Di Indonesia, Quotenya level berapa yah buat bandar since RTI dan IQPlus etc cuma Level 1 :P
--- In obrolan-bandar@yahoogroups.com, "tirta858" <tirta...@...> wrote: > > www.investopedia.com/university/electronictrading/trading8.asp > > Specialist see not the Level 2 but Level 3 Quote. > > There are a variety of ways in which Nasdaq quotes security prices to > the public. These levels vary on the amount of information and access > they provide to investors. > > > Level I > This type of quote is most often published on the net as a "real- time > quote." Level I consists of real-time bid/ask quotes for securities > trading on the Nasdaq stock market. This type of access does not > disclose who is bidding or asking for the stock, and it does not show > how many shares the market maker is looking for. Real-time quotes > show the current quote, but it may be from a different lot than what > you are trading. Market makers love clients with this type of access > because it doesn't show you the order sizes, and therefore your order > may be passed around or held until market makers can profit from your > order. > > Level II > This type of quotation system is a step up from the Level I. Level II > access provides real-time access to the quotations of individual > market makers registered in every Nasdaq-listed security as well as > the offering or bidding lots that they are looking for. This level of > access also gives the name of the market maker looking to trade the > stock. It allows traders to see what market makers are showing the > most interest in a stock and to identify the patterns for each market > maker. Level II access is available over the internet - but at a > cost. This can range in the hundreds of dollars per month depending > on the company. For clients placing a large number of trades, the > firm may waive the access fee because they will make up the costs on > your commissions. > > Level III > This is a trading service consisting of everything in Level II plus > the ability to enter quotes, execute orders and send information. > This service is restricted to NASD member firms that function as > registered market makers. Level III allows you to enter bid/ask > quotes as the trades are being executed right in front of you. It is > the fastest way to execute a trade and is typically found only on the > trading floors of brokerage firms and market makers. > > 1. The Specialist : > > > What's the difference between a Nasdaq market maker and a NYSE > specialist? > > -------------------------------------------------------------------- -- > ---------- > > What's the main difference between a specialist and a market maker? > Not much. Both the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) specialist and the > Nasdaq market maker try to increase the liquidity on the exchange and > provide more fluid and efficient trading. > > > A specialist is a dealer representing a NYSE specialist firm - one of > the main facilitators of trade on the exchange. A market maker is a > broker-dealer who facilitates the trading of shares by posting bid > and ask prices along with maintaining an inventory of shares. It is > important to note that a specialist is a type of market maker. The > NYSE has seven specialist firms while the Nasdaq has nearly 300 > market makers. The NYSE is an auction-based market where traders meet > on the floor of the exchange, using person-to-person, telephone > orders or electronic orders. The Nasdaq, on the other hand, is > strictly an electronic exchange. > > NYSE > Specialists working on the NYSE have four roles to fulfill in order > to ensure a fair and orderly market: > > Auctioneer - because the NYSE is an auction market, bids and asks are > competitively forwarded by investors. These bids and asks must be > posted for the entire market to see to make certain that the best > price is always maintained. It is the job of the specialist to ensure > that all bids and asks are reported in an accurate and timely manner, > that all marketable trades are executed and that order is maintained > on the floor. Along with posting the daily bid and ask prices, the > specialist must also set the opening price for the stock every > morning. This price can greatly differ from the previous day's > closing price based on after-hours news and events. The role of the > specialist is to find the correct market price based on supply and > demand. > > Agent - the specialist can also accept limit orders relayed by > investors through brokers or electronic trading. It is the > responsibility of the specialist to ensure the order is transacted > appropriately on behalf of others, using the same fiduciary care as > the brokers themselves once the price of the stock has reached the > limit criteria. > > Catalyst - as the specialists are in direct contact with the bidders > and sellers of particular securities, it is their responsibility that > enough interest exists for a particular stock. This is carried out by > specialists seeking out recently active investors in cases where the > bids and asks can't be matched. This aspect of the specialist's job > helps to induce trades that may not of happened if the specialist had > not been there to bring buyers and sellers together. > > Principal - in the instance where there's a demand-supply imbalance > of a particular security, the market maker must make adjustments by > purchasing and selling out of his/her own inventory to equalize the > market. If the market is in a buying frenzy the specialist will > provide shares from their inventory until the price is stabilized. > They'll also buy shares for their inventory in the event of a large > selloff. > > Nasdaq > Market makers working on the Nasdaq exchange are actually not at the > exchange. They are large investment companies which buy and sell > securities through an electronic network. These market makers > maintain inventories and buy and sell stocks from their inventories > to individual customers and other dealers. > > Each market maker on the Nasdaq is required to give a two-sided > quote, meaning they must state a firm bid price and a firm ask price > that they are willing to honor. > > Each security on the Nasdaq generally has more than one market maker, > with an average of 14 market makers for each stock which provides > liquidity and efficient trading. The market makers are openly > competitive amongst themselves and facilitate competitive prices; as > a result, individual investors generally will get the best price. As > this competition is evident in the limited spreads between posted > bids and asks, the market makers on the Nasdaq will in some instances > act very much like the specialists on the NYSE. > > "Negative Obligation" "Bagged" > > 2.THE Specialist: > > Well-deserved attention has been focused on the $140 million > compensation package received by Richard Grasso, the recently > departed chairman of the New York Stock Exchange. Undoubtedly there > will now be significant changes at the NYSE Board. But the real > question is why that Board, with representatives from the most > sophisticated firms on Wall Street, agreed to pay its chairman such a > rich compensation package. There is only one conclusion: He was worth > the money. > > While the NYSE bills itself as "a private company with a public > purpose," there is no doubt that its chairman's most important role > is to protect the interests of its members. And no interest is more > important than the protection of the trading profits derived by the > NYSE's floor-based specialists. Thanks in large part to Mr. Grasso's > efforts, the NYSE has, until recently, enjoyed a remarkable level of > prestige, providing the cover necessary to protect its inherently > unfair and inefficient trading system. > > Every security traded on the NYSE is assigned exclusively to a > specialist firm. The specialist ultimately sees every order in its > assigned stocks submitted to the exchange either electronically or > through brokers on the floor. But while the NYSE grants specialists a > privileged position in order to maintain a "fair and orderly market" > (which, curiously, is nowhere defined), the specialist is also > permitted to simultaneously trade for his own account -- an obvious > conflict of interest. > > NYSE rules attempt to limit the specialist's ability to improperly > use inside information by limiting specialists to trading only when > there is a temporary disparity between supply and demand, buying when > there are no other buyers and selling when there are no other > sellers. Yet if specialists really traded only when there is an > absence of buyers or sellers, one would think they would lose money. > > The fact is that specialists are profitable, in Samuel Johnson's > words, "beyond the dreams of avarice." A forthcoming study by > Precision Economics will reveal that publicly traded firms with > specialist units last year enjoyed pre-tax profit margins ranging > from 35% to 60%. Labranche, the largest NYSE specialist, generated > more than a quarter of a billion dollars in revenues, almost entirely > from trading for its own account on the floor. Pretty profitable for > trading only when nobody else wants to! > > Since trading is a zero-sum game, these profits come at the direct > expense of investors such as large institutions, which desperately > want competitive alternatives to the NYSE but are reluctant to > publicly complain about the fundamental unfairness of the NYSE model. > After all, institutions have to do business with the NYSE because > there are no real competitive alternatives. > > The NYSE has perpetuated myths that mislead regulators and the > investing public into believing that specialists serve the public. > For instance, the NYSE asserts that investors need specialists > because without them, "who is going to be there to buy or sell when > nobody else wants to?" The NYSE claims that the specialist reduces > market volatility by acting as the buyer or seller of last resort. > > Think about that: Envision SpecialistMan, emerging amongst the bedlam > of a fast falling stock with a giant "S" on his chest. Quickly > calming the crowd, he exclaims "I will buy from every one of you > because it is my duty, even though I will lose money." They sell > their shares to SpecialistMan, praising him for his willingness to > selflessly provide liquidity, regardless of the impact on his > profits. > > While this notion is ridiculous on its face, it is still put forward > to defend the NYSE specialist when nearly every other major > instrument is traded completely electronically without anyone being > given an informational advantage. The truth is that when a stock like > Enron starts falling, just like everyone else, SpecialistMan gets out > of the way. > > We ought to ask ourselves why we even want a specialist to manage the > decline of a stock. In an efficient market, that is the last thing we > should want. The market should be permitted to clear -- move to its > equilibrium point -- as quickly as possible, without somebody trying > to manage the process. A slowly declining stock only hurts buyers at > the expense of sellers, and vice versa. > > We need not worry about the specialist abusing his privileged > position, we are assured, because the NYSE's cardinal principle is > that the investor's interest is always served first. But it's easy to > get around this tenet. Even though there is no imbalance between > supply and demand, the specialist simply trumps the price of investor > orders. If a specialist is holding investor orders to buy IBM for > $10.00, he cannot buy at $10 until all investor orders at $10.00 are > executed. But he can buy at $10.01. With his informational advantage > over everybody else concerning the likely direction of a stock's > price, the specialist will outbid investors only at the most > advantageous moments. > > Ironically, the specialist is rewarded for this exclusive > opportunity. The NYSE calls this "price improvement" because the > investor trading with the specialist receives a better price. The > NYSE actually brags about the frequency of price improvement, which > really represents how often the specialist uses his informational > advantage (what most of us would otherwise call insider information) > to make a trading profit and disadvantage investors. > > These points should not be a revelation. Why would NYSE members pay > approximately $2 million for the privilege of standing on an old, > crowded floor all day unless they gained some sort of advantage? > Membership has its privileges. But does the public benefit from a > structure that grants privileges to a select few even though, thanks > to technology, we now have more efficient ways to trade securities? > > SEC rules ban floor brokers from trading for their own accounts. > Specialists, however, are exempted from this prohibition because they > are assumed to be performing a public service, an assumption belied > by the facts. So let's be clear. While the NYSE Board structure needs > to be fixed, and fixed promptly, we investors ought to focus most of > our attention on the profit center of the NYSE, its specialist > system. >
