> On Mar 31, 2021, at 2:01 PM, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL <u...@ll.mit.edu>
> wrote:
>
> For a Web GUI with the user at the console (e.g., a Web browser), it might be
> OK.
>
> For my needs (devices talking to each other over austere links), sending the
> root CA very is both useless and wasteful. One you factor in the sizes of
> Post-Quantum keys and signatures - you’ll start disliking this idea even
> more.
There's no urgency in post-quantum keys for CA signatures in TLS. Their
future weakness does not compromise today's traffic. Until actual scalable
QCs start cracking RSA and ECDSA in near real-time only the ephemeral key
agreement algorithm needs to be PQ-resistant now to future-proof session
confidentiality.
So certificates can continue to use RSA and ECDSA for quite some time.
--
Viktor.
