Hello! > -----Original Message----- > Subject: Re: [opensc-devel] --insecure ? > > Il 28/04/2011 09:05, Toni Sjoblom - Aventra ha scritto: > > > I agree. Also a very common scenario is to have 3 PINs, one for normal use, > > one for signatures (PIN is reset after every use, so user need to enter PIN > > explicitly for every signature) and one for administration. > How can you tell that a PIN is actually a "signature PIN" that must not > be cached? Really enorcing "re-enter PIN" policy could be done only if > keyboard was on card (seen some prototypes online, w/ a display, too... > but never seen 'em in shops :( ), but making card "forget" it + > "hinting" driver not to cache it could often work well enough.
Don't know how this could be done for OpenSC, since it caches PIN codes. Sometimes this is an issue, because e.g. if you are signing something (legally binding stuff), the signature should explicitly be done by the person, requiring the user to enter the PIN for each signature. After successful PIN verification smart cards usually keep PIN as verified until it is reset, but in some cases this is not desired. When using MyEID cards, the private key and or PIN can be set up on the card so, that the specified PIN is immediately reset after usage. This is something called "User Consent", and is a common standardized feature. MyEID supports this but I dont know if OpenSC does. The OpenSC PIN cache should take this into account when caching PINs and somehow it should be possible to create PINs or keys that have this flag set. Br, Toni > BYtE, > Diego. _______________________________________________ opensc-devel mailing list opensc-devel@lists.opensc-project.org http://www.opensc-project.org/mailman/listinfo/opensc-devel
