Paul, Karl, Aaron, Yaron,
A few observations from the requirements side, since the draft was kind enough
to position against it.
On the deployment-shape discussion: it may help to name what the two shapes are
actually deciding. In the vocabulary the requirements draft's -02 revision
adopts, every cross-boundary trust story has an acquisition step (how the
relying side obtains trust material for an issuer at all) and a binding step
(whether that material represents the party it claims). WAG's admin-level entry
per tenancy performs both in one administrative act, directly between platform
and resource AS, and amortizes it across unbounded ephemeral instances via
just-in-time acceptance; the IdP-integrated shape in issue #73 performs the
same two steps once, between IdP and resource AS, and then amortizes across
platforms as well as instances. Both are prior-arrangement models with
different concentration trade-offs: the direct shape keeps the trust decision
with the party consuming it at the cost of one entry per tenancy; the brokered
shape collapses entries at the cost of making the IdP the issuer of record for
identities it did not mint and a runtime dependency for every platform behind
it. Which trade a deployment wants seems genuinely situational, which argues
for Paul's separate-draft instinct with aligned token shape, rather than one
model absorbing the other. And for completeness: the case where no prior
arrangement can exist at all, first contact between organizations with no admin
on either side to perform the entry, is the lane the requirements draft exists
for, and neither shape here claims it.
On claims vocabulary, one boundary drawn now will save this thread's successors
a painful divorce: WAG's scope is the agent acting as itself, no human
principal in the token, and the claims that case needs (instance identity,
tenancy, attestation context, the RFC 9068 authorization attributes) are
structurally different from the with-principal case, where delegation and
authorization evidence must be conveyed and where the requirements impose
invariants (principal binding and non-alterability along the chain, dual-axis
authorization, execution-time human-authorization evidence) that own-behalf
tokens never carry. Issue #73's relaxation of subject_token toward client
assertions and attestations is exactly where these two vocabularies could
quietly merge, and they should not: whatever registry these claims land in, I
would ask that own-behalf attributes and with-principal delegation evidence be
distinguishable by construction, not by convention. The with-principal evidence
vocabulary is adjacent work I intend to bring forward separately, and I will
keep it aligned with whatever this thread settles for the own-behalf case.
On Paul's question 3, briefly, because the working group just paid for this
lesson: audience handling should inherit rfc7523bis's sole-audience discipline
exactly, one audience, the token endpoint's issuer identifier, no relaxation
toward relationship-inferred audiences. The audience-injection findings were
about assertions consumable by parties other than the one named, and a grant
format born after the remedy should be strict from birth.
And Yaron, thank you for the production datapoint; PoP-constrained grants
running at bank grade is evidence the whole space should be citing, and
cnf-in-the-grant seems clearly right for WAG as well.
Morgan
On Tuesday, August 4th, 2026 at 8:18 PM, Karl McGuinness
<[email protected]> wrote:
> +1
>
> The changes we made to relax the definition of ID-JAG IdP from Enterprise IdP
> to as Aaron indicated, the role of identity issuer for the RAS, was to enable
> a "Kubernetes"-like deployment model with a Platform IdP. We also relaxed
> actor_token constraints to enable profiling ontop for instances.
>
> Issue #73 is just proposing to do the same for Principal and relaxing it to
> allow Client Assertion/Attesation/Client Instance Assertion as a
> subject_token instead of an id_token with the IdP brokering subject, claims,
> scopes. resource to the downstream RAS for client as subject.
>
> -Karl
>
> On Tue, Aug 4, 2026 at 6:06 PM Aaron Parecki <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>> fwiw a deployment option for ID-JAG could be a consumer platform issuing
>> ID-JAGs itself. This is outlined in appendix A.2
>> https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-oauth-identity-assertion-authz-grant-04.html#appendix-A.2
>> but imagine the case where the "CIAM Platform" in that example is actually
>> the same platform as where the client is running. The key thing is the
>> relationship between the Resource AS and the ID-JAG issuer. The "IdP" role
>> in ID-JAG is not limited to being what you typically think of as an
>> enterprise IdP.
>>
>> On Tue, Aug 4, 2026 at 5:57 PM Paul Carleton <[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>>> Karl, I agree that shape sounds a lot like the "BYO-IdP" model listed in
>>> the open issue. A few things I want to be true:
>>>
>>> - An RS adopting ID-JAG has an easy time adapting to accept WAG (i.e. same
>>> / similar token shape + similar JIT semantics)
>>> - An RS adopting WAG has an easy time adapting to accept ID-JAG
>>> - An RS adopting WAG does not necessarily need to integrate with an IdP
>>>
>>> This last bullet point pushes me toward making this a separate draft. The
>>> initial and simplest deployment shape I am thinking of is similar to a
>>> kubernetes cluster's OIDC provider being used in a workload identity
>>> federation flow. In that deployment, the kubernetes cluster is not a
>>> full-blown IdP, it is just trusted to issue identities to its pods. There
>>> is no expectation that Kubernetes clusters register their pod identities
>>> with an IdP.
>>>
>>> Similarly the agent platform is not a full IdP, it is just responsible for
>>> giving identities to the agents in its domain. I agree that there are
>>> benefits to the IdP-integrated deployment model, but I want to allow for
>>> the simpler model initially.
>>>
>>> ID-JAG could also allow for platform's issuing their own non-IdP tokens,
>>> but that feels like bypassing the IdP when it is human-based access. With
>>> workloads, it feels more natural to have a deployment model with the
>>> platform being directly responsible for issuing tokens (similar to k8s oidc
>>> providers).
>>>
>>> That being said, the token shape, etc., should be similar regardless of
>>> which draft its specified in, so it seems worth aligning regardless of
>>> where it ends up. The claims I want to align on here would also be relevant
>>> to ID-JAG JIT provisioning.
>>>
>>> Yaron -- thanks for this. I agree we want PoP constraining. Re: [OAuth
>>> SPIFFE Client
>>> Authentication](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-oauth-spiffe-client-auth-02.html),
>>> I have sketched out the shapes
>>> [here](https://pcarleton.github.io/draft-carleton-workload-authz-grant/request-shapes.html).
>>> I think it solves a slightly different problem in that it relies on the RS
>>> understanding the SPIFFE credential, where in this case I want the WAG to
>>> be compatible with SPIFFE but not require SPIFFE. I would lean more towards
>>> CIMD + private_key_jwt for this particular pattern.
>>>
>>> On Mon, Aug 3, 2026 at 5:20 PM Yaron ZEHAVI
>>> <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Hello everyone,
>>>>
>>>> This looks like a useful addition to [OAuth SPIFFE Client
>>>> Authentication](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-oauth-spiffe-client-auth-02.html),
>>>> which also uses workload identity as RFC7521/3 assertion JWTs, but stops
>>>> short of using them as JAGs, rather focuses on client authentication for
>>>> other grants.
>>>>
>>>> A couple remarks:
>>>>
>>>> - This draft feels more naturally positioned as another profile of
>>>> [identity
>>>> chaining](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-oauth-identity-chaining-17.html),
>>>> alongside [ID
>>>> JAG](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-parecki-oauth-identity-assertion-authz-grant-05.html).
>>>> The latter originates from challenges of streamlining cross-domain SSO
>>>> for humans by removing friction, and now tackles further aspects in this
>>>> space such as required claims for JIT user provisioning, deferred
>>>> responses etc.
>>>> - The JAG should be PoP constrained, which is easily achievable by
>>>> including the agent’s cnf claim in it. This mechanism is proposed by
>>>> [OAuth 2.0 JWT Authorization Grant with DPoP
>>>> Binding](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-parecki-oauth-jwt-dpop-grant-01.html)
>>>> and we use it with good results in applicable JAG flows in our company.
>>>>
>>>> Yaron
>>>>
>>>> Classification: GENERAL
>>>>
>>>> From: Karl McGuinness <[email protected]>
>>>> Sent: Monday, August 3, 2026 9:47 PM
>>>> To: Aaron Parecki <[email protected]>
>>>> Cc: Paul Carleton <[email protected]>; [email protected]
>>>> Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Re: New I-D: draft-carleton-workload-authz-grant
>>>> (Workload Authorization Grant)
>>>>
>>>> This message is from an external sender - be cautious, particularly with
>>>> links and attachments.
>>>>
>>>> I didn't see it as out of scope for ID-JAG because it's still acting as a
>>>> principal managed by the IdP across domains which could have RAS specific
>>>> subject identifiers and authorization claims. IdPs already need to solve
>>>> the challenge of managing different principal types, lifecycle,
>>>> entitlements, provisioning, etc. Its reduces a lot of cognitive overhead
>>>> for the developer to just think of ID-JAG as SSO where the upstream IdP
>>>> manages all the identity complexity as I just need issuer scoped `sub` I
>>>> can use for subject resolution. I acknowledge that my take my not be
>>>> shared which is why I was hoping to get more attention on the issue.
>>>>
>>>> On Mon, Aug 3, 2026 at 12:36 PM Aaron Parecki <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> That's basically how we were thinking of it. I just felt like it was
>>>>> something a bit out of scope of the ID-JAG spec. But the idea is very
>>>>> much to reuse the existing relationship established between the Resource
>>>>> AS and IdP for ID-JAGs, and reuse it for workloads as well.
>>>>>
>>>>> On Mon, Aug 3, 2026 at 12:33 PM Karl McGuinness <[email protected]>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Paul,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Interesting draft. I'll have to dive in deeper. My initial reaction is
>>>>>> that this draft lines up with something I raised in ID-JAG issue #73
>>>>>> (https://github.com/oauth-wg/oauth-identity-assertion-authz-grant/issues/73):
>>>>>> whether ID-JAG should also cover workloads acting as themselves. The
>>>>>> issue sketches Workload and Agent Identity SSO modes where the
>>>>>> assertion's sub is the workload or agent itself rather than a chained
>>>>>> user identity, which is the same shape as your grant. The appeal of
>>>>>> reusing ID-JAG was one simple SSO model for agents, workloads, and
>>>>>> clients, whether acting on behalf of a user or as themselves, and it
>>>>>> stays aligned with the standard identity and authorization claims (which
>>>>>> also bears on your question 2).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The deployment I was picturing looks a lot like the Enterprise IdP
>>>>>> variant in your issuer-placement open issue: the workload brings its
>>>>>> credential to the IdP (a WIMSE WIT, say), the IdP issues the grant, and
>>>>>> the platform picks it up by token exchange. If the resource AS is
>>>>>> already integrated with the IdP, things get simpler, since the IdP is
>>>>>> already handling agent lifecycle, entitlements, and governance through
>>>>>> SCIM or JIT. The resource AS ends up with one federation relationship
>>>>>> instead of an allowlist entry per platform.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Would love to hear your thoughts, as there was some initial positive
>>>>>> signal on #73 but I was hoping for a larger discussion on the topic.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Karl
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Mon, Aug 3, 2026 at 11:06 AM Paul Carleton
>>>>>> <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hi all,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Good to meet many of you in Vienna!
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I've posted an early individual draft based on some discussions had
>>>>>>> over that week. The draft profiles RFC 7523 for agent platforms: an
>>>>>>> agent obtains access tokens by presenting a platform-signed JWT
>>>>>>> authorization grant at the resource's authorization server. I've also
>>>>>>> posted this to wimse@, since the identity in the grant is a WIMSE
>>>>>>> workload identity produced by ordinary WIMSE issuance and cross-domain
>>>>>>> federation; this draft covers the OAuth-facing hop where an existing AS
>>>>>>> consumes it.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This defines no new grant type, no new token format, and no change to
>>>>>>> RS-to-AS trust. A service with an existing OAuth deployment changes
>>>>>>> only its token endpoint. Trust is one admin-level entry per customer
>>>>>>> tenancy with keys resolved by reference, and the AS accepts
>>>>>>> previously-unseen subjects under a trusted issuer just in time; there
>>>>>>> is no client registration step.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Relative to adjacent work: same JWT-authorization-grant shape as ID-JAG
>>>>>>> and draft-ietf-oauth-identity-chaining, but the subject is the agent
>>>>>>> workload itself rather than a chained user identity. The
>>>>>>> agent-as-client alternative (spiffe-client-auth,
>>>>>>> attestation-based-client-auth, CIMD) is addressed in question 1 below.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Datatracker:
>>>>>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-carleton-workload-authz-grant/
>>>>>>> Editor's copy:
>>>>>>> https://pcarleton.github.io/draft-carleton-workload-authz-grant/draft-carleton-workload-authz-grant.html
>>>>>>> Repo: https://github.com/pcarleton/draft-carleton-workload-authz-grant
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Feedback I'm most looking for:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 1. The draft treats the agent as the grant subject, not a new client ID
>>>>>>> per-instance, and I think that's the right shape; thank you Brian
>>>>>>> Campbell for nudging me in that direction. It's one concrete stance in
>>>>>>> the ongoing client-instance discussion: consistent with the adopted
>>>>>>> stack (ATTEST, spiffe-client-auth, and the McGuinness drafts all keep
>>>>>>> one logical client_id and surface the instance elsewhere), and it keeps
>>>>>>> the adoption floor at "jwt-bearer, which already ships everywhere."
>>>>>>> Additional support for that framing would be helpful, or for concrete
>>>>>>> scenarios where subject-not-client breaks down.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 2. Claim naming for platform-asserted attributes: reuse the RFC 9068
>>>>>>> roles/groups/entitlements registrations, or register new names?
>>>>>>> (Related question posed to wimse@ about whether the AIMS work wants to
>>>>>>> own this vocabulary.)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 3. Input on Audience handling relative to rfc7523bis.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Requested cluster: Cross-Domain Chaining. Related: Client
>>>>>>> Authentication.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Most sections are deliberately TODO. Feedback here or on the repo is
>>>>>>> welcome.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Paul
>>>>>>>
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