On 26/04/2011 15:19, Alon Bar-Lev wrote: > Just wanted to note that exposing such device to IP stack makes it a > target to hack, That's why I'm quite reluctant to enable Ethernet port on such a dongle.
> packaging is much more difficult. I don't want to compete with $20k HSM. They use dedicated HW for good reasons. I only want something I can plug in my servers at work to be sure that no *remote* intruder can compromise my keys and make me revoke all certs (can be quite costy!). > Also, that in crypto caching is not a problem as 99.999999% of time > the content of the crypto device is constant. Unless you keep some state vars on the device (ugly). But when it changes (new key/cert added, PIN changed, etc), that change must be propagated atomically to all clients. > About using USB directly, well, I disagree... I see this much like GPS > device, with a simple optional multiplexer for applications (local and > remote). When you use libusb, you claim() a device to get exclusive access. Then you handle it as you like. Usually a daemon claims the device and listens for socket/pipe connections actually multiplexing access and abstracting low-level protocol. > Implementation of hardware independent stream protocol will allow > using crypto in many scenarios (serial, USB, unix sockets, tcp, ssh) > with the PKCS#11 forwarding features built-in. You need "something" to forward it (unless I missed an SSH option "forward this serial port"), be it serial, USB or socket. And once you have a running daemon (pcscd, maybe?) that accepts socket/pipe connections from localhost, you're OK. BYtE, Diego. _______________________________________________ opensc-devel mailing list opensc-devel@lists.opensc-project.org http://www.opensc-project.org/mailman/listinfo/opensc-devel
