The reason for keeping the old crypto. algorithms around is the obvious one, that's been stated over and over. OpenSSL's SSL isn't the only consumer of the algorithms, remove the low level algorithms and you risk breaking more than OpenSSL. SSH, IKE,IPSec, Kerberos and I'm sure there are more, and the scripting languages like Perl that use OpenSSL to provide algorithm support.
There are a lot of ecosystems built on top of OpenSSL's crypto, it's not just SSL, and for someone like a distro. maintainer it's between a rock and a hard place, stick with the old code and patch the security vulnerabilities, or break stuff. Which is why them being still available in the old code isn't a good enough answer to the problems this would create. And in this case 'breaking stuff' is unecessary. Do what you like with TLS in terms of pruning algorithms in use, but removing the algorithms is a lot like burning books in a library for being irrelevant. They may be irrelevant to you, but they aren't necessarilly irrelevant to everyone. Peter From: Richard Moore <richmoor...@gmail.com> To: openssl-dev@openssl.org Cc: openssl-us...@openssl.org Date: 17/11/2015 06:29 Subject: Re: [openssl-dev] Removing obsolete crypto from OpenSSL 1.1 - seeking feedback Sent by: "openssl-dev" <openssl-dev-boun...@openssl.org> On 16 November 2015 at 19:05, Hubert Kario <hka...@redhat.com> wrote: Example: CAdES V1.2.2 was published in late 2000, the first serious attacks on MD2 were not published until 2004. I think it is not unreasonable for CAdES-A documents to exist today which were originally signed with MD2 while it was still considered secure and that are still relevant today, just 15 years later. This doesn't explain why the code needs to exist in future versions of openssl. The previous ones aren't going to vanish and can be compiled and used to rescue data in theoretical edge cases like this. You're making it sound like this is making the data totally inaccessible which is not the case. Cheers Rich. _______________________________________________ openssl-dev mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-dev
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