Sebenernya yg sejenis "level II" screen dia RTI Terminal, Ipot, dll 
juga ada, cuma bedanya siapa yang pasang BID & Offer ngga ketauan.., 
setelah done baru kita bisa tau..., dulu pernah ada wacana kode 
broker mau dihilangkan, padahal di Amerika kita bisa dengan jelas 
melihat siapa yg pasang BID & OFFER lewat level II screen..., 
mestinya disini juga dibikin kayak gitu..., baru sip.

JsxTrader 

--- In obrolan-bandar@yahoogroups.com, "tirta858" <tirta...@...> 
wrote:
>
> Di Indonesia, Quotenya level berapa yah buat bandar since RTI dan 
> IQPlus etc cuma Level 1 :P
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> --- In obrolan-bandar@yahoogroups.com, "tirta858" <tirta858@> 
> wrote:
> >
> > www.investopedia.com/university/electronictrading/trading8.asp
> > 
> > Specialist see not the Level 2 but Level 3 Quote.  
> > 
> > There are a variety of ways in which Nasdaq quotes security 
prices 
> to 
> > the public. These levels vary on the amount of information and 
> access 
> > they provide to investors. 
> > 
> >  
> > Level I 
> > This type of quote is most often published on the net as a "real-
> time 
> > quote." Level I consists of real-time bid/ask quotes for 
securities 
> > trading on the Nasdaq stock market. This type of access does not 
> > disclose who is bidding or asking for the stock, and it does not 
> show 
> > how many shares the market maker is looking for. Real-time quotes 
> > show the current quote, but it may be from a different lot than 
> what 
> > you are trading. Market makers love clients with this type of 
> access 
> > because it doesn't show you the order sizes, and therefore your 
> order 
> > may be passed around or held until market makers can profit from 
> your 
> > order. 
> > 
> > Level II 
> > This type of quotation system is a step up from the Level I. 
Level 
> II 
> > access provides real-time access to the quotations of individual 
> > market makers registered in every Nasdaq-listed security as well 
as 
> > the offering or bidding lots that they are looking for. This 
level 
> of 
> > access also gives the name of the market maker looking to trade 
the 
> > stock. It allows traders to see what market makers are showing 
the 
> > most interest in a stock and to identify the patterns for each 
> market 
> > maker. Level II access is available over the internet - but at a 
> > cost. This can range in the hundreds of dollars per month 
depending 
> > on the company. For clients placing a large number of trades, the 
> > firm may waive the access fee because they will make up the costs 
> on 
> > your commissions. 
> > 
> > Level III 
> > This is a trading service consisting of everything in Level II 
plus 
> > the ability to enter quotes, execute orders and send information. 
> > This service is restricted to NASD member firms that function as 
> > registered market makers. Level III allows you to enter bid/ask 
> > quotes as the trades are being executed right in front of you. It 
> is 
> > the fastest way to execute a trade and is typically found only on 
> the 
> > trading floors of brokerage firms and market makers. 
> > 
> > 1. The Specialist :
> > 
> > 
> > What's the difference between a Nasdaq market maker and a NYSE 
> > specialist? 
> > 
> > ------------------------------------------------------------------
--
> --
> > ----------
> >  
> > What's the main difference between a specialist and a market 
maker? 
> > Not much. Both the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) specialist and 
> the 
> > Nasdaq market maker try to increase the liquidity on the exchange 
> and 
> > provide more fluid and efficient trading. 
> > 
> >   
> > A specialist is a dealer representing a NYSE specialist firm - 
one 
> of 
> > the main facilitators of trade on the exchange. A market maker is 
a 
> > broker-dealer who facilitates the trading of shares by posting 
bid 
> > and ask prices along with maintaining an inventory of shares. It 
is 
> > important to note that a specialist is a type of market maker. 
The 
> > NYSE has seven specialist firms while the Nasdaq has nearly 300 
> > market makers. The NYSE is an auction-based market where traders 
> meet 
> > on the floor of the exchange, using person-to-person, telephone 
> > orders or electronic orders. The Nasdaq, on the other hand, is 
> > strictly an electronic exchange.
> > 
> > NYSE
> > Specialists working on the NYSE have four roles to fulfill in 
order 
> > to ensure a fair and orderly market: 
> > 
> > Auctioneer - because the NYSE is an auction market, bids and asks 
> are 
> > competitively forwarded by investors. These bids and asks must be 
> > posted for the entire market to see to make certain that the best 
> > price is always maintained. It is the job of the specialist to 
> ensure 
> > that all bids and asks are reported in an accurate and timely 
> manner, 
> > that all marketable trades are executed and that order is 
> maintained 
> > on the floor. Along with posting the daily bid and ask prices, 
the 
> > specialist must also set the opening price for the stock every 
> > morning. This price can greatly differ from the previous day's 
> > closing price based on after-hours news and events. The role of 
the 
> > specialist is to find the correct market price based on supply 
and 
> > demand.
> > 
> > Agent - the specialist can also accept limit orders relayed by 
> > investors through brokers or electronic trading. It is the 
> > responsibility of the specialist to ensure the order is 
transacted 
> > appropriately on behalf of others, using the same fiduciary care 
as 
> > the brokers themselves once the price of the stock has reached 
the 
> > limit criteria. 
> > 
> > Catalyst - as the specialists are in direct contact with the 
> bidders 
> > and sellers of particular securities, it is their responsibility 
> that 
> > enough interest exists for a particular stock. This is carried 
out 
> by 
> > specialists seeking out recently active investors in cases where 
> the 
> > bids and asks can't be matched. This aspect of the specialist's 
job 
> > helps to induce trades that may not of happened if the specialist 
> had 
> > not been there to bring buyers and sellers together.
> > 
> > Principal - in the instance where there's a demand-supply 
imbalance 
> > of a particular security, the market maker must make adjustments 
by 
> > purchasing and selling out of his/her own inventory to equalize 
the 
> > market. If the market is in a buying frenzy the specialist will 
> > provide shares from their inventory until the price is 
stabilized. 
> > They'll also buy shares for their inventory in the event of a 
large 
> > selloff. 
> > 
> > Nasdaq
> > Market makers working on the Nasdaq exchange are actually not at 
> the 
> > exchange. They are large investment companies which buy and sell 
> > securities through an electronic network. These market makers 
> > maintain inventories and buy and sell stocks from their 
inventories 
> > to individual customers and other dealers.
> > 
> > Each market maker on the Nasdaq is required to give a two-sided 
> > quote, meaning they must state a firm bid price and a firm ask 
> price 
> > that they are willing to honor.
> > 
> > Each security on the Nasdaq generally has more than one market 
> maker, 
> > with an average of 14 market makers for each stock which provides 
> > liquidity and efficient trading. The market makers are openly 
> > competitive amongst themselves and facilitate competitive prices; 
> as 
> > a result, individual investors generally will get the best price. 
> As 
> > this competition is evident in the limited spreads between posted 
> > bids and asks, the market makers on the Nasdaq will in some 
> instances 
> > act very much like the specialists on the NYSE. 
> >  
> > "Negative Obligation" "Bagged" 
> > 
> > 2.THE Specialist:
> > 
> > Well-deserved attention has been focused on the $140 million 
> > compensation package received by Richard Grasso, the recently 
> > departed chairman of the New York Stock Exchange. Undoubtedly 
there 
> > will now be significant changes at the NYSE Board. But the real 
> > question is why that Board, with representatives from the most 
> > sophisticated firms on Wall Street, agreed to pay its chairman 
such 
> a 
> > rich compensation package. There is only one conclusion: He was 
> worth 
> > the money. 
> > 
> > While the NYSE bills itself as "a private company with a public 
> > purpose," there is no doubt that its chairman's most important 
role 
> > is to protect the interests of its members. And no interest is 
more 
> > important than the protection of the trading profits derived by 
the 
> > NYSE's floor-based specialists. Thanks in large part to Mr. 
> Grasso's 
> > efforts, the NYSE has, until recently, enjoyed a remarkable level 
> of 
> > prestige, providing the cover necessary to protect its inherently 
> > unfair and inefficient trading system. 
> > 
> > Every security traded on the NYSE is assigned exclusively to a 
> > specialist firm. The specialist ultimately sees every order in 
its 
> > assigned stocks submitted to the exchange either electronically 
or 
> > through brokers on the floor. But while the NYSE grants 
specialists 
> a 
> > privileged position in order to maintain a "fair and orderly 
> market" 
> > (which, curiously, is nowhere defined), the specialist is also 
> > permitted to simultaneously trade for his own account -- an 
obvious 
> > conflict of interest. 
> > 
> > NYSE rules attempt to limit the specialist's ability to 
improperly 
> > use inside information by limiting specialists to trading only 
when 
> > there is a temporary disparity between supply and demand, buying 
> when 
> > there are no other buyers and selling when there are no other 
> > sellers. Yet if specialists really traded only when there is an 
> > absence of buyers or sellers, one would think they would lose 
> money. 
> > 
> > The fact is that specialists are profitable, in Samuel Johnson's 
> > words, "beyond the dreams of avarice." A forthcoming study by 
> > Precision Economics will reveal that publicly traded firms with 
> > specialist units last year enjoyed pre-tax profit margins ranging 
> > from 35% to 60%. Labranche, the largest NYSE specialist, 
generated 
> > more than a quarter of a billion dollars in revenues, almost 
> entirely 
> > from trading for its own account on the floor. Pretty profitable 
> for 
> > trading only when nobody else wants to! 
> > 
> > Since trading is a zero-sum game, these profits come at the 
direct 
> > expense of investors such as large institutions, which 
desperately 
> > want competitive alternatives to the NYSE but are reluctant to 
> > publicly complain about the fundamental unfairness of the NYSE 
> model. 
> > After all, institutions have to do business with the NYSE because 
> > there are no real competitive alternatives. 
> > 
> > The NYSE has perpetuated myths that mislead regulators and the 
> > investing public into believing that specialists serve the 
public. 
> > For instance, the NYSE asserts that investors need specialists 
> > because without them, "who is going to be there to buy or sell 
when 
> > nobody else wants to?" The NYSE claims that the specialist 
reduces 
> > market volatility by acting as the buyer or seller of last 
resort. 
> > 
> > Think about that: Envision SpecialistMan, emerging amongst the 
> bedlam 
> > of a fast falling stock with a giant "S" on his chest. Quickly 
> > calming the crowd, he exclaims "I will buy from every one of you 
> > because it is my duty, even though I will lose money." They sell 
> > their shares to SpecialistMan, praising him for his willingness 
to 
> > selflessly provide liquidity, regardless of the impact on his 
> > profits. 
> > 
> > While this notion is ridiculous on its face, it is still put 
> forward 
> > to defend the NYSE specialist when nearly every other major 
> > instrument is traded completely electronically without anyone 
being 
> > given an informational advantage. The truth is that when a stock 
> like 
> > Enron starts falling, just like everyone else, SpecialistMan gets 
> out 
> > of the way. 
> > 
> > We ought to ask ourselves why we even want a specialist to manage 
> the 
> > decline of a stock. In an efficient market, that is the last 
thing 
> we 
> > should want. The market should be permitted to clear -- move to 
its 
> > equilibrium point -- as quickly as possible, without somebody 
> trying 
> > to manage the process. A slowly declining stock only hurts buyers 
> at 
> > the expense of sellers, and vice versa. 
> > 
> > We need not worry about the specialist abusing his privileged 
> > position, we are assured, because the NYSE's cardinal principle 
is 
> > that the investor's interest is always served first. But it's 
easy 
> to 
> > get around this tenet. Even though there is no imbalance between 
> > supply and demand, the specialist simply trumps the price of 
> investor 
> > orders. If a specialist is holding investor orders to buy IBM for 
> > $10.00, he cannot buy at $10 until all investor orders at $10.00 
> are 
> > executed. But he can buy at $10.01. With his informational 
> advantage 
> > over everybody else concerning the likely direction of a stock's 
> > price, the specialist will outbid investors only at the most 
> > advantageous moments. 
> > 
> > Ironically, the specialist is rewarded for this exclusive 
> > opportunity. The NYSE calls this "price improvement" because the 
> > investor trading with the specialist receives a better price. The 
> > NYSE actually brags about the frequency of price improvement, 
which 
> > really represents how often the specialist uses his informational 
> > advantage (what most of us would otherwise call insider 
> information) 
> > to make a trading profit and disadvantage investors. 
> > 
> > These points should not be a revelation. Why would NYSE members 
pay 
> > approximately $2 million for the privilege of standing on an old, 
> > crowded floor all day unless they gained some sort of advantage? 
> > Membership has its privileges. But does the public benefit from a 
> > structure that grants privileges to a select few even though, 
> thanks 
> > to technology, we now have more efficient ways to trade 
securities? 
> > 
> > SEC rules ban floor brokers from trading for their own accounts. 
> > Specialists, however, are exempted from this prohibition because 
> they 
> > are assumed to be performing a public service, an assumption 
belied 
> > by the facts. So let's be clear. While the NYSE Board structure 
> needs 
> > to be fixed, and fixed promptly, we investors ought to focus most 
> of 
> > our attention on the profit center of the NYSE, its specialist 
> > system.
> >
>


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