That is correct but in my case I am getting the cert in PEM, and it is
created by another application we develop so it should be an exact
duplicate if it is actually the same one.

On 1/26/06, Lev Walkin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Joe Gluck wrote:
> > That attack is interesting, how can that be done, (sorry for bothering you 
> > :-) )
> >
> > But cutting down the X509_cmp will not work because the memcmp
> > compares the hash which if I will cut out the X509_check_purpose lines
> > will not make any sense.
> >
> > But I think the best idea is to compare the entire text of the entire
> > certificate (The text as I get in a PEM format before loading it into
> > the X509 object. it is faster than hashing the same size and comparing
> > the hash.
>
> You should then consider comparing DER encoding, not the PEM wrapper
> around the DER certificate contents.
>
> PEM encoding of the same certificate can be different, due to relaxed
> rules about whitespace characters.
>
> > Thanks
> >
> > On 1/26/06, Dr. Stephen Henson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >> On Thu, Jan 26, 2006, Joe Gluck wrote:
> >>
> >>> Thank you.
> >>> I still am not sure if it the best idea,
> >>>
> >>> Because i will be getting for example 1,000,000 a times in a day the
> >>> same certificate, I don't want to do that even short process if not
> >>> necessary, what I could do is compare the times between X509_cmp() and
> >>> my code, or even to doing memcmp() on the original text of the X509.
> >>>
> >>> So I would like to know if any one thinks there is a problem with how
> >>> i am doing it, or if it will be slower then using some other way to do
> >>> it?
> >>>
> >> Your algorithm ends up accessing X509 structure internals which isn't a 
> >> good
> >> idea if it can be avoided. It also doesn't compare the whole public key: 
> >> you'd
> >> also need to compare the algorithm type and its parameters (if any). There 
> >> are
> >> sound reasons as to why you should also check parameters. If you don't 
> >> there
> >> are some interesting key substitution attacks that could spoil your whole 
> >> day...
> >>
> >> If structure internal access is considered acceptable you can cut the whole
> >> thing down to the memcmp() of X509_cmp().
> >>
> >> Steve.
> >> --
> >> Dr Stephen N. Henson. Email, S/MIME and PGP keys: see homepage
> >> OpenSSL project core developer and freelance consultant.
> >> Funding needed! Details on homepage.
> >> Homepage: http://www.drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk
> >> ______________________________________________________________________
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