Martin Bartosch wrote:
but thats what i mean in seperating the 'change' from the object and its state itself:admin 1 requests operation X on object A -> results in an entry in edit state
Now as long as the request is neither approved nor revoked it is not possible (it SHOULD not be possible) to add a new (conflicting) change request for the same object. That would mean two active change requests whose implications on the object might be contradictory.
object enters state edit (through whatever action ever, in our case the first operator starting the decission process) this is consitent for the object - it enters state edit - like new, approved, rejeceted, and so on and stays there till something happens that enables it to leave this state
I see here one point that seems not to be recognized by martin and dalini - Martin, of courese the object is pending either if no one or to less operators have signed BUT there is a difference !
As long as the request was not touched by anyone the first operator may "fix" the data in the request, e.g. Typos in the Name or wrong/missing data that is completed when the user comes to the RA Officer.
As soon as the first operator has apprived the request, no one is allowed to touch the data as it will break the approval of the preceeding operators - so I see the need for two states
"pending_and_not_reviewed" and "pending_and_currently_processing"
but this still doesn't solves my other question:
which signature does the object get afterwards the decission is made?
when it is approved - since it won't be an operator signatur or when, which one of them? - would there then be an abritrary 'ra-key' which signs the approved request?
huhu - as the RA-System is a online system and a potential target for a security relevant break in, I would feel much better if ALL approval-signaures are appended and checked again by the CA - that is waht we are doing at the moment - otherwise I see a problem when someone breaks in the system and can sign penindg requests with an "ra-key" as I see no chance to really protect such a key...
regards
Oliver
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