Hello everyone, This looks like a useful addition to OAuth SPIFFE Client Authentication<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-oauth-spiffe-client-auth-02.html>, which also uses workload identity as RFC7521/3 assertion JWTs, but stops short of using them as JAGs, rather focuses on client authentication for other grants.
A couple remarks: * This draft feels more naturally positioned as another profile of identity chaining<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-oauth-identity-chaining-17.html>, alongside ID JAG<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-parecki-oauth-identity-assertion-authz-grant-05.html>. The latter originates from challenges of streamlining cross-domain SSO for humans by removing friction, and now tackles further aspects in this space such as required claims for JIT user provisioning, deferred responses etc. * The JAG should be PoP constrained, which is easily achievable by including the agent’s cnf claim in it. This mechanism is proposed by OAuth 2.0 JWT Authorization Grant with DPoP Binding<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-parecki-oauth-jwt-dpop-grant-01.html> and we use it with good results in applicable JAG flows in our company. Yaron Classification: GENERAL From: Karl McGuinness <[email protected]> Sent: Monday, August 3, 2026 9:47 PM To: Aaron Parecki <[email protected]> Cc: Paul Carleton <[email protected]>; [email protected] Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Re: New I-D: draft-carleton-workload-authz-grant (Workload Authorization Grant) This message is from an external sender - be cautious, particularly with links and attachments. I didn't see it as out of scope for ID-JAG because it's still acting as a principal managed by the IdP across domains which could have RAS specific subject identifiers and authorization claims. IdPs already need to solve the challenge of managing different principal types, lifecycle, entitlements, provisioning, etc. Its reduces a lot of cognitive overhead for the developer to just think of ID-JAG as SSO where the upstream IdP manages all the identity complexity as I just need issuer scoped `sub` I can use for subject resolution. I acknowledge that my take my not be shared which is why I was hoping to get more attention on the issue. On Mon, Aug 3, 2026 at 12:36 PM Aaron Parecki <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: That's basically how we were thinking of it. I just felt like it was something a bit out of scope of the ID-JAG spec. But the idea is very much to reuse the existing relationship established between the Resource AS and IdP for ID-JAGs, and reuse it for workloads as well. On Mon, Aug 3, 2026 at 12:33 PM Karl McGuinness <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Paul, Interesting draft. I'll have to dive in deeper. My initial reaction is that this draft lines up with something I raised in ID-JAG issue #73 (https://github.com/oauth-wg/oauth-identity-assertion-authz-grant/issues/73): whether ID-JAG should also cover workloads acting as themselves. The issue sketches Workload and Agent Identity SSO modes where the assertion's sub is the workload or agent itself rather than a chained user identity, which is the same shape as your grant. The appeal of reusing ID-JAG was one simple SSO model for agents, workloads, and clients, whether acting on behalf of a user or as themselves, and it stays aligned with the standard identity and authorization claims (which also bears on your question 2). The deployment I was picturing looks a lot like the Enterprise IdP variant in your issuer-placement open issue: the workload brings its credential to the IdP (a WIMSE WIT, say), the IdP issues the grant, and the platform picks it up by token exchange. If the resource AS is already integrated with the IdP, things get simpler, since the IdP is already handling agent lifecycle, entitlements, and governance through SCIM or JIT. The resource AS ends up with one federation relationship instead of an allowlist entry per platform. Would love to hear your thoughts, as there was some initial positive signal on #73 but I was hoping for a larger discussion on the topic. Karl On Mon, Aug 3, 2026 at 11:06 AM Paul Carleton <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Hi all, Good to meet many of you in Vienna! I've posted an early individual draft based on some discussions had over that week. The draft profiles RFC 7523 for agent platforms: an agent obtains access tokens by presenting a platform-signed JWT authorization grant at the resource's authorization server. I've also posted this to wimse@, since the identity in the grant is a WIMSE workload identity produced by ordinary WIMSE issuance and cross-domain federation; this draft covers the OAuth-facing hop where an existing AS consumes it. This defines no new grant type, no new token format, and no change to RS-to-AS trust. A service with an existing OAuth deployment changes only its token endpoint. Trust is one admin-level entry per customer tenancy with keys resolved by reference, and the AS accepts previously-unseen subjects under a trusted issuer just in time; there is no client registration step. Relative to adjacent work: same JWT-authorization-grant shape as ID-JAG and draft-ietf-oauth-identity-chaining, but the subject is the agent workload itself rather than a chained user identity. The agent-as-client alternative (spiffe-client-auth, attestation-based-client-auth, CIMD) is addressed in question 1 below. Datatracker: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-carleton-workload-authz-grant/ Editor's copy: https://pcarleton.github.io/draft-carleton-workload-authz-grant/draft-carleton-workload-authz-grant.html Repo: https://github.com/pcarleton/draft-carleton-workload-authz-grant Feedback I'm most looking for: 1. The draft treats the agent as the grant subject, not a new client ID per-instance, and I think that's the right shape; thank you Brian Campbell for nudging me in that direction. It's one concrete stance in the ongoing client-instance discussion: consistent with the adopted stack (ATTEST, spiffe-client-auth, and the McGuinness drafts all keep one logical client_id and surface the instance elsewhere), and it keeps the adoption floor at "jwt-bearer, which already ships everywhere." Additional support for that framing would be helpful, or for concrete scenarios where subject-not-client breaks down. 2. Claim naming for platform-asserted attributes: reuse the RFC 9068 roles/groups/entitlements registrations, or register new names? (Related question posed to wimse@ about whether the AIMS work wants to own this vocabulary.) 3. Input on Audience handling relative to rfc7523bis. Requested cluster: Cross-Domain Chaining. Related: Client Authentication. Most sections are deliberately TODO. Feedback here or on the repo is welcome. Paul _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list -- [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list -- [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> This message and any attachment ("the Message") are confidential. If you have received the Message in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete the Message from your system, any use of the Message is forbidden. Correspondence via e-mail is primarily for information purposes. RBI neither makes nor accepts legally binding statements via e-mail unless explicitly agreed otherwise. 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