Dear TSC and Security Subcommittee,

As part of S3P requirement, the CII Silver badge requires:
*        Level 2: CII Silver badge, plus:
-        All internal/external system communications shall be able to be 
encrypted.
-        All internal/external service calls shall have common role-based 
access control and authorization with CADI

If I understand correctly, CADI is an SDK/framework from AAF. And integration 
with CADI needs AAF SDK which is only available with java binding, is that 
correct?

As you know some ONAP projects are python based and it is a great 
challenge/burden for us to develop a python based CADI SDK. So this could be a 
risk need TSC/Security subcommittee's attention, especially in case that TSC 
makes it a mandatory requirement for Casablanca.

On the other hand, I am wondering what is the real intention with this security 
requirement. If the role-based access control is the key pursuit, then we 
should explore other alternatives.
Before diving into the specific alternatives, I would like touch a little bit 
the different requirements between a "Role" for end-user and "Role" for 
internal service entities.

*        A role for end-user could be dynamically maintained/assigned since the 
end-users are created/deleted/updated during run-time. In that case some UI is 
needed and I guess this is what AAF/CADI is doing, correct?

*        A role for service-entity is another story. The role for a 
service-entity should be designed at day 0 and configured during deployment 
time. And should be kept intact during the life cycle of the whole system (ONAP 
in this case). Hence there is no need to create/update/delete the role for a 
service-entity.

If my understanding/assumption is correct, I believe those services which does 
not expose API/UI to end-users should control the access based on the "role for 
service-entity" because their API consumers are service-entities, not end-users.
e.g. MultiCloud services's consumers are SO/VFC/APPC/etc. No end-user should 
access the MulitCloud APIs directly. Hence the access control based on the 
"role for service-entity" should be enough and will be provisioned during 
deployment.
In this case ISTIO's RBAC could be an alternative, which fullfil the 
requirement of RBAC, while offering following beneficts:
               1, leverage the ongoing effort with regarding to ISTIO for 
service mesh.
               2, Reuse the same infrastructure to fulfill requirement w.r.t. 
"All internal/external system communications shall be able to be encrypted"
3, OOM/Kubernetes based/managed, easy to configure/maintain.
               4, Projects are not impacted at all, no code change, no API 
change, etc. No SDK development/integration needed.


This is my 2 cents.  Please let me know if I got anything wrong/incomplete.

Thanks.


Best Regards,
Bin Yang,    Solution Readiness Team,    Wind River
Direct +86,10,84777126    Mobile +86,13811391682    Fax +86,10,64398189
Skype: yangbincs993


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