _simplicity_. We definitely need to keep it secure, but we > should also keep it as simple as possible. > kind regards, > Torsten. > Am 29.04.2016 um 10:08 schrieb Nat Sakimura: >> As I look at it more and more, it started to look like the problem of >> accepting tainted values without message authentication. To fix the root >> cause, we would have to authenticate response. ID Token was designed to also >> serve as a solution anticipating it. >> >> Any concrete ideas? >> >> On Sat, Apr 23, 2016 at 04:47 Torsten Lodderstedt <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> Hi all, >> >> discussion about Mix-Up and CnP seems to have stopped after the session >> in BA - at least in the OAuth WG. There is a discussion about >> mitigations in OpenId Connect going on at the OpenId Connect mailing list. >> >> I'm very much interested to find a solution within the OAuth realm as >> I'm not interested to either implement two solutions (for OpenId Connect >> and OAuth) or adopt a OpenId-specific solution to OAuth (use id! tokens >> in the front channel). I therefore would like to see progress and >> propose to continue the discussion regarding mitigations for both threats. >> >> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-mix-up-mitigation-00 >> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-mix-up-mitigation-00> >> proposes reasonable mitigations for both attacks. There are alternatives >> as well: >> - mix up: >> -- AS specific redirect uris >> -- Meta data/turi >> (https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sakimura-oauth-meta-07#section-5 >> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sakimura-oauth-meta-07#section-5>) >> - CnP: >> -- use of the nonce parameter (as a distinct mitigation beside state for >> counter XSRF) >> >> Anyone having an opinion? >> >> best regards, >> Torsten. >> >> _______________________________________________ >> OAuth mailing list >> [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >> <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth> > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
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