Martin Bartosch wrote:
Hi,
the (now fixed) recent problem with the signed role for a new certificate raises several interesting problem, at least for me.
In OpenCA standard configuration the CA certificate itself is issued with the following key usages:
digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, cRLSign, keyCertSign
However, I believe that CA certs should NOT be used for anything else than signing CRLs and certificates, and this would only require the CA cert to have the key usage bits
cRLSign, keyCertSign
These are also the only key usages that are allowed according to ISIS-MTT for CA certificates, and I believe that there will be environments that will want to adhere to this standard.
I think, if you setup an PKI mostly you have an policy for it, describing what the key should be used fore, and if you need an separate key for communication uses and so on by the ca... and setup the environment accordingly
This has several implications:
* OpenCA uses the CA certificate for signing the cert Role. (BTW: openca-sv does use the CA cert regardless of its key usage bits - and can create invalid signatures this way!)
so this is an bug
* Verification of this signature (correctly) fails as reported
by openca-sv verify) because of incorrect key usage bits in
the CA certificate if the ISIS-MTT conforming profile is used.
so this is correct
* The CA private key usage should IMHO be limited to the absolutely
necessary minimum, and this is cert signing and CRL signature only.
Using the CA key for creating PKCS#7 signatures violates this
principle and introduces not really necessary audit events
once we have implemented the private key counter.
right
* I am somewhat unsure if the signature on the Role is really necessary - what is the rationaly behind this anyway? The CA signed the cert, so it has expressed consent that this certificate (with the attached cert policy) is valid. A signed "Role" seems redundant to this policy to me.
thats right - the role is part of the certificate and as such signed, the approved requests including the assigned role are usaly also signed (dependent on workflows setuped) and therefore 'protected' till the real certificate gets issued
and that it should either be possible to switch it off or at least to specify a dedicated CA auxiliary certificate that is issued by the CA when setting up the system and then used to sign such stuff.
i think its an good idea anyway, since this could be used for exchanged setupdata - like exported rbacs and so on - too
dalini
------------------------------------------------------- SF.Net email is sponsored by Shop4tech.com-Lowest price on Blank Media 100pk Sonic DVD-R 4x for only $29 -100pk Sonic DVD+R for only $33 Save 50% off Retail on Ink & Toner - Free Shipping and Free Gift. http://www.shop4tech.com/z/Inkjet_Cartridges/9_108_r285 _______________________________________________ OpenCA-Devel mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/openca-devel
