On Friday 14 December 2001 22:35, you wrote: > Actually, it is more likely that you (the defendent) will delete the > records that are unfavorable to your case. What I have shown is that you > will be able to get away with it.
It would be an inadvisable action. It is unlikely that destroying a contemporaneous record will leave you in a more favourable position than protecting it. And experience in the UK suggests it is already hard - even in a system without an actual audit trail - to substitute an alternative record, whcih i really the only plausible action. One of my colleagues in our consulting group demonstrated the presence of a very famous coverup. > > Ordinary system administration has the responsibility for dealing with > > this threat. > Sure. If we feel comfortable trusting them with this responsibility, > then why are we not willing to trust them with preventing other > types of record tampering???? Andrew, it isn't a question of us trusting them, because we (in UK general practice anyway) _are_ the systems administration, or in larger practices, we are the employers of the sysadmins... We also tend to be in the buildings longer than anyone else, and anyone who prowls the 'Net will know that a number of us cannot expect to be believed if we say that we don't know how the records are protected from tampering or that knowing we could not defeat it. I can't, of course, nor have I tried, nor would I consider it, but that isn't the problem, the problem is demonstrating it and for that separation is needed. The actual protection against external threats is something everyone in my organisation is united in, and nobody expects us not to hold our boundary. THis oddly focussed thread has reached the point where a closely argued position paper with references would be a useful way of putting the point, since I am not clear what the argument is against Gnotary being a highly useful service and system. -- From one of the Linux desktops of Dr Adrian Midgley http://www.swis.net/midgley/
