> 1. Where's the security analysis? Does https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/633 apply?
If question is if referred paper applies literally in this case, then answer is no, algorithm is different. If question is if spirit of the paper applies, then answer is that there is no reason to believe that it was impossible to mount similar attack. Fortunately the code is not released yet. > 2. When will RT2574 be integrated to protect our ECC keys in the > inevitable presence of software defects like this? > http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2574&user=guest&pass=guest It will be looked into. [It has been "starred" in my mailbox.] Problem of course is that it takes an effort to understand and evaluate. But it keeps falling to low priority, because it protects against something one doesn't believe exists. In sense that no programmer believes that there are bugs, because of their, programmers' human nature. This is not to "devaluate" the suggestion, on the contrary, it's great, thanks, just an apology for why it's taking so long. Thanks again, for report and reminder. ______________________________________________________________________ OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org Development Mailing List openssl-dev@openssl.org Automated List Manager majord...@openssl.org
