Hi Nat, wouldn't a maleware steal the response and the cookies from the device and replay it somewhere else. Or just steal the password? So no need to tweak the response?
best regards, Torsten. -------- Originalnachricht -------- Betreff: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Mix-Up and CnP/ Code injection Von: Nat Sakimura <[email protected]> An: [email protected] Cc: [email protected],[email protected] >Hi Torsten, > >No, not defeating, but being able to find out if the input is tainted or >not. > >Nat >On Mon, May 9, 2016 at 07:46 <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Are you suggesting OAuth should defeat maleware? So far, this was >> considered to be handled by OS/Anti-Virus/other measures. >> >> >> -------- Originalnachricht -------- >> Betreff: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Mix-Up and CnP/ Code injection >> Von: Nat Sakimura <[email protected]> >> An: Torsten Lodderstedt <[email protected]> >> Cc: Justin Richer <[email protected]>,"<[email protected]>" <[email protected]> >> >> Yes, and unfortunately, that is a rather common attack these days. >> Infesting a user device with a malware is probably easier than having the >> client developer register its client to unknown server. >> >> 2016年5月1日(日) 16:54 Torsten Lodderstedt <[email protected]>: >> >>> Hi Nat, >>> >>> please explain the attack. I assume the attacker would need to control >>> network transmission or client device. >>> >>> kind regards, >>> Torsten. >>> >>> Am 01.05.2016 um 07:36 schrieb Nat Sakimura <[email protected]>: >>> >>> It actually depends on what risk level the transaction is at. For low >>> risk transactions, just having separate redirection endpoint may be >>> adequate. On the other hand, I can easily think of an attack that replaces >>> iss on the authz response making the control invalid posing questions on >>> whether it is worth introducing it. >>> On Sun, May 1, 2016 at 14:21 Justin Richer <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> I agree that we’re getting dangerously close to recommending signed >>>> assertions at every step of the process, thereby bypassing HTTP. This was >>>> the same mistake that WS-* and SOAP made, let’s not repeat it if we can. >>>> >>>> — Justin >>>> >>>> On Apr 30, 2016, at 10:57 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt < >>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> Hi Nat, >>>> >>>> sure, one could also authenticate and cryptographically protect the >>>> redirect response. Leveraging OIDC concepts is an idea worth considering >>>> but they should be adopted to the OAuth philosophy. The id token as used in >>>> the hybrid flows mixes an identity assertion with elements of transport >>>> security measures. A OAuth AS does not provide identity data to clients, so >>>> we only need the transport security part. >>>> >>>> I personally would prefer a OAuth response object (similar to request >>>> object you have proposed) over the id token. Such a response object could >>>> contain (and directly protect) state, code and other response values. I >>>> consider this the more elegant design and it is easier to implement then >>>> having detached signatures over hash values of codes or access tokens. >>>> Moreover, it would allow to encrypt the response as well. >>>> >>>> Generally, our threat analysis so far does not have provided >>>> justification for cryptographically protected redirect responses. All >>>> proposals currently on the table stop mix up and code injection using >>>> simpler mechanisms. >>>> >>>> I think OAuth 2.0 is a huge success due to its balance of versatility, >>>> security and _simplicity_. We definitely need to keep it secure, but we >>>> should also keep it as simple as possible. >>>> >>>> kind regards, >>>> Torsten. >>>> Am 29.04.2016 um 10:08 schrieb Nat Sakimura: >>>> >>>> As I look at it more and more, it started to look like the problem of >>>> accepting tainted values without message authentication. To fix the root >>>> cause, we would have to authenticate response. ID Token was designed to >>>> also serve as a solution anticipating it. >>>> >>>> Any concrete ideas? >>>> >>>> On Sat, Apr 23, 2016 at 04:47 Torsten Lodderstedt < >>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Hi all, >>>>> >>>>> discussion about Mix-Up and CnP seems to have stopped after the session >>>>> in BA - at least in the OAuth WG. There is a discussion about >>>>> mitigations in OpenId Connect going on at the OpenId Connect mailing >>>>> list. >>>>> >>>>> I'm very much interested to find a solution within the OAuth realm as >>>>> I'm not interested to either implement two solutions (for OpenId Connect >>>>> and OAuth) or adopt a OpenId-specific solution to OAuth (use id! tokens >>>>> in the front channel). I therefore would like to see progress and >>>>> propose to continue the discussion regarding mitigations for both >>>>> threats. >>>>> >>>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-mix-up-mitigation-00 >>>>> proposes reasonable mitigations for both attacks. There are alternatives >>>>> as well: >>>>> - mix up: >>>>> -- AS specific redirect uris >>>>> -- Meta data/turi >>>>> (https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sakimura-oauth-meta-07#section-5) >>>>> - CnP: >>>>> -- use of the nonce parameter (as a distinct mitigation beside state for >>>>> counter XSRF) >>>>> >>>>> Anyone having an opinion? >>>>> >>>>> best regards, >>>>> Torsten. >>>>> >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> OAuth mailing list >>>>> [email protected] >>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >>>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> OAuth mailing list >>>> [email protected] >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >> Nat Sakimura >> Chairman of the Board, OpenID Foundation >> Trustee, Kantara Initiative >> >-- >Nat Sakimura >Chairman of the Board, OpenID Foundation >Trustee, Kantara Initiative
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